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# West Europe Report

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22 February 1984

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## KOMISSAROV LETTER SHOWS SOVIET DESIRE FOR NORDIC 'ZONE'

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 17 Jan 84 p 2

[Editorial by Rafael Paro: "Komissarov on the Zone"]

[Text] The constructive element in Juri Komissarov's latest article is the Soviet interest in the Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone, which he once more holds out, writes Rafael Paro.

The pseudonymous Soviet Juri Komissarov warns that underestimation of the danger of Euromissiles can lead to serious political mistakes. In general we in Finland need not feel especially moved by that remark. Previously almost more than in any other country we understood the risks which the increasing arming of the 1970's in Europe means. President Kekkonen's speech in Stockholm in May 1978 was an especially important statement of position within which the threat picture could be discerned. In that connection the thought of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries stood out in a growing Nordic public opinion as all the more urgent.

The qualitative arming with medium-range nuclear missiles, which was decided on in both the East and the West in the 1970's, confronted most allied countries with difficult decisions. By declaring themselves ready to receive the United States Pershing II and cruise missiles, Belgium, England, Holland, Italy and West Germany made a vain attempt--as it has now proved to be--to prevent the leading continental power, the Soviet Union, from deploying its modern SS-20 missiles.

After the breakdown of the INF negotiations in Geneva in December, the prospects of averting the threat which the new weapons pose are smaller than ever. But one should not, however, be so pessimistic as not to see certain possibilities for negotiations, although on an entirely different basis than that offered by the INF negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Juri Komissarov has deep insights into Nordic security problems and consequently deals from the Soviet viewpoint with the threat which the cruise

missiles pose in that part of Europe. But the cruise missiles are also a threat to Central and South Europe. It is not only Nordic airspace which is at risk of being a passage for these slow, low-flying missiles of a nuclear war breaks out.

The Soviet writer does not touch on the question of how the military-political situation in the rest of the world would look in that moment when the Soviet Union discovers that hundreds, perhaps thousands of American cruise missiles have been launched at Soviet targets. One can assume that he considers it an axiom that Soviet intercontinental missiles will not remain in their silos. In that hour of destruction the questions of defense models and neutrality protection are going to have very little relevance in the largest part of the northern hemisphere.

In the deepest sense, the constructive element in Juri Komissarov's article is the Soviet interest in the Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone, which he once more holds forth. His text stands out as an indirect reminder that the Nordic countries with their peacetime nuclear weapon-free status is one of the areas from which new disarmament efforts on a regional basis should take place.

We are not escaping the new weapons in the arsenals of the great powers. They have increased suspicion and uncertainty, not only in the camps of the opponents, but also in the military alliances and among the neutral states.

One of the few ways out remaining is to create nuclear weapon-free zones. It is high time that Europe experiences a breakthrough of that kind. The Nordic countries offer many ready elements for a zone arrangement.

9287

CSO: 3650/104

## LEFTIST PAPER, SOVIETS ATTACKED FOR STORY ON NUCLEAR ARMS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 11 Jan 84 p 20

[Editorial: "Now It's Bombers"]

[Text] One point in the debates about the security of Iceland is repeated again and again and has in recent years come about in a similar manner. Reporters for the state mass media get news about American reports, private and official reports; then they report on that on the radio or the television; then they interview Icelandic officials to have them make categorical statements about the contents of the reports; then the People's Alliance brings this matter up in the Althing if it is in session, otherwise THJODVILJINN [PA party organ] does it, and the Communists always say that no credibility should be placed in what the Icelandic officials say, but on the other hand that everything that comes from the Americans is correct. In 1980, nuclear weapons deployed at Keflavik Air Base were discussed based on these arguments; in November 1983 it was stated that cruise missiles were about to be deployed in Iceland, and last Friday it was pointed out in the television program Kastljós that during a hearing conducted by a U.S. congressional committee, a U.S. naval captain had, among other things, used the argumentation for the participation of the United States in the construction of the oil tanks in Helguvík that U.S. B-52 bombers could get fuel from there and these bombers would be used for nuclear attacks. On account of what came forth in the U.S. documents used by the reporter in Kastljós, THJODVILJINN said yesterday, of course, that they show "in black and white that Iceland has become an important link in the nuclear arsenal of the United States."

In three instances which have been mentioned here, in 1980, 1983 and last week, Icelandic officials and politicians have categorically denied, firstly, that any nuclear weapons are deployed in Iceland; secondly, that cruise missiles will be deployed here, and thirdly, that B-52 bombers will have use of the Keflavik Air Base. As was mentioned before, statements issued by Icelandic parties are given no credibility by those who want to make the defense cooperation between Iceland and the United States as suspicious as possible. In those efforts the People's Alliance and the propagandists of the Soviet government, whether they are in the Soviet Embassy in Reykjavik or not, are stable allies. In 1980, the

harmony was frightening between what Svavar Gestsson and Olafur Ragnar Grimsson said in the parliament and what was written in Soviet papers hinting that it would be possible to justify a Soviet nuclear attack on Iceland on the basis of misrepresentation by the People's Alliance. On account of the cruise missiles, Svavar Gestsson and the director of the Soviet Embassy Propaganda Office in Reykjavik, APN-Novosti, have become bosom buddies and agree that no credibility should be placed in what Foreign Minister Gier Hallgrimsson says about the matter. The same will most likely happen with regard to the bombers.

These repetitions are unavoidable ghosts that hover over the defense cooperation between Iceland and the United States and this ghost will be hard to get rid of, especially since the Americans are the most active in reviving it. It is amazing how eager private parties and public officials in Washington are to give information not based on facts and literally wrong information about the nature of the Keflavik defense base and other facts regarding the base. It would be a direct violation of the defense agreement between Iceland and the United States if arms that could be used for attacks on the Soviet Union were to be deployed there. A naval captain who gives witness to a U.S. congressional committee about projects for the Defense Force should know that. Governments in the NATO countries on both sides of the Atlantic are still combating the ghosts that were revived after Ronald Reagan and his men came to power in Washington and started issuing careless statements about "limited nuclear war" and "victory in a nuclear war," to mention only two reprehensible points.

U.S. authorities must make sure that their officials know and understand the position of Icelanders on basic points in the defense cooperation. Reporters from the state mass media must not repeatedly fall into the trap of making a mountain out of a molehill when the security of Iceland is mentioned in U.S. documents. And the People's Alliance should have the grace to stop giving the Soviets reason to threaten the Icelandic nation with nuclear attack.

9583

CSO: 3626/18

## PAPER COMMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL DEBATE IN ALTHING

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 18 Dec 83 p 22

[Editorial: "'Njet' to Negotiations"]

[Excerpts] The debates about a nuclear arms freeze in the Althing during the past days have in fact evolved around minor points in light of East-West relations at the moment. The outcome of the vote in the UN General Assembly on the proposal introduced by Sweden and Mexico for a nuclear arms freeze is immaterial to the development of arms buildup and war and peace in the world. The proposal becomes a political issue in this country and elsewhere because politicians see the opportunity to launch disputes on the homefront about an idea that is not favored by the governments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

The foreign ministers of the Atlantic Alliance met recently and issued a statement that is a much more significant contribution to peace in the world than the proposal introduced by Sweden and Mexico about a nuclear arms freeze. No debates have, however, taken place on this statement in the Icelandic Althing as it does not fit in with the ideas of those who think that everything that goes astray in the world is to be blamed on the democratic states.

The NATO ministers said further: "We offer to work with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries toward creating realistic conditions for long-term relations that are based on equality, moderation and reciprocity. To the benefit of the whole human race, we encourage open and multilateral discussions, along with cooperation for mutual interests."

It can be seen from these words that the governments of the member states of the Atlantic Alliance categorically want matters to be conducted so that the superpowers and the East-West alliance states talk together. But is that same desire noticeable among the leaders of the Soviet Union and their satellites? No, on the contrary. In recent days and weeks the Soviets have stopped participating in three talks of four that are mentioned in the statement issued by the NATO ministers and mentioned above.

The Soviet representatives slammed the doors behind them when they walked out of the INF-talks on the reduction of Euromissiles. When they refused to continue to discuss ways to reduce the number of long-range nuclear missiles, they indicated that most likely they would not return to the START-talks, moreover, on Thursday the Soviets and their cohorts refused to decide on a new date for the MBFR-talks on a reduction in the conventional forces in Central Europe that have been going on for a decade. In three instances the Soviets have in fact said "njet" to negotiations about disarmament affairs.

It is impossible to figure out what the Soviets have in mind. They use it as a reason that the deployment of the U.S. Pershing II-missiles and cruise missiles in West Germany, Italy and Britain is already under way. This is only an excuse. For 4 years the Kremlin has known that these missiles would appear if they did not show a conciliatory intent at the INF-talks in Geneva. The cold Soviet shoulders exposed to the Americans and others from the Western states in the disarmament talks can perhaps be traced back to the lack of leadership in the Soviet Union. Party Leader and Premier Yuriy Andropov has not been seen publicly in 4 months. He is sick and elderly. There is a great power struggle taking place within the Kremlin walls. Most likely the people there are not capable of handling anything but internal disputes.

Under these circumstances it is absurd that Icelandic parliamentarians act as if the Icelandic government or governments in other NATO countries are impeding any talks about disarmament and peace in the international arena or between the superpowers. The parliamentarians should join forces in order to get the Soviets to change their policy and go back to the negotiating table on reduction of nuclear arms and conventional arms.

As can be seen from the above, much greater and more important events are taking place in the international arena than those connected with the proposal introduced by Mexico and Sweden on a nuclear arms freeze. These events seem, however, to have bypassed the most intense spokesmen for the government opposition for disarmament affairs in the Icelandic Althing.

9583

CSO: 3626/18

## FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES STOCKHOLM TALKS

Beykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 19 Jan 84 p 1

[Article: "Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson in an Interview with MORGUNBLADID Last Night: I Think Talks Between the Superpowers Are Near"]

[Text] "Schultz was more conciliatory; there is no doubt that he was more open to ideas and talks but Gromyko was tough. He gave an old fashioned speech in which he quoted Lenin's foreign policy. There is always the possibility that he felt that he had to be tough before he sat down at the negotiating table with Schultz and in that case it is questionable whether his words were meant to be taken seriously and whether there will be a delay before the United States and the Soviet Union resume talks about disarmament. I believe, however, that there is such pressure on both superpowers, and the Soviet Union in particular, that talks will start between them before long," said Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson in an interview with MORGUNBLADID last evening. Hallgrimsson is attending the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm which he chaired yesterday.

Hallgrimsson talked about the speeches given by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet Union and U.S. Secretary of State Schultz and their meeting yesterday which lasted for 5 hours. Hallgrimsson said that Gromyko's speech had been both extremely harsh and unreasonable "but I think that people will take such a speech with calculated calmness," said Hallgrimsson.

The NATO foreign ministers met at the French Embassy Monday evening. "It was decided there to submit a joint proposal at the secondary conference. The proposal contains ideas that would promote mutual and increased trust in Europe, such as exchange of information, among other things, about troop movements and any kinds of military maneuvers. These ideas would also promote ways to avoid misunderstanding, untimely solutions and surprise attacks, to name a few," said Foreign Minister Hallgrimsson. Moreover, he said the role of the conference had been discussed at length as well as the importance of resuming East-West talks about bilateral disarmament.

## BRANDT REPLIES TO PSI CHARGES OF SPD 'PACIFISM'

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Jan 84 pp 109, 111

[Interview with Willy Brandt]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Brandt, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), clearly on a Reagan course, charges that the German Social Democrats have betrayed the principles of socialism in security policy.

Brandt: I cannot take that quite seriously. If a party with 950,000 members, which now has again received a 40-percent share of the vote in its country, receives the approval of 96.5 of its delegates for the present party line, they cannot all be crazy.

Rather they are people who in accordance with their conviction, their assessment of the world situation and the policies of the Western and the Eastern leading power, go ahead and say: Not this way!

SPIEGEL: The PSI draws attention to the fact that it is not the only socialist party in Europe which cannot take a liking to the new course of the SPD.

Brandt: One flurry of excitement or other that may have occurred between the SPD and the PSI, in my opinion, does not justify such a judgment.

I can see that clearly when I look at the relationship between the SPD and the French Socialists. The two appear to be far apart. For some months, however, experts of the SPD and the French Socialists have been meeting monthly to engage in intensive talks about a more independent European security policy, a security policy which does not say goodbye to the Americans but...

SPIEGEL: ...but does not want to be all that independent from the United States?

Brandt: Yes. The emotional outbreaks which you have noted on the Italian side make it necessary to talk with one another more frequently and in a better way. And if that does not help, I say without arrogance, as do other parties which base their relationships on the voting public and find their

echo there: We like to listen to advice, but the SPD determines its own policy!

SPIEGEL: The PSI thinks the SPD's new positions on security policy are dangerous and wrong, among other things because while the West followed a course of detente the East armed to the teeth. The PSI therefore supports the stationing of U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe and rejects any kind of pacifism. What do you think is the reason for this profound difference of opinion between the Italian Socialists and the German Social Democrats?

Brandt: I have to go back a little way. Late in 1981 we had a precursor of what appears to be developing at the moment when some of our friends in Latin countries thought the SPD was cowardly in the Polish question. When there were meetings, however, and there was an opportunity to talk, it turned out there had in fact been difficulties in communication.

In what concerns Poland--but not only there--the SPD bases its position on its experience. It has a method of its own. I think it is better for it to exercise its influence where it is possible actually to effect changes, and sometimes forgo the rhetoric preferred by a number of others.

SPIEGEL: Are the difficulties in communication affected by the fact that the Socialists in France, Italy and Spain have become the parties in power, whereas the SPD is now an opposition party?

Brandt: The Social Democrats of the Nordic countries, who used to dominate the consciousness of the Latins, are having a little more trouble at the moment, and this in fact contributes to difficulties in communication. I think it has been a long time since we last conducted a thorough analysis of the East-West situation among the Social Democratic and Socialist parties--in other words, also within the Socialist International. We have to make up for that.

SPIEGEL: The Italian and French Socialists equally deplore the fact that the policy of detente has foundered....

Brandt: What is true is that it actually started to founder when the powers involved continued to arm while negotiating about new political relations of greater cooperation.

This could have improved only if--as Brezhnev and I once envisioned in 1971--practical cooperation had been coupled with military detente. The responsibility for the fact that nothing came of this does not lie with just one party: the Soviet Union certainly bears joint responsibility.

SPIEGEL: So where do you see positive results?

Brandt: In the view of one who was mayor of Berlin in the fifties and then foreign minister and chancellor, the policy of detente, which is being subjected to sarcastic comment here and there, has yielded quite a lot. For example, Berlin is no longer so isolated that one cannot take a trip there without any obstacles being put in one's way.

Further, people by the millions can visit each other in the divided Germany, and thousands who did not want to live in Poland or the Soviet Union any longer have returned from there. For Germans this has a special significance. Others are apt to forget that. Economically too, despite all the present liabilities, we now have a situation where we have much closer relations with each other than 15 years ago.

SPIEGEL: About pacifism too there are basic differences of opinion between the PSI, a party in power, and the SPD, a party in opposition.

Brandt: The SPD is not a pacifist party, though I hope pacifists in our ranks will continue to be respected. What is called peace movement in Germany is translated wrong into both Italian and French if it is indiscriminately portrayed as a pacifist movement.

It also would be a good thing to take note of the fact that the German defense contribution to the Western community did not decrease while the Social Democrats were in power. I don't want to brag, but under Social Democratic chancellors and defense ministers the Federal Republic, like few other countries, complied fully with the decisions of the alliance. Experts will confirm the fact that the Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces] is not any weaker than it was 15 years ago.

SPIEGEL: In the opinion of the Italian Socialists, the SPD's new course in security policy is even tearing apart the Socialist International. Carlo Ripa di Meana, Socialist deputy for Europe, even hinted that the PSI did not rule out quitting the Socialist International because it was infiltrated by communists. What do you say to that?

Brandt: I think a number of years ago I read an article by that deputy which might have been published in Mr Strauss' BAYERNKURIER. What Mr Ripa di Meana then recently put on the European market jibes with a non-paper [Brandt uses the English word] from the circle of Mrs Kirkpatrick--I don't say the CIA--directed to various addresses in Europe and elsewhere. Social Democrats reading that and making it their own do not lend the paper credibility by doing so.

Incidentally, I received so many letters and wires by Italian Socialists after Mr Ripa di Meana's remark that I have to conclude that his opinion is not typical of the PSI.

SPIEGEL: The Italian Socialists criticize the fact that the socialists of southern Europe are not being heard sufficiently in the Socialist International in view of the predominance of the "Scandilux" group--in other words, the Social Democrats in Norway, Denmark and the Benelux countries.

Brandt: That is quite a different problem. It will now have to be pondered seriously. For some time the "Scandilux" group has wanted to host talks about security questions, inviting to them the SPD, the Labor Party and the French Socialist Party. The SPD played a particularly strong role in this.

You know there have also been such regional gatherings among the parties in southern Europe. I can see, though, why those who are now in power have the feeling that they are not playing a sufficient part in what the others are doing. That is nothing dramatic; it can easily be put right.

SPIEGEL: Since they assumed power, the Italian Socialists more than ever have charged the SPD with flirting with the Italian Communists. One can even hear in the PSI that it no longer pays the PSI to be a "sister party" of the SPD. Do you consider it possible that the PSI is dramatizing differences of opinion in the Socialist International in order to build itself up, even at the cost of the SPD, since it is the smallest Socialist party in power?

Brandt: No, I don't think so at all. My contacts with Bettino Craxi fail to support this thesis. As for the question of the Communists, let me say only this:

We know exactly who belongs in the Socialist International and who doesn't. Further, not least through the Italian Socialists, we have learned that the CPI [Italian Communist Party] is an influential and interesting party. But there is no danger of the line being blurred somewhat in this case.

SPIEGEL: No mistakes on the SPD's part?

Brandt: I cannot rule out the possibility of some clumsy things, which I would regret, having happened on the German side. However, let me just remind you that my first real talk with Enrico Berlinguer took place at the invitation of Bettino Craxi and on Italian soil--in Rome in 1976. So it cannot be all that bad.

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CSO: 3620/144

## POLL ON SUPPORT FOR AUSTRIAN LIBERAL PARTY

Vienna PROFIL in German 19 Dec 83 pp 18-20

[Article: "Will the FPÖ survive the Year 1984?"]

[Text] Judging from the latest poll conducted for PROFIL by the Salzburg Institute for Basic Research [Institut fuer Grundlagenforschung--IFG], there are only two possibilities left for the Austrian Liberal Party (FPÖ): either it will be atomized, or it will survive all heavy barrages during the next few years of the coalition. [Results of the poll are based on 1,500 interviews which were conducted between 24 November and 8 December 1983.]

From the demoscopic aspect, the mood in Austria is one of civil war. On the one side of the trenches are the somewhat intimidated socialist and liberal partisans of the coalition government; facing them are the Volkspartei [People's Party, VPÖ] voters, presenting what for them is an unusual image: aggressive, spoiling for a fight and having nothing but contempt for the Red-Blue coalition.

"Compared with them," says IFG chief Dr Gernot Zieser with some surprise, "even VGO and ALÖ adherents, who are normally much more inclined to criticism, are being kind to the government."

And this threatening opposition tornado is blowing particularly hard at the Blue team of ministers. While Vice Chancellor Norbert Steger is being hadmouthed by only one out of five SPÖ voters, two out of three VPÖ adherents are mad at the leader of the Blue group. Minister of Justice Harald Ofner is not much better off; he infuriates one-half of all fans of Mock's. Friedhelm Frischenschlager, responsible for matters concerning defense, is the only one who appears to be able to stay out of the field of fire.

Considering all the other difficulties, it is perhaps less troublesome that among his own partisans, Norbert Steger now has a serious competitor in the popularity contest: the SPÖ's Federal Chancellor Fred Sinowatz, who is held in high or very high esteem by about one-half of all Blue voters (53 percent, to be exact). FPÖ voters aren't much more friendly toward

their own party chief--59 percent. It is true however, that only 6 percent of FPÖ voters are really mad at the vice chancellor, who is given to loose talk.

However, the "total war" between ÖVP and FPÖ didn't just come out of the blue. Since the beginning of the year, when Steger, in high holiday spirits, first leaked the impending Red-Blue romance in a press interview, every third FPÖ voter has turned into a "black enemy." But this "organizational cleanup" has some benefit for the FPÖ leadership also, because among today's voters there is practically no one who would welcome a coalition with the ÖVP.

While in the IFG poll's coalition question just before the National Council election last March 25 Percent of FPÖ voters had been in favor of a Black-Blue coalition, this has dropped to a mere 3 percent now.

By contrast, the number of advocates of an SPÖ-FPÖ coalition among Blue voters has increased considerably: the former 21 percent group which had indicated that a Red-Blue flirt would be their preferred form of government has grown to 39 percent. The ÖVP might be tolerated in a concentration government to share power and benefits. Thirty-eight percent of FPÖ voters expressed preference for such a constellation.

Not only Liberal Party members and a few provincial governors appear to be intrigued with such a concentration government, but an increasing number of all Austrians. Preference of a "three-party-regiment" has overtaken the formerly most popular Grand Coalition by 26 percent, which is now favored by only 22 percent of the population.

It is due only to the socialist voters, of whom now one out of every three prefers the current setup, that the SPÖ-FPÖ coalition ranks third with 18 percent. Nine months ago it was only 4 percent.

However, among partisans of the FPÖ the Red-Blue liaison finds sharp rejection: only 2 percent are in favor of the present division of power. But here too there is evidence of a certain process of rethinking: one out of every four "Black" voters now hopes for ministerial slots for ÖVP members by way of a concentration government rather than in the Grand Coalition.

While the governing coalition feels that after a "hot summer" things appear to be calming down, the FPÖ is looking forward to the possibility of intra-party turbulence this winter. Sixty-six percent of all Austrians can't make head or tails out of the ideological discussion started by Vice Chancellor Steger--up with the liberals, out with the nationalists--and even one out of every three FPÖ voters doesn't know what to do about it. Among the rest, the feeling is unequivocal: 58 percent are in favor of a more or less evenly divided emphasis on the nationalist and the liberal line; 7 percent want more liberalism, 3 percent more nationalism put into the FPÖ Blue.

In a breakdown by the IFG Institute showing which social strata of the population are interested in the FPÖ's ideological ideas, the competition with the ÖVP for the favor of certain groups becomes evident. Nationalist and liberal accents in politics are desired primarily by well-educated self-employed people, professionals, employees and officials, but also skilled workers. However, the broad, SPÖ-dominated worker strata could hardly care less about the FPÖ's ideological discussion.



These entanglements between ÖVP and FPÖ voters, which could turn into the central question of survival for the coalition, may also be the reason for a number of nasty attacks against Vienna on the part of some Liberal Party "provincial emperors."


The reason for this is that while the FPÖ at the federal level has almost uninterruptedly had the support of the hard core of its unswerving devotees and therefore suffers relatively light losses even during times of great turbulence, most provincial party organizations risk considerably greater losses.

A long-term comparative study undertaken by the IFG on behalf of PROFIL shows that 10 percent of all Austrian can be counted as belonging to the hard core of the liberal voter potential. When the FPÖ is having hard times--as at present--it hovers around the 4 percent mark; when things improve it jumps to 6-7 percent; and at the best of times, as in the days before Norbert Steger became vice chancellor but was an oratorically powerful "explainer," even 10 percent of the votes are not a pipe dream. True, on election days the FPÖ had precious little benefit from such demoscopic excursions into the stratosphere and had to content itself with a modest 5-6 percent.

After this 10 percent which is (theoretically) attainable in the short term, an additional 10 percent of the Austrian population are latently potential FPÖ voters. In contrast to National Council elections, the FPÖ can tap this potential in regional elections, attaining a share of the votes which is occasionally double or triple the party's share in federal elections.

Charts "A" (Frischenschlager), "B" (Steger) and "C" (Ofner)





Key:

1. FPOe voters
2. Potential FPOe Voters
3. SPOe Voters
4. OeVP Voters

Chart "D": What Type of Government Composition Do You Prefer?

Welche Regierungszusammensetzung ist Ihnen am liebsten? D.									
	Gesamt 1.		SP-Wähler 2.		VP-Wähler 3.		FP-Wähler 4.		FP-5 Hoffnungswähler
	Dez. 83 6.	März 83 7.	Dez. 83 6.	März 83 7.	Dez. 83 6.	März 83 7.	Dez. 83 6.	März 83 7.	
Konzentrationsregierung									
SP/VP/FP 8.	26%	20%	19%	15%	25%	18%	38%	29%	40%
Große Koalition									
SP/VP 9.	22%	27%	11%	20%	35%	42%	6%	6%	14%
10. Koalition SP/FP	18%	4%	31%	5%	2%	1%	39%	21%	32%
SP-Alleinregierung 11.	17%	27%	36%	57%	+	+	1%	8%	6%
VP-Alleinregierung 12.	8%	11%	+	1%	27%	28%	2%	7%	2%
13. Koalition VP/FP	4%	6%	+	+	8%	8%	3%	25%	4%
14. Keine Meinung	5%	5%	2%	2%	3%	3%	11%	4%	3%
+ = unter 1% 15.									

[Key on next page]

Key:

1. Total
2. SPOe Voters
3. OeVP Voters
4. FPÖe Voters
5. Potential FPÖe Voters
6. Dec '83
7. March '83
8. Concentration Government: SPOe/OeVP/FPÖe
9. Grand Coalition: SPOe/OeVP
10. Coalition: SPOe/FPÖe
11. SPOe One-Party Government
12. OeVP One-Party Government
13. Coalition: OeVP/FPÖe
14. No Opinion
15. Less than 1 percent


Chart "E": In your opinion, what ideological tendency should be emphasized by the Liberals?

Welche ideologische Richtung sollten die Freiheitlichen Ihrer Meinung nach stärker betonen?					
E.	1. Gesamt	2. SP- Wähler	3. VP- Wähler	4. FP- Wähler	5. FP- „Hoff- nungs- wähler“
6. die nation- ale Rich- tung	5%	5%	6%	3%	7%
7. die liberale Richtung	14%	14%	14%	7%	16%
8. national und liberal ungefähr gleich	15%	11%	19%	58%	23%
9. egal/keine Meinung	66%	70%	61%	32%	54%

Key:

1. Total
2. SPOe Voters
3. OeVP Voters
4. FPÖe Voters
5. Potential FPÖe Voters
6. The nationalist tendency
7. The liberal tendency
8. Nationalist and liberal in about equal proportion
9. No preference/No opinion

Chart "F": "Hitparade" [Popularity Rankings] of Government Members



Key:

1. Good Opinion
2. Bad Opinion

9273

CSO; 3620/141

## KKE, AKEL VIEWS DIFFER ON CYPRUS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15-16 Jan 84 pp 1, 9

[Article by Ploutis Servas]

[Text] The dogmatic Greek Left continues to get its arrows against the U.S.-NATO mediation from the arsenals of yesteryear, ignoring the conditions and national imperatives of today. We spoke previously (4 Jan 84) on this harmful tactic. It would not have been necessary to come back to this subject if it were not for its repercussions, centered in an effort to move the Cypriot Left away from the present generally accepted course.

The difference between KKE and AKEL was noted by almost all Athenian newspapers the day following the meeting of KKE Secretary General Florakis with Premier Papandreou, when AKEL Secretary General Ezekias Papaioannou (after his own meeting with Papandreou) told the press that his talk with the premier was "useful and constructive."

It appears that the dogmatic Greek Left was not annoyed by the few reserved but constructive words spoken by Ezekias Papaioannou to the press. It believed that, in spite of early reactions, the two kindred parties easily would continue their common course under the "protective" umbrella of the Kremlin. For this reason it continued in its party newspaper to give emphasis to the views of PRAVDA about the suspect Schultz plan, supported by articles of special analysts.

In addition, the dogmatic Left extracted from Kyprianou a statement to Soviet television, expressing his "special appreciation for the position of the Soviet Union on the Cypriot problem--the Soviet Union which always supports all UN resolutions for the solution of the problem and plays an important role in the search for its peaceful settlement."

This brief statement by the Cypriot president which in any event lies within the context of current diplomatic moves was given extensive prominence. Yet, any attempt to evaluate this response of the Cypriot president to the Soviet TV will be of no use. Nor can one cover the ridiculous aspect (and the audacity) of those who tried to solicit the statement as well as of those who tried to use it for "public consumption." Because the burning issue for the Greek people today is not whether the Soviet side "always supported the UN resolutions for the solution of the problem." What matters now is what practical measures must be taken to deal with the Turkish provocation and how to exert pressure to channel the

issue at last toward its solution. This, according to the president of the republic, is the "foremost issue of Hellenism." This is the most pressing one. This is what created the national need for the discussions of the Greek premier with the leaders of all Greek and Greek-Cypriot parties (large and small).

What particularly annoyed the dogmatic Greek Left was the fact that the press emphasized the different views between the two parties (KKE and AKEL). While AKEL wisely appeared to go along with all other parties (in Cyprus and Greece) in the face of the new (and possibly most critical) phase of the Cypriot problem, KKE, going against all others, continued to theorize and indulge in sloganeering, speaking against "Western and NATO-list intrigues" in Cyprus and in the area. This explains why the KKE leadership targeted in particular the newspaper that could be branded as "extreme-right" thus causing the most intensive condemnation among the masses of the Left. It may be that at that time it was assigned to the respected person of the secretary general of AKEL to make the following impressive denial last Sunday:

"The report about differences between AKEL and KKE regarding Cyprus, published in AKROPOLIS and reprinted by some rightist newspapers in Cyprus, does not deserve even a denial. In my recent meeting with KKE Secretary General Kharilaos Florakis we found complete agreement and there is no truth about any disagreements...."

AKEL supports the urgent implementation of Security Council Resolution 541 in its entirety and the comprehensive solution of the internal aspects of the Cypriot problem, through the secretary general of the United Nations. AKEL rejects any tripartite or five-partite conference or a Camp David solution, as it has repeatedly stated. We will solve the foreign aspect of the problem in an international conference in the framework of the UN. This is exactly what KKE also supports. All the rest are anti-communist myths and tricks.

However, something entirely different was supported in the decision of the KKE Central Committee Plenum, officially published on 4 January 1984 (1 day before the meeting of Papaioannou with the Greek premier and 4 days after the aforementioned denial). In any event, Florakis is "keeping to this decision regarding what he said to Papandreou" who mentioned this statement to the press. This decision underlines:

"The government would be able to contribute substantially to a just solution of the Cypriot problem if it reexamined our country's relation to NATO and the operation of the bases, and if it went ahead with opening the file on Cyprus."

These are the official words Florakis invoked and which reveal his differences with all other parties, including AKEL, as well as with the talks currently being held by the Cypriot president. No other party and none of the premier's guests posed as a condition "the reexamination of our relations with NATO" or the "reexamination of the operation of the bases," nor "the opening of the file on Cyprus." The leader of AKEL did not raise such conditions, at least according to his statements to the press.

It appears that Ezekias Papaioannou did not take into account that the Greek journalists had in front of them the full text of the decision of the KKE Central Committee Plenum when they were writing about "a difference in the views of AKEL and KKE." They could not imagine that the AKEL secretary general might not have read the text. It is a pity that E. Papaioannou did not have the courage to keep a "golden silence." He sacrificed for the sake of "partisan comradeship" the excellent impression the Greek people were prepared to keep as they observe AKEL's domestic policies during this stage when there is so much need for order, consistency and monolithic unity.

7520

CSO: 3521/149

## INTERNAL PROBLEMS STILL AFFLICT GREENS

## 'Rotation' Strife Intensifies

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 16 Jan 84 pp 80, 81

[Text] As late as the beginning of the year, Otto Schily, Fraktion [parliamentary party] speaker of the Greens in the Bundestag confidently devised plans for his party: In 1987 or later, according to Schily on Radio Luxemburg, the Greens would have to be ready to assume responsibility for the government as junior partners of the SPD. Hardly back in Bonn, the spokesman of the Greens last week was suddenly yanked from his day-dreams about alternative ministers and brought back to the ground of green reality.

Only 10 months after their entrance into the Bonn Parliament, the Fraktion has ended up in a crisis which poses a serious threat to its parliamentary future.

The impetus for this was given at the beginning of last week by the Green Deputy Gert Bastian. In a letter addressed to the "Dear Lady Friends and Friends", the retired general informed his party comrades that, because of "serious wrong developments" he is considering representing the political goals of the Greens and the peace movement in the future as a "deputy without parliamentary party affiliation" [fraktionslos].

In his letter, Bastian reproached his colleagues in the Fraktion with insufficient solidarity and asserts that communist-oriented cadre groups are changing the political goals of the eco-peaceniks [Oekopaxler]. Moreover, the renowned Green criticized, the working capacity of the deputies is being hindered by incompatible decisions of the base.

Bastian presented the letter to the green parliamentary deputies at the beginning of a 2-day secluded meeting last Tuesday. Far away from the government district in Bonn, they had gathered in the pub "Waldau" on the Venusberg in order to reflect on their parliamentary work in the new year.

After the one-man revolt, this subject was only marginally discussed. For suddenly what many Greens have feared for a long time has become reality: The alliance of "K-sects, Sponti-freaks, Eco-freaks, and feminists" (the parliamentary executive secretary Joschka Fischer) threatens to disintegrate under the pressure of daily work. "The ice," laments the budget expert Hubert Klei-  
nert, "on which we move is thin."

The general called forth indignation among his Fraktion colleagues above all with his reproach that the Greens are agitating in an increasingly one-sided manner against the American arms build-up. To be sure, since the founding of the party a conflict has been brewing between more strongly socialist-oriented forces and the ecologically oriented members in regard to the goal and content of the green program. But, in the opinion of Kleinert, there is no proof of the predominance of the Left. When questioned, Bastian did fail to produce clear evidence for his theory and came down a peg or two. "The subject was quickly dealt with," according to Kleinert.

In his critique of the chaotic working style of the Fraktion, on the other hand, the general did not find himself alone. However, the Fraktion was willing to discuss more efficient forms only if Bastian withdrew his threat to leave.

For the Greens much is at stake in the controversy. For if only 3 deputies of the 28 members of parliament leave, the Greens would lose the status of a Fraktion.

But then they would be condemned to insignificance: They would have no right to introduce bills; their right to speak would be limited, and they no longer would have votes in the committees.

Finally, the Greens would also have to renounce Fraktion allowances in the amount of DM 7 million a year, with which they finance their regional offices and ecology funds.

To be sure, Bastian emphasizes that he acted as an individual. But the members of parliament fear that others could follow his example.

For a number of green deputies are not satisfied with the rotation principle. At their party congress in Sindelfingen, the Greens decided in 1983 that as a matter of principle all Bonn deputies must give up their mandate after two years to a successor, unless the responsible state assembly votes by a margin of 70 percent in favor of their staying on.

The successors are already now being trained as assistants so that at the half-way mark they can continue the parliamentary work smoothly. The present members of parliament are then supposed to move into the second rank and help the new ones with their experience. But whether green stars like Otto Schily, Petra Kelly or precisely Gert Bastian are willing to play second fiddle beginning in 1985 is doubtful.

Thus the rotation, originally thought of as a symbol of intra-party democracy and the trade mark of another political culture, is turning into a gruelling test for the Greens in the Bundestag. It is precisely this principle which Bastian attacked in his letter.

For months the Greens declared the problem taboo. Bastian's critique of the cooperation now aims at toppling the decision of Sindelfingen.

The members of parliament-in-waiting, according to his proposal, should clean out their desks in Bonn and instead make themselves useful at the base. In their stead Bastian wants to hire qualified staff members. For, according to Bastian: "Good will does is no substitute for expertise."

The additional personnel costs the ex-general would like to divert from the funds which thus far have been channeled to the ecology funds and the green study groups. Hamburg deputy and former member of the Communist League Juergen Reents: "That is a declaration of war on the party."

In contrast to the established parties, the Greens do not have a professional apparatus at their disposal; the party politicians, who are acting in an unpaid capacity, would definitely take the back seat to the Fraktion. "We would become the Jusos [Young Socialists] of the Fraktion and condemned to insignificance", Rainer Trampert, chief of the Greens, rejects the demand of the ex-soldier. That the rotation incites competitive thoughts between deputies and successors is clear even to the executive committee members of the Greens. But how they are to keep their promise without there being grave disputes is something which neither the executive committee of the party nor the Fraktion knows.

Thus in Baden-Wuerttemberg the green state assembly group and the base came to blows because of differences over the rotation.

In Hamburg, too, the rotation is not adhered to because there were not enough women among the successors. A plenary assembly of the women of the GAL [Green Alternative List] decided that parity of the sexes is more important than rotation.

In Lower Saxony the Greens arrived at the consensus that only 5 of the 11 provincial diet deputies are to be exchanged.

A similar solution is conceivable in Bonn. But whether Gert Bastian can still experience this as a Fraktion member is questionable. For the majority of the Greens in Bonn are not prepared to repudiate the decision of the party congress and, as Bastian wishes, to send the successors home. But the general insists on this.

Bastian: "If this is not done, I do not see any possibility of remaining in the Fraktion."

## Greens' Constitutionality Questioned

West Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 23 Dec 83 p 7

[Interview with Berlin Senator for Federal Affairs Prof Rupert Scholz]

[Excerpts] taz: Mr Scholz, recently you have given various talks to legal associations. In so doing you have also talked about the Greens.

Rupert Scholz: In my conception the Greens are either not a party at all or not yet a party in the sense of Art 21 of the Basic Law. The most important consequence of this is that in the election systems which recognize the list privilege of the party, they do not, in other words, have a claim to the right to participate not only with the nomination of direct candidates but also with list candidates, thus especially in the Bundestag.

[taz] According to the definition of the statute on parties, a party is an organization which is striving for direct participation in the political formation of intent in parliament, for this reason participates in elections, moreover has a political program, whose content is to be achieved through the participation in the political formation of intent, and which exhibits a certain measure of durability and stability. Where is the hitch in regard to the Greens?

[Rupert Scholz] The decisive point is the participation in elections with the goal of assuming overall responsibility in the system of parliamentary government. The participation in the elections is guided by the principles of parliamentary democracy, i. e., representative democracy. Article 21 of the Basic Law, which stipulates the so-called party privilege, in terms of the particulars is further and more concretely defined in Article 38 of the Basic Law, which sets forth the fundamental principles of representative democracy, especially the free mandate of deputies. The Greens, however, basically do not accept this free mandate. A political grouping, which professes the imperative mandate and which--via the so-called rotation principle--arrogates to itself the right also to recall elected mandate bearers, thus does not definitionally fulfill the prerequisites of a party in the sense of parliamentary democracy. The list privilege of Article 21 of the Basic Law finds its explanation precisely in the especially prominent function of the parties in the system of representative democracy. Accordingly a party must fully heed its principles.

[taz] But the Greens cannot force their deputies into rotation against their will?

[Rupert Scholz] If an elected deputy is put under pressure to submit to an election of local party or association functionaries, in this case the Greens, and if he may continue his parliamentary mandate only if, in this election, he receives at least 70 percent of the votes, this means unequivocal compulsion to rotate. Such a deputy, after all, could otherwise continue only if he would leave his Fraktion. Deputies are elected by the people for 4 years, their mandate therefore cannot be reduced to less, in this case to 2 years, by the political grouping which they profess, in an arbitrary manner.

[taz] What is the meaning of force?

[Rupert Scholz] Strictly speaking, you cannot generally force a person to do something. But you can, however, place him under certain sanction provisos if he does not do what you want him to do.

[taz] And that kind of thing happens among the Greens?

[Rupert Scholz] The deputy of the Greens is under pressure from the very outset, alone because of the fact that he sits together with his later successors in Bonn. These are literally sitting on his heels and are waiting for his departure. In the case of the decisions that you have just now mentioned, the point was to put through majority viewpoints of the Fraktion, and specifically in the form of recommendations, surely also in personal addresses. But this is always oriented by certain substantive subjects. In the case of the Greens, however, already the voters are presented with candidates, who are elected by the voters for 4 years, but under the proviso are internally subjected to a new election legitimation after no more than 2 years.

[taz] The voter knows the rotation principle.

[Rupert Scholz] The voter cannot take part in the vote after two years.

[taz] The voter knows this and accepts it, otherwise he would not vote for the Greens.

[Rupert Scholz] The voter knows the election law, which is the foundation. No party can arbitrarily change this foundation. The voter has a right to insist that his decision to have elected someone for 4 years is not changed after 2 years.

[taz] But the voter has no guarantee with any party. Take, for example, your Weizsaecker.

[Rupert Scholz] This is something different. The voter, after all, does not elect Mr von Weizsaecker directly. Moreover, every deputy has, of course, the right to resign at any time.

[taz] But this is what the Green does, too.

[Rupert Scholz] He does not do this in the full freedom of his own decision. The decision is made for him by people who are not authorized to make dispositions with respect to the decision of the voter.

[taz] In other words, the rotation principle violates Article 21 of the Basic Law. . .

[Rupert Scholz] It violates Article 38 and the free mandate which is stipulated in it.

[taz] You say that you do not engage in the preceding reflections because you do not like the Greens. But in one of your talks you once said that the 5 percent votes of the Greens are votes against parliamentary democracy.

[Rupert Scholz] The concepts of democracy at the base and fundamental opposition do not fit in with representative democracy. A form of direct democracy or Soviet democracy is, in terms of democratic theory, of a different structure. But our Basic Law is founded on representative democracy, direct democracy or Soviet democracy are excluded.

[taz] And this group of voters may not be represented in our parliaments?

[Rupert Scholz] As long as the system of a representative democracy is in force, nobody has the right to eliminate it, unless he has the requisite majority for a constitutional change. A minority, which does not have constitution-changing quality, cannot take the view: While we have to live on the basis of this system, we nevertheless attack it with non-system-immanent means.

[taz] In this way the minority can never become the majority.

[Rupert Scholz] One has no other choice but to conduct the corresponding election campaign and to try to attain the required two-thirds majority.

[taz] But the Greens are not allowed to conduct an election campaign because they are not a party.

[Rupert Scholz] As persons they can conduct one. Moreover, they can, of course, try to attain the necessary majority for the desired constitutional change through parliamentary means.

[taz] Mr Scholz, now for once not in terms of constitutional law, but in political terms: Where are the 5 percent Green voters to be represented?

[Rupert Scholz] It is part of democracy that one stands for election and, if one loses or does not achieve a majority, among other things, preserves the rules of the game of a good loser. Above all, the Weimar experience teaches that democracy is seriously endangered if parties or political groupings do not observe the rules of the game. I refer merely to the beginning of the path of the Nazis and their--expressed in today's terminology--march through the institutions.

[taz] But for this we have the prohibition procedure. . .

[Rupert Scholz] Now I have the feeling that you absolutely want the prohibition of the Greens?

[taz] That we do not want. Only we also do not want that, instead of a prohibition motion, which must be introduced by the Bundestag, the Government, or the Bundesrat and which then must be decided in a formalized procedure by the Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Electoral Supervisor makes the decision.

[Rupert Scholz] This comes into consideration only for a party. A political association, which puts its main emphasis on extra-parliamentary activities, is not a party.

[taz] A while ago, you spoke about totalitarian tendencies. Are the Greens totalitarian?

[Rupert Scholz] Why not for once use a quotation to make the problem topical: In Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf" [My Struggle], you can read the sentence that resistance becomes a duty where human rights are involved. Do you recall how often we hear sentences of this type today in connection with the counterarmament from its opponents?

[taz] Would the Federal Electoral Law have to be changed or can the Federal Electoral Supervisor already today refuse to admit the Greens to the election?

[Rupert Scholz] Actually already today he must examine whether an association represents a party. But here surely there is room for legislative clarifications.

[taz] Who would profit politically if the Federal Electoral Supervisor would start such an initiative now?

[Rupert Scholz] It would be of use to the Greens, because it would put them on the right track.

[taz] Through a pedagogical measure?

[Rupert Scholz] No, merely a legal indication and expression of the constitutional law assessment.

[taz] Does the Federal Chancellor know about your plans? Has there been an informal agreement with anyone?

[Rupert Scholz] I am speaking here exclusively as a constitutional law expert on the basis of my professional judgment.

[taz] Is there already an agreement with the Federal Electoral Supervisor?

[Rupert Scholz] No, I do not know the gentleman at all.

[taz] Will there be a prohibition motion against the Greens?

[Rupert Scholz] I do not know. Still, from the newspapers one could hear about considerations in this direction which are being entertained in various places.

[taz] Have you--in purely scientific terms--already conferred with Roman Herzog?

[Rupert Scholz] No, not on this subject.

[taz] We are asking because he will become president of the Federal Constitutional Court. Is it now a strategy of the union parties?

[Rupert Scholz] Now you are really operating with rather major insinuations! The only thing at issue here is the assessment of the Greens from the standpoint of constitutional law, which is independent of any political conviction. Please take this just as I said it: That is my assessment from the standpoint of constitutional law, nothing more, independent of political convictions.

[taz] But you, after all, are a man of profile, also and especially with regard to politics. If I were in your place, I would feel pressed to transform a legal opinion recognized as correct into legal facts.

[Rupert Scholz] You are once again operating with insinuations if you impute to a political engagement that it must place scientific convictions, too, in its service alone. If you think along these lines, you will never be able to find an objective judgment.

[taz] In short, you are not making any further advance?

[Rupert Scholz] I am not making any further advances, but will always reserve the right to say in public what is required from the standpoint of constitutional law.

The interview was conducted by Johannes Eisenberg.

#### Green Caucuses Young, Schoolmasterish

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 28 Dec 83 p 4

[Text] Handelsblatt, Tuesday, 27 December 1983. na Duesseldorf. More than a third of the Bundestag and Landtag [provincial diet] deputies of the Greens as well as the successors for the members of parliament of the Greens elected to the 10th German Bundestag are teachers.

The Freiburg political scientist Dr Helmut Fagt has composed a social profile of the Greens in the parliaments of the federation and the states and published it in the ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PARLAMENTSFRAGEN. He subjected the 104 representatives of the Greens at the federal and state level, the 28 deputies of the Fraktion of the Greens in the 10th German Bundestag, the 28 designated successors of the Bundestag Fraktion, as well as the 48 green provincial diet deputies to a socio-structural analysis. These are the results of the study:

--The Greens are an extraordinarily young party. The average age of the 28 Bundestag deputies at 40.7 years lies clearly below that of all mandate bearers at 48.1 years. If, after expiration of half of the legislative term, the designated 28 successors are exchanged, the average age of the green Fraktion will diminish to only 34 years.

--With the Greens, a new political generation has entered the West German parliaments. The older members of parliament, for whom first of all economic

prosperity, the securing of what had been attained, and political stability represented cherished goals, are encountering the representatives of a generation which could presuppose all of this as a matter of course and which now is raising questions in regard to the risks and costs of this order of preferences.

--In addition to the age structure, the professional membership of the Green members of parliament also reveals characteristics of one-sidedness. The overwhelming majority of the 104 green deputies and successors come from the service sector. The agricultural sector is represented only by 1 farmer and 1 successor.

The Greens are just as little a "proletarian party". There are just 2 skilled workers among their deputies in the Bundestag. With about 14 percent of the members, the "technical-administrative intelligentsia" forms a larger bloc, which in addition to the few lawyers and the member of the board of directors for European social policy and health questions at the EEC, Petra Kelly, includes 9 engineers, natural scientists and architects.

More than half of the investigated green members of parliament and successors can be classified under the professional categories of "education, social science and communication". Teachers account for the lion's share. If one adds the 4 green graduate teacher-trainers, no less than 39 deputies or successors of the Greens worked as teachers or university lecturers. This amounts to 37.5 percent.

#### Not the Faintest Notion About Most of the Issues

The political mandate evidently helps a significant part of the investigated green deputies and successors out of a precarious professional situation. Three Greens are unemployed, 5 additional ones report graduation from a university, but no employment.

Fogt explains the predominance of the teachers and university lecturers among the Greens not only on the basis of advantages with respect to options, the securing of many claims and re-entry without problems, but above all on the basis of the influence of the social science and arts subjects which the majority of the green teacher-members of parliament had taken. Fogt cites the Fraktion chairman in the provincial diet of Lower Saxony and university lecturer in adult education, Martin Mombauer, with the sentence: "Of what use to us are the successors if again they include only teachers who do not have the faintest notion about most of the issues." According to Fogt, the teacher flood represents an obvious obstacle on the inevitable road of the green party to professionalization.

A second, by far more important group of "generalists", that of the lawyers, by contrast is extremely weakly represented among the Greens. While in the 10th German Bundestag every tenth deputy lists "lawyer" as profession, among the Greens in the federation and the states the figure is a bare 4 percent.

--The proportion of Greens organized in trade unions is clearly higher than one would assume based on the programmatic orientation of the ecology party.

To be sure, with 42.4 percent it is still considerably below the degree of organization of the 10th German Bundestag. Two-thirds of all Bundestag deputies are members of trade union organizations.

## SPD, GREENS AGREE ON PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION IN HESSEN

## Boerner Admits 'Risk'

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 19 Jan 84 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] Wiesbaden, 18 Jan--The SPD Hessian leadership has turned down the offer to negotiate by the CDU and FDP and has decided on cooperation with the Greens. After a heated debate, the SPD Land executive committee unanimously approved of the results from the previous talks with the Greens and called for a continuation of the negotiations. Dates have already been agreed on with the Greens (30 January and 1 February). On Wednesday in Wiesbaden, Boerner--the SPD Land chairman and acting minister-president--justified the decision on cooperation with the Greens by saying that with this party it is possible "to put into practice enough social-democratic views that the identity of the SPD is preserved." Although Boerner admitted that the course being taken included "a large risk," because "new political ground" is being broken, nevertheless his personal impression was that it can become "a sound venture."

Following the decision by the SPD, the opposition parties CDU and FDP spoke about a "hazardous enterprise" into which the SPD is plunging the Land of Hessen. Because of the rejection of the negotiating offer from the CDU and FDP, the CDU charged the SPD "of having lost the decisive chance to save the Land of Hessen from harm." It was said that the SPD now bears the sole responsibility for all "developments threatening the stability of the constitutional state and the future of Hessen," which must inevitably appear as the result of an alliance founded on the "imponderabilia of Green politics." The FDP viewed the decision of the SPD in favor of a continuation of negotiations with the Greens as an "expression of the increasingly greater entanglement of the Social Democrats." Whereas the FDP wants to continue to be "ready to talk" with the SPD, the CDU threatened "consequences": "The SPD must not think that the Hessian CDU is available at any time to Mr Boerner as a sort of reserve army." It said that the CDU Land chairman, Frankfurt's Chief Mayor Wallmann, will "define and make quite clear" the future role of the CDU in the Land's politics at the party's congress this coming weekend in Friedberg.

Concerning the unconditional offer to negotiate from the CDU and FDP made Monday, Boerner said that if such an offer had been presented at the end of October, it would have "sparked broad discussion proceedings" in the SPD.

But now he does not see "any reason" to break off the negotiations with the Greens, since the talks with them have progressed "quite a long way" and have made it likely that there will be a speedy passage of the 1983 budget as well as a speedy submission of the 1984 budget. Boerner said emphatically: "I do not let the negotiations with the Greens bother me. The Greens have a right to know that the SPD wants to conclude the talks with them and then take stock at a Land party congress." The minister-president stood up for the Greens. He said that as a party they are "starting on an arduous path." One must take this into account and have "patience" with them. With their resolution in Usingen, they are "on the road toward a collective-bargaining ability."

Boerner had a noncommittal answer to the question of whether the SPD is conducting a trial run for Bonn with its course in Hessen. For him, it is a Hessian venture "above all." The SPD Land chairman denies that this venture in the Hessian SPD could still lead to a crucial test when in early summer, after the passage of the 1984 budget, the final decision is then made at an SPD Land party congress as to whether Boerner should be able to be elected as minister-president and an SPD minority government can be "tolerated" by the Greens. Boerner merely acknowledged that there was criticism "here and there" about the course being taken in his party.

The caretaker minister-president declared the 1984 budget to be the "touchstone" of the party's cooperation with the Greens. He anticipates that the 1983 budget, which has not yet been passed, can be adopted by the end of this month and that the 1984 budget--which is still to be introduced and which must incorporate the deals made with the Greens--can be adopted in the early summer of this year. It remains doubtful whether the election of Boerner to be minister-president and the endorsement of his cabinet with the votes of the Greens could take place as early as before parliament's summer recess. But if this should fail after all because of the Greens, this would "personally not be any reason for new elections" for Boerner, as he said on Wednesday.

#### Greens Enter New Phase

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 20 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Horst Bieber, Michael Sontheimer, and Gerhard Spoerl]

[Excerpts] Do you too feel the breath of history? Slyly and with feigned excitement, Joschka Fischer, a Hessian Green with a taste for power and an inclination toward smugness, looked around in the oppressively narrow hall. Everybody surged forward.

The chairman of the meeting at the podium in front sought desperately to maintain law and order. All of them intended to, all wanted to participate in mind and heart when the Greens in Usingen answered the crucial question: Do we want to, can we come into power?

The Usingen three-fifths majority was quite simply and quite unmaliciously pleased that the red-green alliance will become--or can become--a reality.

Relief could be felt, also weariness. Green party congresses resemble psychodramas. In the last analysis it is always good when everything is over.

In Usingen, winners and losers were in agreement on one thing: Hessen has marked a turning point. It is not alone by any means. Elsewhere as well, in North Rhine-Westphalia as well as in the Saarland, Green Land associations are preparing to give up their chaste existence and enter into relations with the Social Democrats.

For many Greens who have never distinguished between the turbulent history of their party and their own life history, this is comparable to the loss of their innocence. Was it not true that they had wanted to be small, in any case different than the others--an avant-garde with a new awareness, a group which does not conform or take a backseat? Wishing has not helped. The Greens have ended their narcissistic phase. With a grieving heart, they feel cast out into the cold world of power. The realization is forced upon them that they can survive only in this way and not otherwise.

Usingen will have consequences. Once the logic is accepted that whoever wants to gain acceptance for his interests must follow the crowd, conclusions suggest themselves as if spontaneously. Should not Greens keep themselves in readiness to be state secretaries and ministers? Must not one have control over the executive branch to be able to carry out one's own ideas? In short: Must not the anti-party party become a party?

According to the explanation given by Milan Horacek for this "swing to the Right" in Hessen, they have again emerged from their nooks: From self-run cafes, movie theaters and bookshops of the Frankfurt scene, accompanied by their friends, the leftist professors and kindergarten teachers, theoretically supported by the left-wing cleverness found in "Pflasterstrand" [Cobble Beach] and in "Kursbuch" [Timetable]. This scene is discharging a new elite, the Greens are stratifying in their fifth year, they are commencing the march into the institutions.

It is not that they have entered into this experiment with power cheerfully. Circumstances dictate that they find out whether it makes sense to have a relation with the great SPD, rich in tradition and concerned about power--and whether they can remain in harmony with themselves nevertheless.

Before the minister-president lowered himself to the level of the dubious characters whom shortly beforehand he had still wanted to instruct with a cane, he convinced himself that he had no other course. An analysis of the September election convinced him. This election indicates that the vast majority of SPD and Green adherents want a red-green alliance.

Moreover Boerner was relieved to find that the Green voters have a different appearance from the combatants on Runway West. They include those of the salaried upper middle class (senior officials and clerks in public service) which is very sympathetic to criticism of the culture and to an unorthodox political understanding. The second culture which Peter

Glottz has tracked down extends deep into the bourgeois state-supporting class. In Hessen and elsewhere, Green voters are young people with a high level of education, children of the reform years with post-materialist desires in life and anticapitalist impulses.

The sober conclusion of the Social Democrats: The Greens are meeting with approval beyond the leftist scene and alternative milieu as well. They may behave foolishly, childishly, and outrageously. The danger that nevertheless they will get elected is great. Conversely, the chance is small that the SPD will be able to push the Greens to the wall.

Boerner's daydream is to build up in red-green Hessen a better counter-community over against Bonn and to construct that "majority to the left of the Center" about which Willy Brandt once spoke. This is what is wanted also by the level-headed, not at all extravagant Karl Kerschgens, who has advanced to the position of Boerner's preferred opposite number. He embodies in his person the turning away of the Greens from the pleasure principle to the reality principle. His opponents in Usingen found it easy to pick on him for supposedly being in over his head. Kerschgens contented himself with sticking to the facts: "Whoever finds that laughable simply must remind himself of the balance of power in this Land."

The Green identity--it must now be defined anew. By no means is the SPD alone responsible for this. Not only it, but actually all the parties feel they have a mission to do something for nature and the environment. The anti-nuclear-power movement and the peace movement have waned--in part because they met with success, in part because they have failed. The second phase of extra-parliamentary opposition in the history of the FRG seems to be over. The Greens must adapt themselves to that, before it is too late. They are bothered by existential angst. They are made nervous by the vague feeling that the unwept and unsung end to the student revolt may be repeated.

In the jargon of the insiders, the Usingen decision is interpreted as follows: The radical left-wing "Realpolitik practitioners" of old, a few ex-Social Democrats, and some ex-liberals have prevailed, thanks to tactical and rhetorical superiority and a skillful exploiting of the fear of decline. The "fundamentalists," the Green alternative list of Hamburg and the national executive committee, have lost. On both sides ephemeral alliances are involved which have an odor of political prostitution about them. In order to understand this, a digression into "Green fluid dynamics" is unavoidable. It is an extremely complicated business, not only because up to now the party has consisted of a politically contradictory mixture with many regional undertones, but also because at the moment violent movements can be observed in this melting pot. This rainbow-colored mixture is composed of two basic substances. There are the "old-line Green" founders of the party, who had turned away in disappointment from the established parties and for whom ecology and peace are the focus. Secondly, there is the "generation of 1968," whose political awareness was molded in the youth and student revolt. Today, this generation is in the process of taking possession of the Green Party more and more. To be more precise, it is that part of the "small radical

minority" of former times which did not lapse into political abstinence or disappear into the SPD, DKP [German Communist Party], or numerous communist groups back at the start of the 1970's. The fact that so many of them are surfacing again in the Greens leads to the suspicion that they do not persevere well without a party.

The left-overs from the bankrupt's estate of communist sects are sometimes suspected of merely having wrapped the old red catechism with a green foil. They reject this as polemical hyperbole. However it is striking that their economic and social policy is fixated on the State. With that they move near left-wing Social Democrats and far away from radical ecologists such as Rudolf Bahro, who preaches decentralization and self-help.

They all look back on more than 10 years of political experience. They can give speeches, maneuver, scheme if necessary, and take advantage of their qualifications for the sake of rapid party advancement. The more the Greens turn into a party, the greater their influence becomes. This is at the expense of the old-line Green movement, which is strong just where the student movement and their sectarian successors have never been able to gain a foothold: In the south, in the lowland states, in the countryside.

The two positions oppose each other so intransigently that in Usingen there has already been whispering about a split. The Greens--are they only a variant of the many small leftist parties which have broken apart because of their internal contradictions?

In order to prevent such a suicide, in recent months a third group has interposed itself between the other two movements. It can be called "eco-libertarian" or "eco-liberal." It inclines toward Realpolitik and is trying to check the competition for first place between the eco-socialists and the old-line Greens. Its most prominent representatives: Otto Schily and Joschka Fischer in Bonn, Winfried Kretschmann in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Whether these eco-liberals can prevail depends also on how the Greens in Bonn can overcome the crisis triggered by Gert Bastian.

Even before the Usingen party congress, this ex-general had sent out a sharp letter containing three charges. Firstly, in the party and fraction [parliamentary group], forces were pressing to the front which no longer pursued any Green objectives. Secondly, the office-sharing arrangements of deputies and "replacement deputies" [Nachrueckern] have proved to be impracticable. Thirdly, because of mutual mistrust, internal power struggles, and personal intrigues, there is a dearth of political ideas. Without a speedy change, "I will choose to...employ my energies in the future as an independent deputy."

"Bastian has pinpointed an obvious structural problem in the Bundestag fraction, but this cannot be resolved by force," Joschka Fischer said placatingly in Usingen. Others spoke of "blackmail," of wayfarers who should be allowed to pass on, and also of the possibility that Bastian was unwise tactically, simply inadequate militarily, in standing up for the internally criticized identity figure Petra Kelly. The "anti-party party" is beginning to feel the fetters which it has put on itself with an

imperative mandate, grass-roots democracy, rotation, and office-sharing arrangements.

The thought that an active rank and file will convey ideas, suggestions, and concepts by way of national task forces and study groups to the deputies was mistaken as much as it was grass-roots democracy. Although there are such transmissions, they take time and money and seldom happen as rapidly as is required by a fraction which must react to the prior moves of the other parties--must react oftener than it likes. Out of fear of organization, the Greens have acquired already an organization (or "structure," to use their pet word) which hangs around the necks of the parliamentarians like a millstone.

Only marginal Green figures such as Bastian dare to admit this. Knowing full well that development into a party will exert an increasing influence on these parliamentarians, the rank and file is keeping the "guillotine" sharpened, in order to bind the prominent figures to its will through the threat of voting them out of office. It is coldly demanded of the deputies that they bleed themselves dry. Under less favorable working conditions, they must hold their own in parliament and stand accountable to the rank and file. At the same time the rank and file expects to extensively share in the boon of the fraction money, defends its autonomy vis-a-vis the national executive committee, and insists on its rights--but without discharging its self-defined duties.

Under the keyword "professionalization," such questions often have been faintheartedly discussed in the past. Ever since Bastian's letter and the Hessian decision, the old hands have known that once again they will have to put up with a typically Green situation: A recognized, but deferred problem must be cleared up ad hoc. In the matter of rotation, Lower Saxony has shown the way to the mitigation of this party resolution with its "partial rotation." The "office-sharing arrangements" cannot be resolved without living-condition austerities in current legislative periods.

The party--above all the national executive committee--will not "pay" its top functionaries (the mood has not yet reached such a point), but will professionalize them through "compensation for salary losses." After heated debates about to what extent the work of the national party amounts to only its control over the fraction, the Greens are having second thoughts about their duty to serve the rank and file. "We are tired of the endless debates," says treasurer Hermann Schulz. He does not deny the difficulties. "The enthusiasm of the fraction for constant work is now receding." Yet the readiness to draw the structural conclusions from the party's nascence is also growing everywhere.

Only slowly, to be sure. The Greens must say goodbye to the idea of a "different," alternative party; they must painfully learn that Greens can be just as envious, ambitious, intriguing, and indolent as the despised establishment.

Otto Schily is calling on the Greens to become "the junior partner of the SPD" in 1987. That means not only to come to decisions on previously

unclarified practical questions. It also implies that this party must give itself an internal structure which permits partnership and genuine participation. The Greens are taking leave of the rosy dreams of their initial boom years.

#### Setback for Green 'Fundamentalists'

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 20 Jan 84 p 4

[Excerpt] Wiesbaden, 19 Jan--In the Landtag group of the Hessian Greens, a personnel purification process is looming. It is anticipated that soon the Green deputy Brueckner, who belongs to the "fundamentalist" wing of the Greens, will give up his seat and make room for a so-called "Realpolitik practitioner." Jakob, Brueckner's replacement, is in favor of cooperation with the SPD.

A few weeks ago Brueckner had announced that he "probably" would not go along in voting for the SPD politician Boerner, if in the coming months his election to be Hessian minister-president should come up in the Landtag. Brueckner, a protestant clergyman by profession, was also the one who following the hemorrhaging "action" of the former Green deputy Schwalba-Hoth (who meanwhile has been nominated by the Hessian Greens for the Euro-elections) had admitted in parliament that he himself, Brueckner, could have carried out this "action" just as well. Brueckner said at that time that if Schwalba-Hoth had "not done this symbolic act, which reminds me of the old-testament prophets, others would have undertaken it, even myself."

Besides Brueckner, two other "fundamentalists" are considering their withdrawal from the Landtag group of the Greens. These are the replacement deputy Kuhnert, who at the general meeting of the Greens in Usingen had given the opening plea against cooperation with the SPD, and the especially radical "fundamentalist," Keppel, who--as the Greens in Wiesbaden describe it--collaborates with them "for rehabilitation reasons" (Keppel had been convicted of an airplane hijacking). Kuhnert, an avowed Marxist, and Keppel want to discuss and make a decision on their withdrawal from the Landtag group at a "radical-ecological forum"--that is, a "fundamentalist" meeting--early in February in Frankfurt. The two charge the majority of the Wiesbaden group of having betrayed Green principles and of having sold out to the SPD. Kuhnert and Keppel complain in a "statement" that their "criticisms and suggestions" in the Landtag group have remained "fruitless" and have led to a "constant climate of irritation" and an "unbearable atmosphere."

If Kuhnert and Keppel should withdraw from the 15-membered Landtag group, only one "fundamentalist" will still be left there, the Green deputy Schilling. Mrs Schilling had categorically announced even a few weeks ago that she will not give her vote to Boerner in the minister-president election. Also she does not intend to give her approval to the 1983 budget next week and has been given the endorsement of the rank and file for this "refusal" at the Land general meeting in Usingen; she was granted a "special vote." Accordingly, Mrs Schilling will soon play the role of a "token fundamentalist" in the Landtag group of the Greens, because the

"political realists" are coming to the front. Thus, when there is "rotation" among the Hessian Greens in 1985 and the replacement deputies already participating in the Landtag group then become deputies, not much will change with respect to political emphases--unless the group members are suddenly radicalized again in their cooperation with the SPD.

#### Profile of Green Leader

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 18 Jan 84 p 10

[Article by Bernd Erich Heptner]

[Excerpt] Kerschgens is a Green. He is considered to be the "spiritual father" of the Petersberg-Marbach resolution with which the Hessian Greens cleared the way for cooperation with the SPD in October--a path which they continued along a bit farther just last week. In Usingen Kerschgens gave the opening plea--in a sober, almost a little unctuous manner: The Greens must be a "leaven," although not in the refrigerator of the opposition, because then this leaven is not effective, but rather in cooperation with the SPD. Kerschgens is Boerner's favorite Green. When a strained atmosphere arose in the five public showcase negotiations between the SPD and the Greens, the SPD negotiating leader and caretaker minister-president turned to him. When ticklish subjects were to be clarified, the energy policy for example, Boerner negotiated with Kerschgens behind closed doors. Between the two there seemed to be a tacit understanding, similar wavelengths, mutual respect.

In the SPD fraction it is said that people such as Kerschgens might just as well be in the SPD. That is not true. Kerschgens, born in 1939 in Mariadorf near Aachen, could not bring himself to join this party "even in the best times of the SPD" in 1969, to use his own words. In his opinion the political foundations of the SPD are no longer sound, and it always gives the same old answers to the new questions. The SPD, he said, has an "exploitative relationship" to nature, has still not understood that what is needed is a "partnership association" of people with nature and of people with one another. Boerner's--current--credo of "growth by way of environmental protection" is rejected by Kerschgens, in a polite manner and with the air of a carver of crucifixes at peace with himself, yet decisively. Kerschgens is not as far from the "fundamentalists" in his party as it sometimes seems when he is taking issue with them.

The justifications which he gives for his political views extend as far as religious ones, but he protests against mixing up politics and religion; for him, politics is not a substitute for religion, even though in his own career the one has followed from the other. Kerschgens studied Catholic theology, among other people with a young professor by the name of Joseph Ratzinger, the subsequent archbishop of Munich and Freising. Kerschgens was a curate in Aachen for 3 years, but "because of too much intolerance" on the part of the Catholic Church, as he describes it, he parted from its ministrations. He studied Romance languages in Munich, but then underwent training to be a vocational counselor. He came to politics by way of a Church study group, became active in citizens' initiatives, and was finally

present at the founding of the BUND and the Greens. Thus Kerschgens is a genuine Green, he comes neither from the SPD nor from the Maoists, as so many of his party colleagues do. The "danger" does not exist that he will make too many concessions to the Social Democrats and that he will let the Greens become an appendage of the SPD. The SPD should not kid themselves about him.

12114

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## GOALS, SIGNIFICANCE OF FIRST FOREIGN MINISTER TO PRC VIEWED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Jan 84 p 7

[Commentary: "Vayrynen Leaps Over Political Wall: First Visit of Foreign Minister to China Begins"]

[Text] Early Friday morning Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party) begins a trip abroad, one which even a few years ago no one in Finland dared to even plan. Finland's foreign minister is now leaving for the first time on an official visit to China.

The journey is Finland's political stir and gesture, even though during the visit a lot of emphasis is placed on trade between the countries and the prospects of Finnish businesses for gaining access to China's markets. At the same time as Vayrynen is leaping over the political Chinese wall, six industry leaders coming on his coattails will be trying to get export business for their companies from this land of a billion people.

Finland and China have had diplomatic relations for over 30 years. The first noteworthy visit on the political level from Finland to China was decided just last summer.

Vayrynen's visit is considered in a way a return call to the visit Deputy Prime Minister Geng Biao made to Finland in 1979. Geng brought along an invitation to visit to President Urho Kekkonen and Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto. The invitation is being answered by Vayrynen. A presidential journey to China is not being prepared. The visit by the foreign minister may suffice for a long time in the development of political relations.

The bad and strained relations, strained at times to the level of submachine gun clatter, between China and the Soviet Union have above everything else in recent decades held in check any visiting to China by Finland's official leaders. Finland, of course, has not done anything which could be interpreted negatively in Moscow.

Casting an additional shadow on Geng's trip to Finland in 1979 was China's vindictive attack on Vietnam. The deputy prime minister had a chance in Finland to listen to the shouts of the 100-odd demonstrators. The leaders of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] were among those condemning China.

The relations between China and the Soviet Union have in recent times eased up to the extent that Vayrynen's trip is now possible. The journey is also justified by the fact that in international politics China has become a more important factor than it previously was. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Finland's international interest has expanded into new areas, and businessmen especially have had their eyes on the countries of Southeast Asia.

Vayrynen informed the Soviet Union's leaders of the future trip to China on his autumn visit in Moscow.

In Helsinki one is assured that Vayrynen's breakthrough journey does not signify any policy change in Finnish-Chinese relations--they have been friendly for some time--nor in Finland's foreign policy. It may well be that Vayrynen is only bringing friendly greetings from President Koivisto to China's leaders.

Before Vayrynen of those members of Finland's government who have visited the People's Republic of China a foreign trade minister has done it five times, the last being Esko Rekola (SIT) [expansion unknown] in 1981, as well as Education Minister Marjatta Vaananen (Center Party) in 1973, and Traffic Minister Esa Timonen (Center Party) in 1975. In 1953 Sylvi Kekkonen, the prime minister's wife, led the first Finnish cultural delegation.

After Deputy Prime Minister Geng, China's deputy foreign trade minister, deputy culture minister and deputy foreign minister have visited Finland, and even before Geng numerous lower-level ministry guests have come here.

#### East Timor Will Come Up

Vayrynen will remain in China from Saturday to Wednesday, barely 5 days. Besides his host, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, he will probably also meet Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang. The Forbidden City will be introduced to Finland's foreign minister as well as the Great Wall and a model commune near Shanghai.

Those belonging to the delegation of men of industry mapping out trade possibilities are Fredrid Castren (Kymi), Pekka Herlin (Kone), Kari Kairamo (Nokia), Kalevi Numminen (Imatran Voima), Reijo Selin (Finlayson) and Heikki Tavela (Central Industrial League).

With the exception of Selin the men of industry will continue along with Vayrynen from China to Indonesia, where the businessman force is still growing. Following in the wake of the foreign minister will be Wartsila's Tor Stolpe, VALMET's Matti Kankaanpaa, VAPO's Juhani Arppe, Finn-Stroi's Risto Kangas-Ikkala, Enso-Gutzeit's Pekka Snell and Jaakko Poyry's Paul Talvio.

In Indonesia, too, Finland's foreign minister is now visiting for the first time, and the trip may not be any simpler politically than the one to China.

During the time of Indonesia's current leader, General Suharto, the country has received condemnation around the world for the liquidation of hundreds of thousands of human beings, for the takeover of East Timor, for the suppression of opposition, for banishing Chinese and communists to desert islands, for strange nocturnal death squads, etc.

Finland has not gotten involved in those matters, and there is no promise of condemnation during Vayrynen's visit, either. In the discussion, to be sure, the East Timor events will somehow come up. Finland's foreign minister probably at least wants to know what is happening there.

In the opinion of Finland's leaders maintaining contact is useful, and the visit of an important political individual does not mean that Finland approves of everything that happens in the country in question.

In Jakarta, Indonesia, Vayrynen will meet, along with the foreign ministers, President Suharto, as well as the industry and technology ministers, among others. On the tourist program during the 3-day visit is an excursion to the Borobudur temple district in the central part of the island of Java.

On the return trip from Indonesia to Finland Vayrynen will stop over in Tokyo where an agreement will be signed for the Wider Research Institute (under the supervision of the UN university) to be established in Helsinki.

Vayrynen returns from his jaunt to Southeast Asia on Sunday, 5 February. A month later he will leave again for the same region. Then the spots will be India and Vietnam.

12327

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## COMMUNIST PARTY FACTIONS FARTHER APART THAN EVER

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 11 Jan 84 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Deplorable Condition of Finland's Communist Party"]

[Text] The communists are gambling themselves away on their Finnish policy, writes Bjorn Mansson in a commentary on FKP's [Finnish Communist Party's] continuing internal struggles and especially Aarne Saarinen's latest contribution to the debate.

The Finnish Communist Party finds itself in a deplorable condition. It is not enough that the old antagonisms between the majority and the minority factions have not been eliminated, and that the so-called newspaper dispute, despite laborious attempts, has not come closer to a solution. In addition the previous majority and minority groups have fallen apart in different fractions. These appear in different combinations and make it impossible to discern which line will finally determine the direction of development of the party.

Party chairman Jouko Kajanoja's situation is hardly made easier by his predecessor, Aarne Saarinen, who now definitely appears to have established himself as a free thinker of almost the Eurocommunist variety. In his columns in the party organ KANSAN UUTISET [KU] he has long practiced a free speech which has surely surprised man, both within and outside our communist party. Neither the marxist-leninist ideology nor the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have been safe from Saarinen's caustic pen.

This critical free speech has also characterized Saarinen in interviews with other newspapers, most recently in Sunday's HELSINGEN SANOMAT [HS], in which he--to quote the interviewer--used the pensioner's right to speak out. And he did so with harsh words.

If one can believe his judgment, there is no unity in sight for the FKP. He rejects that which he calls "filthy compromises" which are often made on the terms of the old party minority. The point of the criticism is obviously aimed at party chairman Kajanoja.

Saarinen would prefer "a clear and united majority which dictates the contents and form of decisions"--a viewpoint which is of course held by the so-called "axe line" within the party. The "theses" which the party congress will decide upon in May will, according to Saarinen, not contain any degree of interpretation. With this formulation he is aiming another clear needle at Kajanoja, under whose personal leadership a working group prepared these theses with the thought that they would unify the conflicting factions. If they succeed, it is impossible to think that they would not have room for interpretation.

Unity on the terms of the minority would, said Saarinen, only mean that the party's membership and support would decline, and its influence within DFFF [Finnish People's Democratic League] would be weakened. And "experience shows" that dependence on SUKP [Soviet Communist Party] would increase--a development which Saarinen, faithful to his belief in the independence of each communist party, views with concern.

The solution to the newspaper dispute, on which Kajanoja invested all of his prestige, appears at least in this phase to have failed dramatically. The new compromise newspaper YHTEISTYO (Cooperation) has not even fulfilled low grade expectations, while neither the majority's KU nor the minority's TIEDONANTAJA showed any sign of giving up the fight for their positions; rather the contrary.

Entirely correctly Aarne Saarinen pointed out in HS that TIEDONANTAJA, which of course arose as a result of the split, now has instead become a cause of it and an obstacle to reconciliation. In the weekend edition of KU he went one step farther, when he openly requested guarantees that TIEDONANTAJA stop publication. Reading between the lines one sees a criticism of the current party leadership's inability to put through this part of the decision on the newspaper dispute.

Even disregarding Saarinen's criticism of the revolution theory and of the so-called "real socialism" his thoughts contain sufficient inflammable material to ignite the internal conflict within the FKP.

In judging Saarinen's intentions, however, one must remember that in today's situation they are hardly representative of the entire so-called majority wing, such as it was during Saarinen's time as chairman. A significant part of the majority has, attracted by the so-called third line and obviously pressured by the Soviet brother party, allowed itself to be influenced by Jouko Kajanoja's probably correct attempt to unify the party.

If Saarinen can be removed by his opponents as a representative of bygone days, the opponents have a more difficult problem in disregarding the fact that FKP general secretary Arvo Aalto has also recently seen the advantages of similar ideas. His recent proposal that DFFF, following the municipal elections, should return to the government was apparently intended to add

fuel to the party split. Last Sunday Aalto spoke in Lapland of the need to "restore the party's vitality," and warned that current developments are threatening to eliminate an influential communist party in our country. The unity he spoke of has, however, other traits than the unity that Kajanoja is striving for.

The conflict within the FKP shows no signs of waning. The big question is which line is going to win at the party's 20th congress in May. Will the old minority wing, the third line and Kajanoja's followers together win a majority for a "unity" which probably will be dictated for a long time by the old minority? Or will the axe line, together with Arvo Aalto's and Aarne Saarinen's followers from the old majority group put through its idea of the "dictates" which Saarinen now speaks about?

It is no secret that it is Kajanoja who has the sympathy of the Soviet brother party. The first goal of that party is to hold the FKP together at all costs. As Aarne Saarinen also says in HS, the SUKP has on the other hand obviously removed its support for the hardest faction within the minority, the one led by Markus Kainulainen. That eludes an outside judgment of how this withdrawal depends on other than tactical decisions.

As FKP's internal situation appears, it would be surprising if the striving for unity before the congress in May should go so far that both Jouko Kajanoja and Arvo Aalto should be chosen for leadership by the congress. A reservation must, however, be made so that in case of pressures from the outside, in spite of everything they decide through artificial means of coercion to continue as before.

The majority conduct at the congress is obviously decided more by organizational play around the delegate seats than the ongoing political debate within the party. Whatever the result, the FKP is in danger of gradually seeing its support reduced to what could be called the Scandinavian level. The communists are in the process of gambling themselves away on their Finnish policy.

9287

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## STALINISTS WALKOUT FROM POLITBUREAU MEETING OVER PRESS ISSUE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 12 Jan 84 p 15

[Article by Larserik Haggman: "Walkout at FKP Politbureau Meeting Yesterday"]

[Text] The so-called newspaper dispute continues to inflame the situation within the FKP [Finnish Communist Party]. On Wednesday the majority representatives left the politbureau meeting in protest, since the minority in the absence of party chairman Kajanoja and others constituted the majority.

Specifically the dispute concerned a condemnation of the newspaper POHJANMAAN TYO in Osterbotten. The presiding vice chairman Veikko Alho did not want to deal with this newspaper, which according to the interpretation of the majority is a new divisive factor. He explained that the question was not presented in the normal order.

The minority sees the new newspaper as a revision or a continuation of a sporadically returning newspaper. It will now begin to come out continuously since KANSAN AANI, the paper governed by the majority, has not presented the minority with column space.

This conflict has no direct connection with the real newspaper dispute within the FKP, but yesterday's walkout, according to many observers within the party, reflects the nervousness which marks the preparations for the congress. A number of political theses have just been sent out for field consideration, and in February the selection of delegates will begin in the districts.

General secretary Arvo Aalto's speech in Lapland over the weekend, as well as former party chairman Aarne Saarinen's major interview in HELSINGIN SANOMAT are seen as expressions of the same opinion. Yesterday these two were, together with Aarno Aitamurto, among those who walked out.

## Splintered Majority

During recent years the minority group within the FKP has come apart into several different groups, at the same time as the influence of the hardest minority has clearly declined. In that situation a new majority has appeared

in the Riksdag group and among the highest party authorities. It has consisted of the minority led by Taisto Sinisalo and parts of the old minority under Kajanoja's leadership.

That cooperation went farthest in connection with the people's democratic actions in the government crisis one year ago, and in the newspaper dispute. Kajanoja appears in this to have tied himself so closely to the new weekly newspaper YHTEISTYÖ that he can no longer retreat.

The so-called newspaper dispute within the FKP, which is interpreted differently by the majority and the minority, is over making the new newspaper into an ordinary daily which gives space to the entire party in its columns. Within the majority many interpret the decision to mean that the minority's TIEDONANTAJA will be suspended at the same time, something that the minority probably will not agree to.

The tactic by the majority now appears to be to raise political questions to end the splits. The minority, and also Kajanoja, appear to go along with the new, varying and unclear majority.

#### Kajanoja's Strength?

This attitude has so far brought marked attacks on the minority from the old majority leaders. There have been responses. On the minority side, Aalto and Saarinen have been packaged together with the axe line while Kajanoja and group chairman Veikko Saarto are handled with kid gloves.

Many observers are watching the forthcoming selection of congress delegates tensely. It will be decisive if the circles around Kajanoja can collect enough support within the majority together with the minority so that he can continue as party leader. In the other case, Aalto is in the best position for a return to the old two-front war.

9287

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## GREEN PARTY STRENGTHENS POSITION

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 13 Jan 84 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "The Greens Grow and Flourish"]

[Text] A skillful combination of appeals to emotions and reason is one of the secrets behind the opinion successes of the Greens, according to Bjorn Mansson in his commentary on the latest poll. For example, every decision which is damaging to the environment is likely to increase the growth of the Greens.

The poll of political party support carried out by Taloustutkimus and published in this weeks edition of the paper APU is based on the largest selection of interview subjects ever in our country. The reliability of the poll is not necessarily in direct proportion to the size of the sample, but as the opinion institute in general interviews 1,000-2,000 persons, a sample of 5,535 sounds undeniably convincing.

The poll was taken around the end of November, and the question posed applied to voting behavior if there had been municipal elections just then. Before the fall municipal elections it is entirely correct that the question be asked in that way, but when the result is evaluated one should at the same time remember that it is not totally comparable with the latest parliamentary election.

Since that election, if one can believe the poll, all the "major" parties except the Center Party have lost ground. And compared with the municipal election in 1980, of these four only the Social Democrats have held their position. Their support appears to have stabilized at the 25 percent level, which again confirms that the so-called Koivisto effect has passed, and the party will not in the foreseeable future come up to the 30 percent that they dreamed of after the success of the presidential election.

In a corresponding way it appears that the support for the Conservative Party has stabilized at the 20 percent level, and all the dreams of threatening the Social Democrats' position as the largest party are thereby crushed.

The Center Party has, thanks to a little extra contribution from the Liberals, been able to stabilize its support at the level of 17.5 percent, or the same as in the parliamentary election. Compared with both "major" parties' combined support in the municipal election of 1980, the Center Party has lost ground significantly.

The People's Democrats, who in previous polls received bottom entries of below 13 percent, can perhaps see a small consolation in that this poll did not lower its standing further. But compared with 16.6 percent of the votes in 1980, the figures are crushing.

The biggest victor among the parties in the fall, compared with the last municipal election, was the Finnish Rural Party, the growth of which beyond the result of the parliamentary election now appears, however, to have stopped. And then one should further notice that the poll was taken long before the latest disclosures about Minister Leppanen's private affairs, which honorary chairman Veikko Vennamo fears can have a negative effect on the party's voter sympathies.

Both the Swedish People's Party and the Finnish Christian Party are maintaining their positions from the parliamentary election.

The greatest sensation from the polls was, however, the strong advance of the Green Party. Compared with 1.5 percent of the votes in the parliamentary election (in the municipal election of 1980, Green Party candidates stood for election in only a few places) the polls now indicate as much as 5.2 percent. The Greens will thereby outdistance both the Swedish People's Party and the Finnish Christian Party.

Translated into absolute numbers of votes that would mean 150,000 Green votes, and if it were a parliamentary election that would give a much greater number than the present two seats. Anticipating the autumn municipal elections, the result would mean that the Greens would not only be members of councils in many more municipalities than before, but also that in many places they would hold the balance of power between the socialists and the nonsocialist blocs. Such a weighing-master roll would surely suit their purposes perfectly.

In analyzing the causes for the success of the Greens, one thinks of the famous advertising slogan for a plant fertilizer: Love and Substral. The flourishing growth of the green plant should be explained with the words Emotion and Substance, where emotion symbolizes the emotional involvement, and substance--the contents of the message--the intellectual. The Greens seem to be able successfully to combine an appeal to emotions and conscience with an appeal to understanding and intellect.

The general world situation and social developments obviously favor the Greens' way of thinking: the environmental and third world problems are

growing, as is the awareness of these problems, and a nonpolitical and party-critical wave is sweeping forward, especially over the younger generation. In their way the Greens are a typical welfare phenomenon, which shows among other things in that their adherents are concentrated in the cities and in southern Finland. Fully 81 percent of their sympathizers combine both of these criteria, and dwell in the cities of southern Finland.

Another Green success, in more concrete terms, is that their marginal success in the parliamentary election is now giving advantages in the form of increased attention in the mass media. More and more "hidden" sympathizers are beginning to show their green colors, encouraged by the general interest in the Greens.

Those who saw MP Ville Komsa appear on TV at the beginning of the week, in both Veckans Puls and Ajankohtainen Kakkonen, saw in what sympathetic terms his now-ended hunger strike for increased aid to underdeveloped countries was received. Komsa himself, trained in political tactics as he was during his young liberal years in the 1970's, knows exactly how to explain himself so that his message will strike home. The successful combination of emotional and intellectual involvement progressed with the desired clarity.

The strength of Komsa and the Greens is that most people surely at least inwardly grant that he is fighting for good things, such as for greater consideration for nature and the environment and for increased help to underdeveloped countries. The methods are sometimes controversial--such as the hunger strike--but when Komsa admitted on TV that the fast could have been a "dumb" method, he surely won over many former critics with his honesty. He was also correct when he maintained that those who say that we must first help "the poor in our own country" are not doing anything about it.

The municipal election of course does not deal with helping underdeveloped countries, or even the country's energy policies and overlapping environmental policies. On the other hand there are in most municipalities concrete examples of such things which the Greens can easily attack, mostly in the environmental area.

Using the same tactics as the so-called old parties used by "permitting" cleverly nurtured Rural Party election successes, the Greens are helped by every local pollution emission and every environment-damaging decision. Or as Professor Olavi Borg expressed it in a commentary on the current poll: Tear down just a couple more houses in Abo, and the Greens will have the balance of power in the town councils after the elections in the fall.

This is something that our political parties, which are sitting in the power seats in the municipalities must now pay attention to, if it is not already too late.

9287

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## ANALYSIS OF KKE COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 8 Jan 84 p 2

[Text] Is the KKE seeking participation in the government, or cooperation on an equal basis with PASOK on specific issues? This question emerged this week with the publication of the resolution by the plenum of the KKE, which emphasizes on the one hand that "a democratic government based on all the progressive forces and the working-class movement is needed" and on the other hand that the KKE "is striving for cooperation on an equal basis with PASOK on specific issues."

After finding that "the government's policy has gotten trapped in a direction which does not furnish alternatives for the benefit of the people and is causing dissatisfactions among broader classes of people," the resolution of the KKE plenum emphasizes that "the forces exist today which can give a new impetus to the struggle for genuine change, which can ensure a progressive course for the country, and can put a check on the Right."

It is at this point that the resolution explains that in order to realize this positive development, as it characterizes this, "answers are needed to the problems of the country which are grounded on the objectives of change, on the cooperation of all the progressive forces, on the full enlightening of the people, and on a resolute reliance on their struggles. What is needed is a democratic government based on all the progressive forces and on the working-class movement."

But subsequently the resolution states that the KKE "is striving for cooperative efforts on an equal basis on specific issues having to do with safeguarding the peace, repudiating imperialist pressures and isolating the Right, and dealing with the people's problems."

In making a direct reference to the reports on an American initiative on the Cyprus question, the resolution states that "the KKE categorically opposes any attempt to deal with the Cyprus problem outside the framework of the United Nations, whether on the basis of American mediation or that of the so-called guarantor powers," and it stresses that "what is imperatively needed is the broader internationalization of the issue, the taking of initiatives which will mobilize broader international forces for supporting a just solution to the Cyprus problem, by way of the convening of an international representative conference within the framework of the

United Nations." Here it is noted that the KKE is returning to the old proposal by the Soviet Union for an international conference.

The resolution states the following with regard to its other main points:

Euro-elections: "The chief direction of the pre-election work of the party is the fight against the given consequences of our entry into the EEC, in a course aimed at the disengagement of the country from this. The party addresses itself not merely to those who are in favor of disengagement from the Common Market, but also to all those who are seeking the faithful safeguarding of their interests within the framework of the EEC."

Labor unions: It is acknowledged that "steps have been noted in the democratization of the labor movement" and it is stressed that "in the new year the labor movement is facing critical struggles to recover the losses in the income of the workers, since the income policy of the government does not provide for this recovery."

Foreign policy: "The independent foreign policy which the government proclaims it is implementing is inconsistent, is defined by the government's belief in and intention as to avoiding a break with the imperialists, and it frequently proceeds to making accommodations with them."

International situation: "The chief characteristics of the present international situation are on the one hand the increasing belligerence of American-NATO imperialism, and on the other hand the development of the polymorphous peace movement."

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## ANALYSIS OF BLOC POLITICAL REFUGEE PROBLEM

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 1549, 12 Jan 84 pp 25-29

[Article by Giannis Dimitriadis]

[Text] In 1949 and the preceding years, thousands of Greeks, alone or with their families, willingly--but also many against their will--crossed the border and gathered in camps in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. From there they embarked on a new odyssey which led some of them to the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia. There they settled as refugees in foreign countries which, however, offered to all of them what they had tried unsuccessfully to achieve during the civil war in their country: a socialist Marxist regime.

Now many of them, happy and satisfied with the life they spent there, are returning [to Greece]. Along with them are others who regret the years they spent in their voluntary exile. There are those, also, who are not coming back because they have established roots there, and others who cannot return in spite of their wishes--victims of politics.

They saw the possibility of a difficult, conditional repatriation as a reality for the first time during the 18-month government of G. Papandreou (1964-65). The same process was resumed with much greater possibilities during the entire period of the New Democracy government after the fall of the dictatorship. A decision for a mass repatriation with almost no conditions was made by the PASOK government in fulfillment of campaign promises. The repatriation measures included almost all Greek refugees who had kept their Greek citizenship. The measure does not include those who for political reasons gave up their citizenship and now claim part of the national territory, as well as another small group of approximately 100 who from refugees turned into servants of agencies which oppose our national defense and security.

The preceding remarks do not contain details. Certainly there are thousands of stories from all those Greeks. The brevity, however, is due to the fact that our goal is not to study the political refugee problem in its entirety but only the insurance problem of those who return.

#### 1. How the Socialist Countries Deal With the Issue

The transfer of insurance rights of Greek political refugees to Greece for the years they worked in the socialist countries is an issue which had already been

raised 7 years ago. In more than 40 meetings since 1976 no solution has been found. Twice the Greek side has submitted specific plans for the comprehensive solution of the problem without getting any clear answer--not during the government of the New Democracy nor now under PASOK.

On their side, the socialist countries--although each of them handles the matter differently and raises different arguments--seem to wait for a decision in Moscow to open the way. Such a decision has not been made--not because Moscow is short of foreign exchange but because the problem is a bargaining card--indeed, two cards for Moscow. The first one is toward the refugees themselves, some of whom receive their pensions from the embassies of the socialist countries in Athens, provided they are members of a certain party, etc. The second aspect is a card to be played at every meeting with the Greek side; the issue exists permanently, and the possibility of a final denial makes our country more careful when it comes to other claims.

All this has become more fluid in the last 2 months, following the signing of a preliminary agreement with Hungary and the advancement of the negotiations after the visit of Deputy Minister of Social Services (Mrs.) Kaklamanaki to Moscow.

Let us see how each country separately dealt with this question:

**SOVIET UNION:** The Soviet Union cannot accept the Greek request for the transfer of pensions and social security rights. The justification is simply that such payments, according to Soviet law, can be made only within Soviet territory. In spite of repeated promises to study the matter, never has it given any reply (the visit of Mrs. Kaklamanaki may have opened some positive prospects).

**ROMANIA:** Romania appeared initially to be willing to satisfy the Greek request. Later, however, it reneged, arguing that any transfer of money outside of Romania is impossible because the Romanian constitution prohibits the export of foreign exchange. Although initially it appeared to take a positive stand toward the Papandreu proposals, it has not changed its official position so far. Let us not forget that Romania has terrible economic problems and stopped payments in hard currency.

**BULGARIA:** Bulgaria is the only country that has made progress on its own toward the solution of the problems. Already, with a 1977 agreement Bulgaria pays pensions to all Greek political refugees who have completed 35 years of work in Bulgaria. Although those who are included in this are relatively few, Bulgaria is the only country that has taken even a small step, but it continues to prohibit the transfer of social insurance rights of those who have worked for less than 35 years and who are still young.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA:** In more than five interministerial meetings and dozens of formal and informal diplomatic contacts the matter has been brought up by the Greek side without any positive response on the part of Czechoslovakia.

**HUNGARY:** Although in early 1982 it appeared that some progress was forthcoming, Hungary in the end did not change its position until this year. Setting aside

certain foreign exchange difficulties invoked in previous years and which have not been removed after its membership in the International Monetary Fund, Hungary moved ahead with an agreement to pay social security pensions in kind.

POLAND: Although Poland has repeatedly discussed the issue, it has not given any reply. Indeed, in KATHIMERINI, without denial, Poland posed a condition as well: that in the event of agreement Greece would pay pensions to all those declared by the Polish state "heroes of the Greek civil war!!"

EAST GERMANY: East Germany shares the practices of the other socialist countries. In fact, its foreign minister in an interview given in Athens in the winter of 1982 replied to our question that this issue is being studied but he refused to say, even theoretically, that he favors the transfer of pensions and insurance rights. Now some prospects are opening up again.

#### Greek Proposals Up to Now

Several ministries handle this issue on the Greek side--the Ministries of Social Services, Health and Labor, with jurisdiction on matters of social security, work and pensions.

Contacts with the appropriate agencies of the socialist countries are handled by the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry of National Economy also intervenes being responsible for bilateral economic relations, because the matter is often discussed in the context of bilateral relations between Greece and the socialist countries. At this point we must emphasize that the only time the issue became a special subject for discussion was at the meeting of the ministers of social security of Greece and the Soviet Union in May 1979. The matter was handled on the Greek side by the then Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Services Th. Khoutas as the man who had studied it while the meetings were presided over by the then minister Ger. Apostolatos. Under the Greek proposals (a plan was submitted), it was asked that the international procedure for calculating the social security deduction and for their transfer to the Greek Social Insurance Federation (IKA), or to the appropriate insurance agency covering a special agency (TSAY for physicians, TEE for engineers, etc.) be accepted. In this case the Soviets argued (as we said above) that those who leave the Soviet Union are not entitled to pensions and other payments.

Since then the Greek side took another serious step which caused many reactions. Premier Papandreou, when he announced the measures for the unrestricted repatriation of the political refugees, proposed to the socialist countries to recognize the right to transfer the pension payments but instead of payment in hard currency to have payment in kind; in other words, to give to Greece industrial equipment or other products of equal value. This proposal--which raised many questions because it conflicts with many commitments of this country and although it actually "gives away" some of the sums they must pay--has not received any response so far.

Thus, the problem remains and continues to be an element which undermines our bilateral relations with countries of the Eastern bloc. The worst part is that it leaves uncompensated all those who worked for more than 25 years--most of them--

very hard for the economic success of those countries. It also provides a measure for comparison--why not--with what is happening with the Greeks who during the same period worked voluntarily--or often not--in Western countries and today freely receive their pensions and freely transfer their rights.

The refugees who have returned fall into three categories: those who receive their pensions in one way or other; those who are entitled but do not receive them because the problem has not been solved; and those who were not entitled to receive yet a pension when they left the socialist countries. All, however, are entitled to medical and hospital relief which, without the bilateral agreements sought by Greece, cannot be given to them except in a few cases.

For example, under the 1979 Decision of the Ministerial Council, which was completed in the summer of 1981, all those over the age of 70 are entitled to full medical and hospital care. The same assistance is given to all political refugees 1 year after their return to Greece. The present government moved forward the question of pensions to persons over 70 who have no other income source. Yet, for a large number of refugees the problem remains, together with the question: Will the years they worked in the socialist countries be recognized as working years? What kind of hospital aid and pension will they receive? Can they hope that a solution will be found before the year 2010, as one refugee asked us ironically?

Unfortunately no one can yet give a positive and clear answer to these questions. "My son, let us face it, we are 50,000 souls. Will we go down the drain?" said a 76-year-old refugee who spent, as he said, half of his life in Thessalia and half in Tashkend.

## 2. Illuminating Interview with GIKOMMIKOS by Deputy Minister of Social Services (Mrs.) Roula Kaklamanaki

In an exclusive interview to GIKOMMIKOS, Deputy Minister of Social Services (Mrs.) Kaklamanaki reveals certain aspects of the insurance and pension problems affecting the political refugees.

Question: Mrs. Kaklamanaki, much has been said lately on the question of the political refugees and their pensions and social security benefits. What is the case exactly?

Answer: The problem originates from the fact that we wish to help these people but there are no bilateral agreements covering the rights of the repatriates. As in the case of Western Europe we had such agreements with some countries. Those agreements were superseded by the Communal Law following our entry into the EEC. With the socialist--or eastern countries if you wish--we have no such agreements, nor was it possible to have different views. They say: in principle "there are no emigrants," "they did not come to work, so that we have to conclude an agreement with you to transfer their social security rights." Of course, they have no such obligation and they claim that on their part they have never concluded such agreements with other countries. Then they face other problems resulting from their social peculiarities. For us--and for many West European countries--

health insurance means medical and hospital benefits. For those countries it does not mean the same thing because they have a national health system, just as we too sometime will have a national health system. The same applies to other benefits such as housing. For them it is, for us it is not. Everything is different. Even if we had made progress with an agreement the results would be observed but they would be minor. Their minimum pension levels could not cover our minimum levels because the cost of living and the procedures here are different.

Question: But you have announced certain treaties and preliminary agreements...

Answer: Yes, we'll get to that. But there are other questions as well. We have the problem of foreign exchange. They tell us specifically "we cannot export foreign exchange," and many other things. Prior to our coming to power there were several proposals saying, "we want an agreement." I found documents saying, "we propose a Western model." Of course I can tell you that such proposals could not go anywhere. This is a criticism on what has happened before, and we can discuss why no agreements could be reached in this way. We studied the problems, had some thoughts, made some suggestions and presented them to the premier and the premier agreed to move ahead with an agreement, of any type, provided it could solve the problem. As the question of foreign exchange, he said, they might give us products instead. In our discussions we had the opportunity to talk about an agreement which would reflect those peculiarities and which would come close to a solution of the problem, leaving for later an unsolved point, so that we could see here under what conditions we could proceed with health insurance, recognition and paying up for work time to enable us to complete the coverage.

After this, the various countries began to give us specific answers. We received an answer first from Hungary--I'll tell you about it--then from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany.

Question: Bulgaria, Romania?

Answer: Bulgaria had agreed to send the pensions, that is, the pensions it gave over there. A small amount because things are different there. This applied to those who were already retired. If someone had left before receiving a pension and came here and continued to work, he was not included. We, however, continue to press for a broader agreement which would cover this question as well. Despite the fact that to their objections based on legal argument we replied that ways will be found to bypass them, we had accomplished nothing. When the premier visited Sofia we told him about the problem. Kar. Papoulias and Khr. Mahairitsas reminded him. The premier spoke to President Zhivkov and he said, "yes, why not? Let's talk about it to find a solution." As soon as we learned about it we asked for a meeting.

So far Romania has been negative. But we have not given up yet. We have the premier as our trump card. The premier has raised the issue. Ceausescu had said something. But when we talked to the then appropriate ministers they said: "Yes, Ceausescu transfers the matter but we know nothing." The matter again was left there. Now we are going to try again more forcefully. We have, in other words, the same hope we had with Zhivkov.

Question: What exactly has been agreed so far?

Answer: I am coming to that. An initial agreement has been reached with the Hungarians. There is a joint communique between the premier and his counterpart Lazar. "On the basis of a compromise, using payment with products we will find a solution to cover something." We also had replies from the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany.

The first meeting with Hungary took place last summer in Budapest. There we set the stage for an agreement based on the statement of the two premiers. On this basis we had some preliminary talks. Then last time the Hungarians came here and we had a "draft agreement" which provides for the Hungarians giving us an amount in products in installments of 3-4 years. We will try to recognize a certain period of time in an agreement with the spokesmen of the political refugees, with whom we are in close contact. In fact I asked them to form a coordinating organ representing the various organizations. I must say we have splendid relations. The Hungarians are giving us 600 million drachmas or 6 million dollars.

Question: As a total?

Answer: As a total, and after much effort because technically the Hungarians were reaching a much smaller sum.

Question: How many political prisoners are covered by this sum?

Answer: This covers...there is one problem. There are refugees who have not returned, and others who have taken Hungarian citizenship and retain it.

Question: This sum corresponds to how many Greeks?

Answer: I cannot tell you how many Greeks but we are talking about 1,170 who are now here. Of them 115 are retired. The rest have several insured years but they continue to work. In Hungary 1,006 have kept their Greek citizenship. Of them 31 are retired. There are also 1,457 who have Hungarian citizenship with 34 retirees among them.

Question: These are the total figures?

Answer: We are more confident now because the data supplied by the Hungarians agree with those found in a study we conducted. That was the agreement once they refused to sign a treaty. We calculated these figures and we calculated in the sum the coverage of some people who may decide to return and who now have the Hungarian citizenship.

Question: But can such people return?

Answer: I don't know. There is some procedure. Who is going to deny them repatriation?

Question: You mean they will return with Hungarian citizenship and they will receive pensions in Greece?

Answer: Look. Of course they will recover their Greek citizenship. In any event, we included them up to a point. We assume that those who took Hungarian citizenship did so because they want to stay. But we cannot rule out the possibility, since no one can prevent a Greek who took foreign citizenship to recover his Greek citizenship. For this reason we asked for them a small sum to cover partial payment to enroll them organically in IKA. Whether we give them the minimum IKA pension or something else will be decided by the premier.

Question: You have not decided yet?

Answer: The premier has asked us to propose solutions, indicate the cost, possibilities and he will decide.

Question: That there is no detailed decision is easy to understand until you know the final figure or what will happen with the other countries. There is, however, a political decision of the government not to enroll them all in IKA but to the corresponding insurance funds providing pensions to their Greek counterparts: For example, engineers will receive pensions from TSAY, lawyers from the Lawyers' Fund, etc.

Answer: Exactly so. The government has no intention of enrolling them in IKA but in the appropriate fund. At this point we have something pleasant. For example, the Engineers' Fund says, I will take them in, give them regular pension, and I don't want anything. The same goes, I think, for physicians and lawyers. One has been made for the journalists. Now it is pending; the Pension Fund for Public Works Engineer-Contractors [TSMEDE] has decided and it is pending before the minister. Why should not the minister accept it? Initially when I had the entire responsibility for this matter, I told them that if you can make this decision, you who represent the insured, we in the government are going to accept it because we know that we cannot obtain a treaty that will give us comparable sums. Because no country is going to give us more than it gives to its own citizens. Now, if the same sum means one thing here and another there, it is not a matter subject to discussion especially with regard to the political refugees.

This is with regard to Hungary. Next week (4 December) the East Germans are expected to arrive here. (Note: The interview was given prior to this date.) In a preliminary discussion we had, they told us something can be done along the same lines. But there are fewer people involved. It's not so much the economic as the political problem. They must be coordinated. They told us also that they want us to draft an agreement that could be signed when the premier goes to Berlin.

On 12 December we will go to Moscow, and a great deal can be decided there. Coming back from Moscow we will have much to say, because depending on the way Moscow handles the subject we will decide what to do here, i.e., how to exchange this sum--whether it will be in one lump sum, in installments, or through a regular contract. We have three plans--a regular contract of western type. Another view is to accept a lump sum and exchange it into recognition and purchase of rights.

Now if this sum will correspond to so many pensions in so many years, it is not so. I say so because some people tried to give such an impression. When we have recognition and purchase of rights today, it does not mean I will give a pension one for one. Social Security has its own logic. I say this because some people have spoken on this subject in a bad way. You see, if you don't want to solve the problem you have many ways of so doing. But we want to solve it. (Note: Mrs. Kaklamanaki following her return from Moscow stated that she submitted to the Soviet government the plans which the Soviets promised to study as soon as possible. She said that the Moscow meeting had triple significance: 1) It showed that an agreement between Greece and the Soviet Union is possible; 2) it paved the way for the next meeting soon (the Greek side asked for a meeting during the first quarter of 1984); and 3) it set the stage for a new course in dealing with the issue (NEA, 20 December 1983)).

Question: Have you estimated how many will return? How many will receive pensions? How many will be insured?

Answer: We'll know soon since the largest number lives in the USSR. Look, we did something stupid. We took a census ourselves. I mean my office. Now we have these figures--for the premier, the ministers, you, for anybody. Hungary showed that our work is not a mistake. The work is done by my office, what they call the political bureau. I have some money for overtime and I use it for the Directorate of International Relations which does many other things including EEC. Plus we have two men from the mechanical section who help us, in a way, like...missionaries.

Question: What is the final figure?

Answer: 32,000 to 35,000.

Question: Those who are going to return?

Answer: No, those who have already come back. The retirees among them are around 10 percent (note: that is, approximately 3,000). But we'll have a more accurate picture once we check all the data. Although some who live in remote villages may not have been registered with us.

Question: Let us look into something else. How much of this burden will be borne by IKA?

Answer: IKA will not bear any of this burden. IKA will charge automatically the Ministry of National Economy which in turn will select and receive the products from the socialist countries. The enrollment also will be done gradually. Now it will pay only the pensioners. To the insured it will pay nothing right away. To some in a few years, to others much later. The balance will be the difference of the sums paid by the regular IKA pensions. This, however, is a social policy and does not apply to the political refugees only. We'll see how this difference will be covered. Either within the solidarity context of IKA in a group where most members continue to be insured, or by having the government pay for it. This is now being discussed. But our view is not to burden IKA!

Question: How will you calculate the years for purchasing rights for those who return now and then continue to work here? Is your decision to include both?

Answer: Our agreement includes a provision to have the [socialist countries] give affidavits indicating for how many years and where they worked, so that we can tell how to enroll them. For the remaining years they will work here and will complete the necessary years for pension. But if someone wants to buy up the rights for the remaining time with his own funds, we'll see.

Question: Will the purchase of rights be done on the basis of what prevails in Greece?

Answer: Of course. The entire purchase will be based on what exists here. The purchase will take place here; only the amount will be calculated to cover a certain period of time.

Question: Does the agreement provide what kind of products we will take in exchange, or is this left to the Ministry of National Economy?

Answer: The draft agreement provides that the kind, the timing for the transportation, the prices, etc., will be determined by the Ministry of National Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Hungary. Fortunately, a few days after the signing of the agreement we had a bilateral meeting here, and we more or less agreed on the technical implementation of the agreement. The only point we did not settle was the opening date. The Hungarians proposed 1 January 1985, and we proposed 1 January 1984. There we have a small difference. I think we'll find some solution, probably by some compromise. We'll see, because we also insist. The termination date--if it will end in 1988--is of no concern because we, too, imply 3-4 years when we speak of the recognition of insurance rights.

Question: A final question. Those who come here for the first time have full medical and hospital coverage for 1 year. After the year, what happens?

Answer: I don't know. This is a matter under the Ministry of Health and Welfare. For those who are employed there is no problem because anyone who completes 50 working days is automatically entitled to insurance. For the retirees there is nothing special. Although there is something else which applies to all Greek expatriates who return from countries which provide for pensions but not for medical and hospital care, such as Sweden, we suggest that IKA cover them if they pay 8 percent of their pension. The same could apply to the political refugees. Now, if they are going to have different treatment, this is up to the Ministry of Health and Welfare.

#### Political Refugees in Figures

According to the data provided by the three mass organizations of political refugees (the Central Committee for Greek Political Refugees [KEPPE], the Association of Repatriated Political Refugees [GEPP], and the Committee for the Repatriation of Political Refugees [EPPF]) the total number of Greek political refugees who are still in the socialist countries is approximately 33,000 to 35,000.

According to their assurances, approximately 15,000 to 16,000 of them wish to return, provided, in most cases, that they can get their pensions here, or that they will be credited with the years they worked there.

Specifically, they say that the following numbers live in the various countries:

Soviet Union	12,000
Poland	8,000
Czechoslovakia	8,000
Bulgaria	3,000
Romania	3,200
Hungary	3,500

Already, they report, approximately 30,000 have returned and live in Greece, experiencing a number of problems. The social insurance question is not always the most important among them. For many of them, their university degrees are not recognized, while others are often unemployed, although we must underline the special concern of the present government on questions of employment, as it tries to secure employment to all repatriated political refugees.

#### New Problems With Hungary

According to a cable, the Greek Embassy in Budapest, Hungary, has created new additional problems for the Greek political refugees who wish to travel to Greece by prohibiting travel on the basis of "temporary travel documents." As in other issues, the decision is based on "insurmountable legal arrangements" whose victims, however, are in the end the Greek political refugees and especially those who have become Hungarian citizens.

However, matters appear more clear in the cable of the Greek Embassy in Budapest:

"Communication: Ministry of Interior (attention, Secretary General)

"Confidential

"Re: Your document 631/2/AS 121/25.1.83

"Appropriate director of the visa section of Hungarian Foreign Ministry informed yesterday the acting director of our consular office that after careful study, the Hungarian authorities are unable to allow Greek political refugees to travel to and from Hungary on temporary passports issued by the consulate.

"Such temporary documents will be acceptable only for departure from Hungary and permanent repatriation to Greece.

"Hungarian official expressed his regrets for this final negative reply to our request but also hopes that the Greek government will understand that the denial is not due to bad intentions but to existing provisions of domestic legislation in Hungary.

"In view of this the consulate henceforth will issue temporary passports only to those political refugees who depart permanently for Greece. It will issue regular passports to all others provided of course they have regained or never lost their Greek citizenship."

## ANALYSIS OF FUTURE POLITICAL ROLE OF NOMARCHS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 13-14 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by former nomarch Pavlos Gerogiannis]

[Text] Two years ago, in the same columns of this newspaper we had expressed our views in connection with the institution of the nomarch and we had stated our doubts relative to the implementation by the government of the institution of the recallable nomarch. This was the period when the PASOK government had introduced into the Chamber of Deputies the bill concerning recallable nomarchs, which was subsequently passed.

Today, after 2 years the same government is introducing and having enacted in the Chamber of Deputies the bill on recallable eparchs.

Thus, 2 years ago we had pointed out the following:

"And the government must not fail to notice that a great many institutions which were historically esteemed were ruined and began to heap sufferings on the country and the people when they were administered by unqualified and undeserving persons, just as, conversely, controversial institutions have given positive services to the people when they were administered by reputable and qualified persons.

"Thus, let the government be careful in choosing the persons to be the new recallable nomarchs, let it be very careful not only for its own good, but above all for the good of the country, even though unfortunately its path up to now in choosing these individuals has been anything but encouraging in terms of its meritocratic policy."

We pointed out these things 2 years ago then, in a spirit of sincere and constructive criticism about the institution of the recallable nomarchs.

## PASOK Promotes Failures

Subsequently, the PASOK government went on to choose and assign the new nomarchs, after first dismissing the nomarchs who were serving for a specified term, while undertaking in the Chamber of Deputies to freeze the pensionary compensation of those dismissed. Since then 2 years have passed, and the government, faithful to its more general inconsistency,

confined itself to assuring the Chamber a few days ago that "it...will resolve this matter."

But the PASOK government did not dismiss all the nomarchs. The present writer had the foresight to resign in the aftermath of the 1981 elections, thus depriving the government of the satisfaction of dismissing him.

However, it retained also four of the nomarchs serving for a specified term. And the question arises: By what criteria was this distinction made at that time?

For 7 long years, the leader of PASOK in its role as the opposition did not lose any chance to characterize all the nomarchs collectively and without exception as "servile party agents of the New Democracy administration."

How then was the distinction made? Was it the case that the most qualified were retained? The most successful, or the most reputable? Or was it the case that the blood relatives were retained, or those reviling after the fact the administration which had first appointed them and for 7 whole years had retained them, or those who belatedly bestowed adulation on the leadership of PASOK, or were the nomarchs retained those of dubious political respectability and controversial track records?

The answer to these questions has already been given to us by the people of the districts where the retained nomarchs exerted their authority.

In examining the list of the other nomarchs, those appointed for the first time, we tried to discern the criteria which the government used in choosing the persons to whom it would entrust the very important, as it itself admits, duties of a nomarch. We proceeded to this attempt--at all times with a sincere intention--because in the bill on recallable nomarchs no proviso is mentioned for establishing formal or substantive qualifications for the appointment of a nomarch, but rather the choosing, appointment, or dismissal of these nomarchs is left up to the judgment of the government alone.

#### Without Principles of Evaluation

Under the names and surnames we thought that we would find notable university professors, successful businessmen, well-known scientists, esteemed union leaders, senior governmental functionaries, military figures, judges, people with a given good track record, some of those who during the time when PASOK was in the opposition had notably supported its positions, its ideology, and had implemented its political praxis in their sectors of activity.

But unfortunately, none of these things exist as principles of evaluation under the names of the persons on the list. However we found two other criteria, and these were the only ones, under each name of a newly appointed nomarch: The existence of "a notable patron" belonging to the top-ranking leadership of the party, and a close relationship between the nomarch and the leadership of the party organization.

With this finding it was a natural step to predict the quantitative and also the qualitative work of the new nomarchs. And although it has been less than 2 years since the assumption of their duties, these predictions have been confirmed.

In betaking themselves from village to village as third-rate party instructors, they dispute with everybody about everything, creating a climate of insecurity among the civil servants and bringing about a malfunctioning--the term belongs to the premier--in the State machinery.

And of course as the government followed the negative and, even for this administration, unpopular work of its regional representatives, it proceeded to make the appropriate transfers and dismissals of nomarchs--always on the basis of its own judgment--as it had a duty, right, and also an interest in doing.

And up to this point we found nothing sensational, nothing surprised us; we expected these things.

But what was in fact a bolt from the blue, what had happened for the first time--and what we observed dumbfounded and astounded--was the assigning of the dismissed nomarchs to positions of being special advisers to the government.

Not even in our wildest imaginings could we foresee that the PASOK government would subsequently and immediately make use of those dismissed by itself, because it deemed them unfit to be nomarchs, as its own "special advisers."

But however much this move by the government surprised us, it did not make it difficult for us to pinpoint the way its thinking operated with respect to this move.

This move was dictated by the basic thought that "the party comes first above all, and every move on behalf of the unity, the cohesion, and the safeguarding of the party is permissible and imperative, regardless of whether or not people's interests of any sort are harmed because of this move."

And so in the case at hand, the PASOK government promoted the failed nomarchs to being its own special advisers, remaining indifferent to the ruining of the public administration and the violating of every notion of meritocracy and good management.

And while these things are happening in the nomarchy sector, the government is now proposing to restore the institution of the eparchs.

We are all aware of the special characteristics exhibited by certain regions of our country, especially the island areas, as well as the difficulties which exist in communicating with the administrative centers. And we applaud this action of the government.

But it is strange that PASOK, which for 7 long years as an opposition was studying, outlining, and making plans to deal with the problems not only of the Greek sector but also of the international one, now after 2 years of governing the country is managing to render the solution to this very serious problem--the administrative dividing of the country--into a routine problem. Because the bill on the reestablishment of eparchies brings the solution down to the issuing of simple presidential decrees.

Unfortunately the national developmental policy of the socialist government, with its new structures and with its vertical and horizontal organization--the expression belongs to a leading officer of this movement--is also makeshift and at the same time inconsistent in the case of the formation of eparchies as well.

With the establishment of the institution of recallable eparchs in this same bill, the government is proposing to add another link of party commissars to the chain with which it is constricting the freedoms of the Greek people.

After PASOK established the institution of the recallable nomarch without formal qualifications, who has charge of and gives orders to professionals and employees with many years of experience, it is now proceeding to the instituting of the recallable eparch without formal qualifications.

And in the case of the recallable nomarch on the one hand, as long as he uses common sense and acts honorably there are chances to avoid disastrous and catastrophic mistakes to the detriment of the region and the people, since he has around him an adequate number of experienced, educated, and informed employees. But in the case of the recallable eparch--without formal qualifications--given the existing meager civil-service funds, how is it possible to avoid irreparable catastrophes?

But unfortunately the government is neither concerned with nor interested in the number or magnitude or extent of these catastrophes. The only thing which interests it in essence is party control.

The government announces and implements a policy of austerity throughout the civil-service sector. But when it intends to satisfy its own party figures it is not stingy with handouts. And so it classifies the recallable eparch without formal qualifications in the category of special-position employees, in the second grade. This generous reward causes the eparch himself to have reciprocal feelings toward the party which appoints him, and this converts him automatically into a party employee.

The same bill abolishes the possibility of appeal before the appropriate minister in connection with decisions of the eparch. In the introductory report to the bill, it is explained that by way of this provision greater decentralization and a reduction in red tape is undertaken and achieved.

Such a justification is not believable or acceptable, not even if it were addressed to primitive and uneducated people, to Kaffir tribes. We all clearly understand that with this provision the government is pushing

forward with strengthening its party commissar-eparch and at the same time with the constant weakening of the Greek citizen. We can evaluate what the eparch's irrevocable decision--at the nomarchy level--means for the isolated Greek citizen. We can predict with certainty the great magnitude and number of future tyrannical acts by the partisan eparchs, as well as the climate of fear among the citizens of the eparchy.

Because in the name of God we cannot imagine that in all the upcoming arbitrary administrative acts and despotisms of the party eparchs, the average Greek citizen of the isolated and inaccessible eparchy will appeal to the regular courts and to the Council of State.

To the dyptich of the recallable and partisan nomarchs--eparchs, the government is proposing to add also the corresponding Eparchy Councils in the same bill, along with the existing Nomarchy Councils.

It seems that the government is not content with the finding concerning the dubious qualitative and scanty quantitative productive work of the hypocritical nomarchy councils over a 2-year period, which are monitored and controlled closely by this government itself. And it is not satisfied just to have the notoriously--for many reasons--bad functioning of the municipal and above all the communal councils, where evidently the entire work is shouldered and handled by the mayor or the secretary of the community, and therefore it is adding also a new collective organ, the eparchy council.

Of course, as soon as it came into power the PASOK government was faithful to its corresponding pre-election promises and abolished nearly all the councils which had been operating in the country up to then, but it replaced them as rapidly as possible with a multitude of committees, [lines jumbled] of the past and thus while retaining also its own committees it has returned also to having councils.

In any case, this also is a way of governing. Whether it is a proper way or not is another question, and the Greek people will come to a decision about this in due time.

12114  
CSO: 3521/150

## ND RESPONDS TO KKE COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15-16 Jan 84 p 2

[Text] The proposal by the KKE on cooperation with the government is assuming a new dimension. The KKE is not interested in collaborating with the PASOK government. It would not participate in such a government even if PASOK were to ask it. On the contrary, it is interested in and is seeking a government of "all the progressive forces" on the basis of a minimum program, as the secretary general of the KKE, Khar. Florakis, stated to the ELEVTHEROTYPIA the day before yesterday. This new dimension is noted by the chairman of the New Democracy Party; in response to the statements by Florakis, he called on Premier Andr. Papandreou yesterday to enlighten the people about this matter in a responsible and sincere fashion.

In addition it is noted that the government did not take a position yesterday vis-a-vis the statements of Florakis. Conversely, it hastened to reply to the statements made by Averof. Moreover the remarks by Florakis were not even commented upon by the parties which consider themselves to belong to the camp which the KKE secretary general describes as "progressive forces." However, an earlier political application of the term (municipal elections of 1982) assumes that this camp forms a united front, with the only party not included being the New Democracy.

## The Statement by Averof

The chairman of the New Democracy Party, Evangelos Averof, made the following statement:

"The public as a whole will not learn of a momentous revelation which Florakis made. Because it is contained in a statement he made to only one newspaper. Without reservations or equivocations, Florakis proclaims that the policy of the KKE is 'a government of all the progressive forces, with a minimum program which is generally acceptable. We will participate in such a government, not in the present government.' The policy based on a 'minimum program' has been implemented also in other countries, and it leads to either a balance with deputies of the communist party in power for quite some time, or to only the communists remaining in power through expulsions of their allies (case of Masaryk of Czechoslovakia).

"The things which have been done and said recently, which are being reinforced on the one hand by the eloquent silence of Papandreou and on the other by the very wordy texts coming from Florakis, understandably are creating a climate of anxiety.

"Regardless of pre-election or post-election agreements, whether secret or open, the premier has an obligation to speak responsibly and sincerely. The Greek people cannot be ignored and deceived on such an important subject, in hearing only the second-rate verbal witticisms of the government, which are clouding the issue even more."

#### The Government

The government representative, Dimitris Maroudas, stressed the following in his comments on the statement by the chairman of the New Democracy, Evang. Averof:

"Mr Averof continues to be disappointingly .earisome. His statements are no longer paid attention to even by his own party."

#### Rejoinder by the ND

In response to the statements of the government representative, a spokesman for the New Democracy Party made the following remark:

"It is natural for the government to be upset, because the statements by the chairman of the New Democracy keep the issue open and put the government in a difficult position. For this reason it is maintaining its suspicious silence.

"Nevertheless the question remains: Is an agreement between the government and the KKE being hatched up?

"Admittedly a certain political stature is needed for one to confirm or to deny this, rather than choosing silence. Whether the premier has this stature will be shown by what he does.

"Therefore let him stop equivocating and let him speak directly. It is not the New Democracy which demands this. The Greek people demand it."

#### The Statements by Florakis

More specifically, the statements by Florakis, as published in the ELEVTHEROTYPIA, are as follows:

"I do not understand why there is this commotion concerning my meeting with the premier. We ourselves asked for this meeting, as we are entitled to do as a recognized political party."

"--But you were with the premier just a few days earlier."

"--At that time we spoke about the Cyprus problem. The premier briefed us about developments on this issue. The time was too short for us to be able to set forth our views on a number of questions which are of concern to the country. In the last plenum of the party's Central Committee, we examined all the current problems and arrived at resolutions. We gave an account of these resolutions to the premier, and in fact the talk which followed was very interesting."

"--The ND seemed to be upset by the meeting, and its reaction yesterday was yet another in the series of its more general reactions having to do with cooperation between PASOK and the KKE. In fact, some people were speaking about a 'sharing of ministries' in connection with your meeting with the premier."

"--These things do not hold water. Only the Right can say them. And in order to make it clear, I say to you that even if the PASOK government were to offer us ministries, we ourselves would not accept them. Our policy is known, and we have repeatedly announced our position in favor of a government of all the progressive forces, with a minimum program which is jointly acceptable. We will participate in such a government, not in the present government."

"But the day before yesterday we merely examined with the premier the problems which exist and trouble the country, whether we like it or not."

12114

CSO: 3521/150

## ND DEPUTIES CRITICAL OF POLICE CAPABILITIES, USE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Nikos Rizos]

[Text] Nine ND deputies noted in speeches to the Chamber of Deputies that the feeling of insecurity among the Greek people has increased because of the way the government is dealing with the security agencies. During the debate on the formal question, it was underlined that this feeling is because of the slackening of police effectiveness especially in urban areas as well as to the increase in common crimes.

The debate was extended to all aspects of governmental policy on the Security Corps. The opposition spokesmen attributed the "breakup of the police mechanism" to the party-inspired persecution and to the growing impression that the security agencies are controlled by "green guards."

More specifically, ND parliamentary spokesman K. Mitsotakis charged the government with using in its ranks innumerable juntists who have been "rebaptized" in PASOK's "holy waters." He even mentioned the case of a major accused of torture who was sent to his old post by Minister of Public Order J. Skoularikis, although the major himself asked not to be sent back to the area in which he had been active [during the dictatorship].

"You have many 'jenitsars' in your ranks," he added characteristically, "'jenitsars' who care only about revenge."

He spoke of rumors that the Ministry of Public Order has given orders to its organs not to carry out certain decisions of public prosecutors and he expressed the hope that in the coming election "all parties will agree that the Security Corps stay out of the electoral campaign."

At another point in his speech, Mitsotakis expressed his conviction that his telephone is being tapped by some unknown agency, the Athens Police Directorate or the Central Intelligence Service [KYP]. He added: "Moreover, lately we have been living in fear of political assassination, something new in our country. I would like to draw the government's attention to the freedom of travel and communication it gives to certain foreign elements. I speak in general!"

The formal question was presented by ND Deputies K. Sapsalis, S. Gikas, G. Bougas, I. Vougiouklakis, I. Stathopoulos, D. Panousakis, N. Celestathis, P. Koutras, Th. Papadopoulos and A. Krikos. They said in part:

--No man in the Security Corps can foresee his fate because he does not know the fate of the agency in which he serves.

--Police supervision is nonexistent. The men of the Riot Control Units [MAT] patrol streets in Athens they do not know.

--There is word of work stoppages in the Cities Police.

--The chief of the gendarmerie participates in PASOK party festivities.

--Foreign agents are using Greek soil to settle their own differences by means of murders, explosions, etc.

--Police activity has waned in most of the city of Athens except for Kifisia Avenue and the area around the premier's house.

--The government refuses to implement the court decisions which overturn the dismissals of officers.

Ninety soldiers of the Armed Forces are engaged in processing and codifying the data of 135,000 applications for hiring by the civil service. This is reported in a formal interpellation by K. Stefanopoulos, G. Moutzouridis, D. Vrettakis and K. Sapsalis, who want to find out why the Ministry to the Premier is using soldiers instead of its own employees. "With what criteria--and by whom--were the soldiers selected and who will be responsible for any favors or errors? Is it because the minister wants to have an alibi in the event there are unqualified persons selected?"

Skoularikis

Minister of Public Order I. Skoularikis based his arguments mainly on statistical data saying with ease that "our country is almost like an oasis of tranquility where law and order prevail."

According to these data:

--The ratio of policemen in our country is one to every 220 inhabitants. In no other country is the ratio less than 1:350, which proves that there is sufficient police protection.

--The budget of the Security Corps has increased considerably.

--About 66 percent of policemen have only primary education. In general the educational level of the average Greek citizen is much higher. There are very few university graduates.

--Policemen do not receive practical training, only theoretical education. "The ministry is trying to change the system for more sound police supervision, and the ND sees this effort with suspicion."

--Referring to the tapping of Mitsotakis' telephone, he denied that such a thing could happen "unless you have to hide any unlawful acts." "In any event," he said, "none of the services of the security agencies--and I control them all--has tapped your phone."

--Referring to the question of unifying the two agencies Skoularikis said that nothing can be reported before reaching a conclusion. He added: "Or at least nothing that could be made public."

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CSC: 3521/157

## ANALYSIS OF RECENT CABINET RESHUFFLE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 22-23 Jan 84 p 5

[Article by Khristos Karanikas]

[Text] Premier A. Papandreou wastes his time in roundabout moves while only a frontal attack on the country's economic problems can save the government. The reshuffle may have changed the cabinet's profile but it is doubtful that it convinced the people that the critical problems will be dealt with with new effectiveness. Indecisiveness is the main feature of Papandreou's personality and political attitude, judging from the reshuffling and from the statements of his spokesman who daily denies that the government is acquiring a centrist profile.

In any event the appointment of Ap. Lazaris to the most senior ministry signifies a shift to a more realistic policy in all sectors and to the abandonment of the third world wanderings in our foreign relations. This shift is becoming easier following the sudden fall of the partisans from their high government posts reminiscent of the previous "massacres" of 1975 and 1976, only now it is done more politely and each is compensated with a ministerial car. At the same time, the premier makes everyone in his government feel insecure by introducing the old communist tactics of in-party intimidation. Nobody is sure of his post, nobody can be regarded truly or symbolically successful; nothing matters but the leader. The insecurity rolls downhill from Kastri, uprooting bushes and small trees and threatening to become a landslide.

Of course all these moves must be seen in the context of the political balances Papandreou has cultivated. On one side Papandreou meets Khar. Florakis trying to preserve the conditions of strange toleration on the part of the communist leadership toward his economic policies. This toleration is meeting resistance among the followers, the voters and the lower cadres of the communist party who feel, and share, the pressure of the workers for harsher struggles. But at the very same moment the premier demotes the partisans who are KKE's natural allies, thus causing serious doubts in others regarding his long-term plans.

Once again Papandreou showed that "the party is me," complementing the phrase he had used a few days ago speaking to the PASOK parliamentary group, that "after me, chaos." Somewhere, however, he must feel that his tactic appeals only to in-party consumption. He must realize that the responsibility is his, and apparently for this reason he did not appear on TV to announce the reshuffling

as he likes to do. Probably he has found out that his personal appeal has declined and he chose to distance himself for awhile. Time will tell.

### Economy Is the Achilles Heel

The reshuffling hurt only the partisans while it spared the nonparliamentary technocrats who have the economic ministries. At this point, Papandreou apparently tried to preserve the personal balance and avoided strengthening the group of ministers from the parliament. But with this tactic he left his Achilles heel--the economy--exposed, but he also "took care" to let the reshuffling pass unnoticed by the broad public. Of course, the people noticed the appointment of Lazaris to the Ministry to the Premier, with his known roots in the democratic left which emanated in Greece not in the third world or the second way, and with the good impressions he left during his few months in the Ministry of Coordination.

The premier's resort to a roundabout move may appear on the surface as a masterful maneuver because it relieves him of personal friction, but at the same time it reminds one of King Pyrrhos who after defeating the Romans, instead of moving against defenseless Rome, wasted his time in useless campaign in Sicily and southern Italy. The time for dealing with the economy is short and does not allow the luxury of the socialist experiments of American universities. By Easter, the government must take not only the economic measures which will open the road to recovery but it must also show the first positive results.

This is the biggest problem for the government which for the past 2½ years has not been in the habit of producing. It is good in theorizing, but in practice... On the other hand, the government must reconcile its feuding factions. This can be done only by the premier who must overcome his dislike for systematic work. The economic czar must learn to carry over to the other ministries the orders of the Governmental Council for Policy [KYSYM]. The partisans, their wings clipped, must be satisfied with their quarrels with the lower cadres, trying to prevent the strikes.

Both the technocrats in the country's economic matters--one may wonder if they ever understood which country's economy they are dealing with--and the partisans in their relations with the broader popular strata have not shown much dexterity. Papandreou succeeded in selecting the wrong persons for the wrong posts in both of these sectors. On the other hand, already we see personal feuds and conflicts emerge--so frequent in PASOK from its inception and so often hatched by Papandreou. At a time when every minute counts--the Euro-elections are coming and nothing can postpone them--the government wastes its time with economic playacting. At the same time it cannot convince the people that the same persons can implement a different policy under different instructions. At some time [Papandreou] will pay for [his] indecision.

### Balance Toward the Center and the Left

All this is taking place at the very moment the entire political course of the government is subject to question. The populist slogans and the third world orientation are now a burden and are no longer convincing. It may be that the internal problems of the New Democracy give the government some time but they do

not give it the toleration of the public. The clash is not limited to the political area of the center but also from the side of the government's democratic behavior and Papandreou's mentality. The vacillation shows that the premier has not found as yet where the problem lies, something which explains the form the reshuffling took.

On the other hand, the acrobatics with KKE are both difficult and unconvincing. The toleration toward KKE in matters of foreign policy means that the Greek policies on the national issues are weakened. It is shown that only through the West can we achieve some prospect of acceptable solutions. The change in the other top ministries will have effect in this direction. Domestically, this means friction at least with KKE. Papandreou will find it very difficult to have his cake and eat it too.

The political connection of the premier to the center is problematic today, because much is affected by his foreign policy, his handling of the economy and his mentality. One consequence of this is the moves of the nonaligned of the Center and the Left, the search [for new alignments] in Athens and in the provinces. These moves are not phenomena that start with large rallies. They reflect a different political thought while at the same time they herald the end of certain political phenomena. Many people come together, talk and criticize because they are deeply worried over the political mentality exuded by the government because it smells bad times for this country. These moves resemble quiet rivers.

These people have a political dialogue only with the PASOK deputies--dialogue but common worries also. Papandreou did not have the courage this time, too, to proceed with the deep changes in his government and to open up toward his parliamentary deputies. The only thing he did was to avoid adding more technocrats but keeping those already in the government. In an election year this move may prove to be the most critical for the premier because after the downgrading of the partisans who were only doing him harm, he is only left with the parliamentary deputies who have some public appeal. In the villages and in the neighborhoods only the deputies and the old democrats of the Center and the Left have ties, discuss and listen to the people's problems. Every step away from them brings the consequences so much closer.

7520

CSO: 3521/157

## HOUSING PROBLEMS AGITATE SOUTH MOLUCCANS

Rotterdam HET VRIJE VOLK in Dutch 7 Jan 84 p 9

[Report: "Poverty Feeds Moluccan Struggle"]

[Text] After the word "Moluccan" had been absent from the media for many months, last November it suddenly rang a bell again for most Netherlanders. In Capelle aan den IJssel, under the smoke of Rotterdam, there suddenly was a reason for that. Paul Thenu, the 52-year old "djaja keamenan" (leader of the Moluccan vigilance committee) refused to be thrown out of his house. On that 22 November, 100 members of the ME [Police Mobile Unit] stood ready on the edge of the Moluccan district in Capelle, Vak G-Oost-gaarde, to assist the bailiff. They did not need to go into action, however. Backed by the Moluccan action committee, Paul Thenu decided to pay his overdue rent.

Over a month later, on Wednesday 4 January 1984, Paul Thenu was walking through his territory once again. "Rassa di Hati," he murmured almost unintelligibly on behalf of thousands of other South Moluccans in the Netherlands when he had to witness a group of young, but extremely angry fellow countrymen waging man-to-man battle with the front line ME members in the Banda Neira, using primitive arms. "I feel it in my heart . . ."

Capelle aan den IJssel--During the night of 3/4 January the lights were on in most homes of the Moluccan district in Capelle until 5 in the morning. A lot of work was being done and speculation was taking place on coming events. In the Banda Neira, the main life line of the Moluccan community in Capelle, six homes were practically emptied that night. The furnishings were moved to attics in Namlea street, Waitatiri street and elsewhere in the Banda Neira.

Those people didn't sleep that night. The district council was meeting feverishly on what should be done to calm the minds--in vain, as it turned out later. Meanwhile a few evil youths, many of whom were having Christmas vacation, filled some bottles with gasoline and looked for helmets, shawls and klewangs [short, wide swords]. They were expecting "balakai" (fighting) to occur later on.

Around 9 o'clock that day 100 ME members marched up the Banda Neira, awaiting the arrival of the bailiff. The latter was supposed to ask five families and a sick man living alone to pay their rent or else leave their homes. For  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour the ME members, recruited mainly from Rotterdam, stood face to face with the Moluccan "mempertahan" (fighters) and only the clanging of weapons was heard.

Then the skirmishing started. Stones flew through the air; the Moluccans challenged the ME members. The vigilance committee of the district was unable to calm them down. Two ME members were hit by a cudgel and an iron pipe. A third one got a load of stinging (battery) acid in his face. A fourth was mercilessly struck down with a heavy pipe which hit him in the neck just under his helmet. He was taken away with a bad concussion. To protect this colleague and another fallen "mate", one ME member drew his Walther P-5 and took aim. The bullet struck Edjong Tapamahu in his right shinbone. That shot meant the end of the fighting in the Dutch polder, at least for the 4th of January . .

"As far as I can remember, that type of police action had never before occurred in the Netherlands," the secretary of the Dutch Police Federation (NPB), H. van Duyn, was to say later, referring to the drawn arms of the ME members in front who kept the Moluccans at a distance. "I assume that these men experienced such a strong feeling of threat that they feared one-on-one battles."

"A clear case of self-defense," Chief Inspector P.J. van Zunderd of the Capelle police also said, after calm had returned later that day. "The ME members were threatened with klewangs, iron pipes, and other weapons. A decision could no longer be made on using teargas or a water canon because that attack had come too suddenly."

The ME and the masked Moluccans remained face to face that day until 2:30 pm, since 6 homes had to be "cleared" and boarded up. Outsiders were able to witness interesting scenes in the Banda Neira: Moluccan "perumpuan perumpuan" (women) who, wrapped in their sarongs, supplied the fighting Moluccans with hot tea and cake. But the mobile canteen of the ME was also discovered rapidly: buns and coffee for whoever wanted it.

Meanwhile the district council was meeting again in the canteen next to the Bethel church, under the leadership of J. Huliselan. There the Moluccans would bid farewell to "Aunt Ambraham" the following day. After a long illness she had died of a heart attack during the irregularities. Startled, the district council determined that the resistance had got out of control.

The events in Capelle aan den IJssel of last Wednesday formed a safety valve for a frustration of many years. Frustration because of a powerless political struggle and also because of a continuously decreasing standard of living. The steam was let off at the level of an angry street riot.

"This is only the tip of the iceberg," says dr. M. Muai, member of the Discussion Forum for the Welfare of South Moluccans, the only advisory body for Moluccans in the Department of Internal Affairs. "There are large rent debts in Moluccan communities all over the Netherlands. Therefore I consider the action of the police

unfair. Especially since mediation attempts made on our part met with refusals from the Capelle municipality." "Nonsense," Mayor Luigi van Leeuwen of the polder municipality dismisses this criticism. "We have tried to find a solution. We have been working on that since last May. Ultimately the Moluccan district council wanted our municipality to guarantee loans which Moluccan families wanted to get from the Rotterdam Credit Bank. We were unable to do that because we are short of funds ourselves. Moreover, we would have given these South Moluccan families preferential treatment then. There are actually weekly home evictions due to rent debts in Capelle . . ."

The rent debts of the Moluccan families originated after 22 families had delayed their payments to the SVW home building corporation for 1½ years. They had done that in protest against the high housing costs which did not correspond with the drafty and leaking homes and their incomes. The Building Aid Foundation from Eindhoven drew that conclusion already last year. The rent commission of Rotterdam this week also concurred with a number of residents from Capelle-Oostgaarde, including a number of Dutch families: rent increases over 1982 and 1983 do not have to be accepted.

Similar judgments are fuel for the Moluccan struggle which is being fought not only by 22 families, but now by most of the inhabitants of Capelle-Oostgaarde. Since 1 July, about 160 families have been depositing 150 guilders per month in a blocked account, in protest against the high housing costs which sometimes run up to 1100 guilders per month. But many even older problems are lurking in the background.

In the refusal of the Capelle municipality the Moluccans once again see the denial of their KNIL [Royal Dutch East Indian Army] rights which they believe they are entitled to. These KNIL rights go back to 1951. The High Council of the Netherlands determined in that year that 5000 Moluccan military who had served in the Dutch East Indian army would be allowed to come to the Netherlands with their families. They refused to remain behind in the East Indian archipelago because the army of Indonesian President Sukarno had driven out the government of the South Moluccan Republic the previous year. The Moluccan KNIL military feared they would meet certain death if they were to remain behind under the Sukarno government.

Without the existence of a discharge permit, which is customary these days, the 5000 KNIL military unexpectedly were handed an official document during their trip to the Netherlands. They were relieved en masse of their duties in the KNIL army and were in fact the first legion of unemployed to set foot on Dutch soil.

From that moment onward the South Moluccans were under the care of the state. As long as peace did not return to the South Moluccas, they received free housing until they would be able to return home again. They were housed in former concentration camp barracks and other lodgings. Moluccans were not allowed to work for wages, but they received a compensation of 3 guilders per person per week and 2 guilders for every child from the government. The 5000 families were spread over practically all parts of the Netherlands.

"The KNIL rights are still just as valid now as in 1951," says Frieda Tomaso, member of the Moluccan district council in Capelle aan den IJssel. "The problem has been postponed for many years and probably has become blurred in many people's minds. But the majority of the Moluccans in the Netherlands still are of the opinion that they must lay claim to provisions of the Dutch Government on the basis of their KNIL rights."

So far only small, radical youth groups have been willing to court danger, but according to Frieda Tomaso most youths at present are militant. "Many of them were seriously affected by the economic recession in recent years. There is a high percentage of unemployed--not only in Capelle. Chances for employment probably will not increase because many Moluccans are not well educated. Just like many Dutch workers, they are also vulnerable to [economic] blows."

"The younger people therefore see themselves more and more as fellow victims. Hence they support the older generation."

"The Moluccan way of life is primarily characterized by a strong nagari tradition," she explains. "Families from villages with a common tie in the Moluccas therefore often get together. Moreover, our protestant-reformed religion plays a large role in that. Those cultural commitments also entail costs which the Moluccan population has to bear. That is difficult to understand for sober Netherlands, but to us those cultural traditions are extremely important," says Mrs Tomaso. "We try to honor our old Moluccan customs."

Since 1951 there have been numerous difficulties between the Dutch State and South Moluccans over the KNIL rights. In those ranks also, things are not always going too well. For example, many militant splinter groups have separated from the Moluccan unity movement, Badan Persatuan, which strives for an independent republic in the South Moluccas.

According to Frieda Tomaso there is no division in Capelle aan den IJssel. "Here we stand behind our actions as one bloc, and I hope that the extreme limit was reached with the four wounded ME members and the shooting of Edjong Tapamahu."

Seven more families are faced with eviction shortly. Moreover, the Rotterdam district court will soon have a sample case to deal with, for it will be getting rent disputes of almost 110 families in the Oostgarde district.

There are other Moluccan communities in which this action is taking place, including those of Vaassen, Oosterwolde, Boven-Smilde, Barneveld, Assen and Breda.

Mrs Kolanus from Waitatiri Street may also expect to be evicted shortly. So far that has been delayed because she was able to avoid the subpoena addressed to her husband.

Mrs Kolanus: "With my husband and three children, I have to live from a relief benefit of 1400 guilders per month. I'm paying almost 1100 guilders in housing costs. I stopped paying rent because I have to choose between not perishing or paying rent."

## ILICAK POSITIVE ON FIRST OZAL PRESS CONFERENCE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Jan 84 pp 1,10

/Text/ Turgut Ozal has conducted his first press conference. During the conference Ozal presented to public opinion a detailed summary of his policies and provided a list of his objectives. A number of measures have been implemented simultaneously with the inauguration of the new government. With the exception of the impact generated by price hikes, the effect of these measures has not yet been felt by average citizens. It is only over a longer period of time that measures such as the liberalization of foreign currency trading, the removal of restraints on luxury imports or the simplification of bureaucratic transactions will have a visible impact. The economic decisions that are being made will become justified to the extent that they are able to provide for price stability and the mobilization of foreign and domestic resources for the purpose of financing economic development. It is only gradually that the gains of such positive results would be felt by the public which for the moment must be satisfied to receive no more than promises.

The reduction of a budgetary deficit approaching one trillion liras is a primary objective. This budget deficit is the primary source of inflation and the recent price hikes have been implemented with the purpose of reducing the deficit. Increasing output within an industrial system that is currently operating at 65 percent capacity utilization is another priority. A close relationship exists between increases in capacity utilization and increases in export levels. The task of attracting idle savings into the economic system constitutes another objective. It is this objective which has given rise to the idea of banks geared towards high interests and gold deposits. The creation of an atmosphere that is conducive to the arrival of foreign capital in Turkey is a primary objective. The liberalization of laws governing foreign currency transactions has been selected as a measure to provide greater opportunities from abroad.

Should the government be successful in providing price stability and in obtaining foreign and domestic credit sources the fruits

of this success could be distributed to the masses in the future. We do not believe that any visible results will be obtained before the regional elections and that the voters will vote in accordance with their perceptions of the degree of success achieved by these policies. 25 March is too early a date to perceive any results.

We would also like to briefly mention the matter of the European Council which Turgut Ozal mentioned during his press conference. The European Council is busily debating the democratic attributes of the elections of 6 November. Nevertheless, the Council changed its stance after Ozal's victory at the polls and now seems disposed to accept the credentials of the new representatives after regional elections are held. The regional elections are very significant in that they have provided a foundation for the expression of popular sovereignty. We cannot get angry at an organization that does not condone any deviations from democratic principles when the organization in question consists exclusively of democratic member states. Like the European Council, we believe that the nation's true sentiments will only become known after the regional elections. We believe that we should await the results of these elections which will be held within a framework of legitimacy and legality. A move by Turkey to sever its ties with the European Council would constitute a denial of the stability of our foreign policy which has traditionally maintained certain premises regardless of the government in office. For this reason, we do not perceive such a move as possible.

Ozal has held a conference that was relaxed, positive and convincing. Nevertheless, he was not correct in giving the impression that our relations with Europe hang by a thread. Turkey will be modern, powerful and democratic to the extent that it is able to develop its relations with the West. We cannot tie our lifeline to the turbulent and crisis ridden Middle East.

9491

CSO: 3554/126

## SPD, GREENS PRESENT 'ALTERNATIVE' DEFENSE STRATEGIES

West Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 8 Dec 83 p 8

[Article: "Technoguerilla and Social Defense"]

[Text] The Bundestag's Defense Committee met this week for the third time in order to question experts about the status of NATO strategy and about possible alternatives.

A short comment first in connection with the history of this hearing and in respect to the composition of the experts: The parties represented in the Bundestag were able to invite experts according to their proportionate share so that the governing majority was in a position to guarantee a majority opinion at this level and in fact did so. There was also virtually no desire at all to come to grips with alternatives: Of the 10 questions which all those invited had to respond to as homework only the last one dealt with alternatives. Thus, Professor Ebert of Berlin saw himself obliged to make the comment that this list of questions was drawn up by politicians who unquestionably identify with NATO. The Greens had rejected these questions.

## Technocommandos

Horst Afheld of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg and his cousin Eckhard Afheld, retired general (CSU member), both of whom were invited by the SPD, viewed NATO's greatest problems to be in its dependence on the use of nuclear weapons. Instead, they suggest keeping ready only sea-based nuclear weapons as a response to a possible nuclear attack by a potential enemy and otherwise defend themselves in a conventional manner. Three phases are included in this conventional defense:

"A 'motorized group' which will have to be newly created will be echeloned along the border in great depth in a 70-100 km-deep network and will be very widely dispersed. It is charged with absorbing the attack by enemy combat forces--starting right along the border, with repeatedly stopping them in front of barriers and with fire, and with inflicting losses. In battles lasting for days at a time at night and during the day, even against the rear lines of communication, and finally in the total depth of the network the attacker is to be decimated, slowed and hemmed

in in such a way that a large part of its combat effectiveness is absorbed and its attack dynamic is extensively choked." A special advantage of this method would consist in the fact that the villages are left unattacked in these engagements and the enemy would have little opportunity to locate the "motorized units" which operate in small groups.

"Our own mechanized units located behind the network will gain several days time because of the battle by the motorized units. Their job is to contain enemy forces which penetrate the network and to break them up. Additional mechanized forces are located in depth as an operative reserve."

According to this concept the motorized unit is to have a maximum of 150,000 men and will receive special preparation for its task. In times of peace it would have to live in "its territory." Everything that it would need for a battle period of 2 to 3 weeks must be available now in small depots and hiding places which will have to be built in large numbers. The goal of future strategies must, according to Afheld, consist in not being confronted during a possible crisis with a choice between our own preventive attack or the anticipation of one by the enemy.

### Three Legs

Norwegian peace researcher Galtung, currently a guest professor at the Free University of Berlin and invited by the Greens, holds the view that both superpowers have a tendency to be aggressive. Nonetheless, there is a difference: for the Soviet Union capitalism is an historically essential phase in history, for the United States communism is simply superfluous. An evaluation of arms logic indicates that disarmament negotiations must fail.

If NATO strategy does not change he sees a 50-percent probability of a nuclear war in the 1980's. His alternative is to rearm NATO with purely defensive weapons. He has an idea of a defense which has to stand on three legs; first the design of the Afheld cousins must be supplemented by guerilla units and by designs of social defense.

As a long-term outlook Galtung would like the "Finlandizing" of Eastern Europe and the "Austrianizing" of the West. The defense of the West should become independent of the United States.

12124

CSO: 3620/139

## BUNDESWEHR CHIEF REVIEWS MANPOWER, PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS

Munich EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE in German Jan 84 pp 7-10

[Interview with Bundeswehr Inspector General Wolfgang Altenburg]

[Excerpts] For the new year, General Wolfgang Altenburg answered the following questions on the situation of the German armed forces for EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE.

The Bundeswehr of the Future Won't Be Cheap

[Question] The defense budget cannot be raised to the desirable extent by a government that is forced to save all down the line for the sake of fiscal recovery. Where do you see indispensable needs for extra funds and where, do you think, the Bundeswehr also can save some?

[Answer] Sure enough, the defense budget is in a tight spot between needs and taking care of them, between what is militarily necessary to meet our defense mission and what is feasible from the overall economic point of view.

As inspector general I must pay attention to both aspects. The Bundeswehr of the future won't be cheap. More defense and more security can come only from more money. That can't come to "more divisions," but rather to "more ideas," as we have long been aware.

On the other hand, I must respect the government's effort to consolidate the national budget which means, in cleartext, I have to be modest today if need be so that it will be possible tomorrow to get what is needed. Within the defense budget, through reallocation, extra funds must be released for indispensable needs in terms of the strategic trend. They must mainly be used in the years ahead for improving the personnel situation and the training. Procuring urgently needed peripheral devices has the priority in materials.

Chances for savings I see in the material maintenance field, in part also for general operational costs, and this by the already initiated rationalization efforts and the critical testing of inventories. Yet our expectations must not be too high because many sectors are greatly exposed to the risk of unforeseeable price hikes and currency losses.

Capacities Available for the Forward Defense Must Be Strengthened

[Question] Not only SACEUR has vehemently advocated for some time an expansion of the current forward defense into the depth of enemy territory in order to be able in a defense situation to oppose the second strategic echelons of tank armies in the offensive with the help of improved reconnaissance and radar systems, early in the game, by air force and ballistic missiles with new kinds of warheads. Because such extra operational tools are expensive, General Rogers has asked the allies to increase their contributions to NATO. What are the implications from that for the Bundeswehr?

[Answer] General Rogers is concerned with strengthening the conventional fighting capacity as such. He wants to reduce--as we do--the prevailing dependency on threatening nuclear strikes in case of a Warsaw Pact attack and create a higher degree of freedom of action for political decisions. The condition for that is that the power ratio for conventional defense on the battleground is shifted for the benefit of NATO formations. For that purpose SACEUR proposes to oppose the ground forces the Warsaw Pact brings into the battle echelon by echelon in the depth of the territory. This neither is anything fundamentally new nor an expansion of the forward defense.

About the goal of "strengthening the conventional fighting capacity" there is consensus in the alliance. How that can best be done is still being explored in the alliance organizations. What will matter here is not only being oriented to whatever appears technically feasible. Operational needs have to be carefully determined within the scope of overlapping conceptual considerations. Some more detail may explain that:

I think it is crucial first to consolidate the fighting strength and pertinacity of the NATO formations that have to hold in the initial phase of a war against the first echelon Warsaw Pact fronts. That creates the basic premise for NATO to be able to use its growth potential. A high combat capability of NATO's air defense is equally important. It must be able to reduce the impact of enemy air attacks so that our air and ground forces find their freedom of operations ensured and the bringing in of reserves and reinforcements is secured. After all, the second echelon Warsaw Pact fronts are to be opposed and delayed in the places of the deployment system where perceptible delays are obtainable. In being oriented to these operational needs, often it is enough to optimize the available or planned weapons systems. It is important for us to improve our fire power on the battlefield to a depth of from 20 to 30 kilometers, e.g. by more intelligent artillery ammunition and more intelligent mines. It is furthermore essential for us to modernize our air defense and the impact of our fighter-bombers and their targeting efficacy. The next thing then is reducing enemy offensive capabilities in depth. In his concern to pay attention to this aspect and examine the effectiveness of weaponry General Rogers has our backing. It is part of the overall concept!

These solutions will also be costly; for zero investments one cannot buy an improved conventional fighting strength.

The Approaching Personnel Shortage Can Be Surmounted Only by a Bundle of Measures

[Question] It is no secret that the Bundeswehr is facing a personnel bottleneck the closer we come to the 1990's because of the diminished birthrate age-groups. What chances for solutions do you see or which would you prefer?

[Answer] What we want is an adequate peacetime strength that makes possible growing up to an uncurtailed defense strength.

"Adequate" means that the Bundeswehr must retain its forward defense capability even if the time available for defense preparations is short. It also means an unaltered fighting strength, which presupposes an armed forces defensive strength at roughly the present level.

Measures are conceivable which the Bundeswehr can initiate itself, yet we cannot evade measures on which a political decision has to be made, be it the extension of basic military service or the voluntary enlistment of women.

I am sure only a whole bundle of separate measures can take care of the problem in its whole magnitude, nor do I doubt that most measures will be very expensive.

Thus Far Major Weapons Could Be Procured as Planned--That Will Become More Difficult in the Future

[Question] The tighter defense budget forces priorities on us in Bundeswehr material procurement. Which essential demands and desires by the various parts of the armed forces with regard to the major weapons systems can be met within the next 5 years? Where are desires likely to remain unfulfilled?

[Answer] Thus far we have managed to carry out the large-scale projects according to plan, and that included such cost-intensive projects as the TORNADO fighter aircraft, the LEOPARD 2 combat tank and FREGATTE 122. We also still managed to plan the most urgent projects of the so-called peripheral devices--mainly reconnaissance and command tools--and take measures to improve the stockpiling of operationally decisive ammunition.

With finances tightening we had to cut back for a number of procurements which could have helped in fully exploiting the performance range of modern weapons systems. To reduce the catch-up gap there that has grown for some years while preplanning procurement for the 1990's is the problem we now will have to settle in setting priorities for the future.

We are working hard on resolving that, but since the problems of personnel requirements, structure and equipment seem intertwined and have to be resolved in conjunction, I still have no concrete answer to the question about the feasible or the not or only conditionally feasible major weapons systems.

This much suggests itself for the future: We shall continue to get our so-called nuclear projects; yet we also will have to go on and settle for the fact that not everything will be possible in time as would be necessary in view of the growing threat.

## GERMAN REPRESENTATION ON NATO MILITARY STAFFS

## Second Generation of Generals

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 9 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "Without Stripes and Lametta: Sentiments of Bonn and Loyalty to the Alliance"]

[Text] In Brussels NATO-week has begun. As every year, the defense and foreign ministers are meeting.

How is Bonn represented in the North Atlantic Treaty organization?

Who are the German officers in the staffs?

For a long time the Bonn diplomats and military put in a modest appearance in NATO. Only gradually did their contingent turn into a "staff element." And the other member states saw to this. The rebirth of the West German army brought back gloomy memories for them. In their eyes, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization offered not only protection for the Germans, but also from the Germans. The fears of our neighbors were reflected in the acceptance ceremony that preceded the joining of the North Atlantic Treaty in May 1955. In the Paris Protocol of 1954, the Germans had to obligate themselves in writing that they would "refrain from any action which cannot be reconciled with the purely defensive character of this treaty."

"One must savor this sentence," said the redhaired German NATO colonel Lorenz Huber, age group 1938, almost 30 years later. He said it with the attitude of a reflective professor of modern German history. No similar formulation is found in any other acceptance protocol of the altogether 16 members of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Huber occupies the post of chief of staff in the Policy Department of the International Military Staff in the Brussels NATO Headquarters and belongs to that handpicked group of officers whose special area is international military policy. Those who belong to this club, as a rule, speak in a relaxed manner about German war burdens in the alliance. It is not only Huber's age group which provides for distance, but also his--for a German officer

unexpectedly highly-developed--intuition. "Those who work in NATO," Lorenz Huber concludes, "must not be conscience-stricken, but sensitive."

When in 1956 the first seven German officers reported for duty at SHAPE--Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe...--they arrived without fanfare. There was, as DER SPIEGEL reported at the time, "no clicking of heels, there were no penetrating glances, no snappy head movements, no vigorous steps, no raised voices." The officers showed up in civilian clothes and looked like "diplomats who had forgotten their umbrellas." The newcomers behaved with marked reticence and modesty. The respectability which their work in NATO conferred upon them was accepted by the officers with gratitude.

How is the role of the Germans in the common defense of the West reflected 28 years later in the proportional representation of personnel of the three supreme headquarters?

Brussels is the seat of the North Atlantic Council, the highest political organ of the Alliance. The 16-member states allow themselves to be represented in the prefab labyrinth, put up within a few months in 1966, by their Permanent Representatives and their delegations. For the FRG this task has been handled since 1980 by Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck. His experience in questions of security and the alliance has made him into a walking textbook in dogmatism.

The general secretary, with his international staff, also resides under the same roof. In addition, the military committee is housed there, the highest military decision-making body of the Alliance. Here, too, the national chiefs of staff allow "Permanent Representatives" to function. For the FRG this is presently the three-star general Ernest Dieter Bernhard, a fighter pilot in World War II. In the souvenir corner of his office in Brussels, there stands the control column of the last plane he flew during the war, an MC 109. Bernhard is one of that older, departing generation of German officers who "will choke on the collapse to the end of their days," as an experienced observer expresses it. In a conversation about the counterarmament debate and the peace movement in the FRG, which disturbed him deeply, the general himself said with an undertone of bitterness: "My generation suffered the consequences. How could someone like myself be against peace?"

Huge Monastery

Three thousand people, men--women work only as cleaning women and secretaries--enmeshed and entangled in the national policies of 16 NATO countries revolve from 9 o'clock in the morning to 5 o'clock in the evening through the committees. They are so numerous, the abbreviations so bewildering, that no one can actually enumerate them. Whoever does not "sit" at the moment is on the way in the labyrinth or the headquarters in order to cultivate his lobbies on a bilateral basis--wearing security passes around their necks like dog tags, file folder underarm, but otherwise in civilian clothes. Only on Thursdays the officers appear in uniform, because the military committee is meeting. They call this their "costume ball."

Their other basic needs are also satisfied in the headquarters: The ground floor houses a bank, a barber, a travel agency, a drycleaning establishment, a bookstore and a canteen. All diplomatic rituals have been reduced to a minimum. Cocktails to welcome or bid farewell to military personnel or diplomats take place in the evening after duty hours in the NATO canteen, usually without wives. Their participation would create problems for the security service. Such details further amplify the impression of a huge monastery in which 3,000 citizens of 16 nations contemplate so exclusively on war and peace that they are in danger of withdrawing from this world.

The ease with which the gigantic NATO machine in Brussels functions, the Alliance owes to the British and their Lord Ismay, the first general secretary of NATO. It is always the British who know how to oil international organizations so that they do not get completely stuck. On the other hand, the spirit that prevails in SHAPE, the seat of the supreme commander for Europe, General Bernard W. Rogers, which is located an hour by car from Brussels, clearly American. The system of work in Casteau, too, is developed on the American model and is carried mainly by the Americans. The rest is team work of the nations--"integrated staff work."

Altogether more than 1,000 officers serve in SHAPE, of these 30 percent are Americans, 18 percent Englishmen and 17 percent Germans (140 officers). The individual members have only small national "outlets" in SHAPE in the person of the representative of the respective national chief of staff. The general inspector of the Bundeswehr is represented at SHAPE by Brigadier General Kurt Graf Schweinitz--a rare example of those officers who, with their high education, their sense of history, and their tact, remind one of the good traditions of Prussia. On the Day of National Mourning, he and other Germans meet every year with British NATO officers to commemorate the Battle of Mons in August of 1914 at the neighboring military cemetery. The date is reminiscent of the first "encounter" of the Germans and the English and of the men who died in it. Today the Allied Headquarters stands on the former battlefield.

Where in this large international organization is the German element found? Whenever such a question is raised, German NATO officers assume their alliance look. That question does not conform to the American alliance ideology. At SHAPE in particular, the "allied spirit" is being promoted. But after the security debate, which German politicians have just now completed, and in view of the discussion of strategy, which still lies ahead of them, the glances of the people in Bonn are becoming more "national" and probing once again. The FRG has not only placed the largest conventional military contingent at the disposal of the alliance, and it is not only the reliable payer in good stead: Above all, the Germans bring their geographic location to the Alliance--and in so doing their own destiny.

During peacetime they are host to no less than six foreign armies: Americans, Englishmen, French, Dutch, Belgians and Canadians. There are, in addition to the half million soldiers of the Bundeswehr located in the western territory, altogether 400,000 men. Moreover, Bonn has seen to it that more than 1,000 nuclear weapons can be stored on the territory of the FRG. For NATO in Brussels, all of this is nothing new. What is new, however, is the heightened consciousness of the Germans, who have been aroused by the missile debate as

if awakened from a slumber. Ever since they are assessing their security in a new way. In this context the question arises of how much influence the West Germans themselves can exert in the Alliance with respect to their own fate.

The counting of the stars on the shoulders of the Bundeswehr generals in Brussels and at SHAPE is one of the favorite occupations of the strategists in the Bonn Ministry of Defense. But this does not necessarily lead to valid conclusions. The representation of the Germans in the posts of generals in the Alliance is not bad at all, at least measured by the goal of doing approximately as well as in the distribution of posts as the British. To this day, the British threaten themselves to a good personnel allowance in their staffs. A German officer, who described British skill in personnel politics, with honest admiration expressed the view: "Otherwise they save everywhere, in material, in their companies, which they thin out, with respect to their tanks--only three out of nine still work. But nobody holds this against them. Here, too, they prove themselves as good diplomats."

The most important command post held by the Germans in the Alliance is the "supreme commander of Central Europe." In case of war, the four-star general, who resides in the Dutch [town of] Brunssum, will lead the troops in Central Europe. The post fell to the Germans when the French, who originally held it, left the NATO military organization in 1966 with a thunderclap. As retired General Gerd Schmucke writes in his memoirs, it was thanks to the presence of mind of the German diplomat Ulrich Sahm that, at the next routine session of the Council, he immediately claimed the post for the Germans, and indeed "forever." Evidently the British, too, had nurtured ambitions, but they did not win. The Alliance accepted the German claim. The first supreme commander was Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, a military man of the first hour.

In September of this year, the supreme command changed from Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin, one of the last generals with war experience and one of the few knotty personalities in the Bundeswehr, to Leopold Chalupa, who--in Hardtkoehe [FRG Defense Ministry] jargon, is called "our best operative head." He is a supreme commander who was touched by the war only briefly. The lametta on his general's breast consists of sports and merit badges. His greatest pride is the Hamburg Flood Medal, which he received for his life-saving achievements as a young pioneer captain behind the dikes of the Elbe River in the Altes Land [Old Country].

In an exemplary way, Chalupa's career reflects the development--carefully promoted by the personnel department of the Ministry of Defense--of a "maverick" to top quality. At every career level, there are built-in "horizon-expanding experiences." That begins long before the American general staff training, which he completed after he had finished the German general staff training. Every 3 or 4 years he was given a new hurdle, always with greater responsibility. Troop commands, ministerial desk work, and delegations in integrated NATO staffs (there is spent a total of 8 years) rotated systematically. "Only in this manner can a leadership style develop and be secured," says Chalupa. He performed his last national military duty as commanding general of the 2d Corps in Ulm.

Whoever knocks down a hurdle in such a high-performance race is out of the race. That is the shadow side in the promotion of the rising generation which is without equal. Chalupa has never "knocked down" anything. Only once did a command as division commander elude him in his career. Among the initiated, this is a deficiency which he regrets to this day. But to praise the freedoms of a commander is almost an integral part of the international chic of the military who happen to occupy a staff position. Their dream is always the troop.

With Rhenish composure and on the basis of a great deal of professional experience, the former personnel chief of the Ministry of Defense, Heinz Schaefgen used to state: "There are posts in NATO that are worth their assessment, others are not." The second category includes, in the opinion of a school of thought strongly represented at the Hardthoehe, the post of second deputy at the Supreme Allied Command in Europe, General Rogers. The post was created in 1978 at the insistence of the Germans, who wanted a greater measure of participation. The first deputy has been accorded to the British since Montgomery's time.

The more significant their defense contribution became, the more frequently the people in Bonn tried to change the proportion of posts in NATO in their favor. They would have liked to hold the post of chief of staff at the American Supreme Command most of all, but this was a matter which the Americans, intent on a smoothly functioning chain of command, were not willing to discuss. Instead they offered the "second deputy," a post which satisfied all those for whom the number of generals' stars in leadership positions suffices as proof of significance. It brought four. For the then minister of defense, Georg Leber, who had advocated the strengthening of the German influence, the deputy meanwhile was only a promemoria item, which was to remind him of renewed submission.

The weakness in the authority of the post was initially offset by a successful appointment: Gerd Schmueckle, a general with imagination and the courage of his convictions. Moreover, he knew that you must blow your own horn. No high military officer has ever cultivated such trustful relations with journalists. His comrades blamed him for this accordingly, but not so the Americans. They regarded him as "a nice guy"--a quality which in their case opens doors and ears even without going through official channels.

Alexander Haig, Roger's predecessor in the office of Supreme Commander, got along well with the Germans. Moreover, Schmueckle brought to his post a network of personal relationships which had been developed during many years in the profession, a network which made him, among other things, politically valuable to the American general. In critical situations, when there were important pressing questions, Gerd Schmueckle could count on the fact that the Federal Chancellor, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of defense were accessible to him by telephone, not to mention Franz Josef Strauss, who had selected Schmueckle as press spokesman, when he was minister of defense himself.

In the case of Schmueckle, therefore, it was of little import that his post was not located in the chain of command of the headquarters. He was in any case a member of Alexander Haig's kitchen cabinet and had access to him at any time. In the meantime he is "retired," but even today he presents himself convincingly: "Only those who sit at the very top can exert influence in the military. That is especially important as soon as nuclear policy is involved. To influence General Rogers from the standpoint of German interests is not a power question, but a question of influence."

His successors, Admiral Guenter Luther and General Guenter Kiessling, to be sure, lacked that influence. They were less successful in the work of persuasion required by the post. As a result of their reticence, therefore, the position shrunk to its true significance: Luther and Kiessling were no longer deputies, but merely titular bishops who resigned in the grinding struggle for information access at the highest level. Perhaps the next one will have better luck: Tank General Ulrich Mack. Rogers personally selected him. Among the great deal of smooth, quickly-grown wood of which generals in a peacetime army happen to be made, Mack stands out because of his angularity. He is one of the most impressive leadership personalities which the Bundeswehr has "self-produced."

Differences in dimension and power, which are as prominent as in the alliance between the world and nuclear power America and its European allies, must lead to friction. When in such a relationship, on top of everything else, the question of the primacy of politics over the military is raised by an ambassador, tensions are produced. The question is courageous, but it is also rather hopeless. Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck has found this out. According to his conception--and this, after all, is what the textbook says--the motive forces of the alliance must come from the national delegations in the Atlantic Council or from their governments at home. The American Supreme Commander, however, was not particularly disturbed by this. For moral reasons alone, the Americans feel obligated to guard their European allies like a bag of money.

#### The Germans as Brakemen?

Furthermore, the general was anxious to stimulate the European strategy debate through contributions of his own. For this he did not need an ambassador. For the Rogers-Plan, in which he is soliciting support for a conventionalization of the Alliance, for which the members, to be sure, are to pay more money, he came personally to the capitals of the allies. That is his right. But the tensions to which such initiatives of the commander-in-chief lead also reflect in every case the wrestling of politics with the military.

When in such an encounter, on top of everything else, American impatience and German "we know better" attitudes come together, things become dangerous. In so doing, the temptation to clarify the leadership sequence is particularly great for a German. In his own national interest he must proceed from the assumption that NATO is an alliance for the defense of the FRG. Wieck is troubled, above all, also by the concern that too great an emphasis on the conventional elements could undermine nuclear deterrence and thus make war in Europe possible again. To be content on this point with the approximate

congruence of interests exercised by the British in the NATO committee business, without engaging in nit-picking and getting down to fundamentals, is difficult for an ambassador skilled in argumentation.

But whoever in the Alliance insists at all costs on being proved right will soon maneuver himself onto the sidelines.

In this respect, too, the British frequently show the Germans how a thing is done. At any rate, this is how the young colonels and lieutenant-colonels see it, who in the NATO hierarchy are the last link in the chain, who are not completely crushed by the burden of responsibility and who still can afford to be curious. One of them recounted from his observations: "When the Americans here put a train on the track and take off, and we Germans do not like it, then we jump on the last car, pull the brakes and make trouble. But look what the British do in such situations: They jump on the locomotive and drive the train."

Next sequence: The Young Colonels: Do the Germans in NATO Lack Posts or Qualities?

#### Junior Staff Officers Assessed

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 16 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "The Germans Into the Antechambers: How the Bundeswehr Is Represented in the Alliance"]

[Text] The German army has always known how to deal with the progressive elements in its officer corps. During the time of the Imperial Empire, it sent its military talents to Turkey. In the FRG it was for a long time the headquarters of NATO which were considered places of exile. "Those whom I do not like I send to Schap" (for SHAPE--Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe) was the motto at the Hardthoehe, in the FRG Ministry of Defense in Bonn. Not only military officers who had failed to perform to expectations and had to be taken care of were shoved off to NATO. The Bundeswehr leadership in this manner also got rid of a good many reformers in the officer corps, whose ideas about "inner leadership" and the "citizen in uniform" were to be kept away from the troops.

This did not do any damage to the German reputation abroad. On the contrary. This personnel policy resulted in the fact that German officers of unusual format turned up in the NATO staffs. They were more striking, more interesting and more clever than the caricature of the German officer, properly speaking, permitted. Among others, they included: Wolf Graf Baudissin, the "father of Inner Leadership," Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmannsegg, advocate of a new spirit in the military, Johannes Steinhoff, the air force general and strategist, Franz-Joseph Schulze ("egghead Schulze"), Karl Schnell, respected for his brilliant analytical capabilities, and Gerd Schmucke, a determined "citizen in uniform."

The Bundeswehr has found it--and to this day finds it--difficult to find voluntary and suitable applicants for the NATO posts to which it is entitled. Those who are intent upon making a career prefer to stay at home. A Prussian general, too, was not experienced. For this, he lacked the outlet in the colonies. The Americans gain world experience in view of the global interest position of Washington. The English, too, up to and including the national contingent in Saudi Arabia, have a multitude of international uses for their officers, in which they can gain experience. In the international staffs of NATO they are disproportionately well represented.

Among the Germans Helmut Schmidt was the first who, as minister of defense, saw to it that the international polishing of officers became a prerequisite for their promotion. Only those soldiers who had also worked in NATO staffs advanced into national leadership positions. Ever since the "integrated" uses have been worked into career planning at the Hardthoehe, the fear of the Germans in regard to the semipolitical posts on the slick NATO parquet, to be sure, still exists, but it is suppressed. Since Helmut Schmidt it is a hindrance to career development.

The greatest obstacle for the Germans has always been the language. The NATO language is English. French is admitted as the second official language. An adequate knowledge of French, to this day, is a reason for rejecting an applicant for a nonquota post (a post which is not the entailed estate of a nation, but is given away in a competitive process). But as a rule one can proceed from the assumption in such cases that chicanery was involved in such cases.

On the other hand, the best man is of no use if he has only limited ability to express himself in English. He deprives himself of his possibilities to be effective. That applies particularly to the "work level" at which the "papers" are written. Whoever puts a piece of paper on the table has half the battle won. Brigadier General Heinz-Guenter Donner, "action officer" in the International Military Staff in Brussels, calls this the "grace of the first draft." The first draft indicates the basic direction, "with which all the others have to cope."

"On the roll" from the very first day in Brussels or at SHAPE in Mons are those officers who, in addition to their German general staff training, have attended an English or American military college. There are only a few of these--as a rule only the best of an age group in the general staff training course. The others have to see how they manage. But in any case, they have it easier than the older generation of generals, who still viewed the NATO world from the point of view of the campaign in Russia and knew classical Greek and Latin, but did not understand the NATO language.

At first glance, the young colonels and lieutenant-colonels of today have hardly anything in common with them. Rather it seems as though the reformist legacy of Wolf Graf Baudissin has left the most distinct traces in their education and training. The large number of reflective and intelligent interlocutors proves it. Their political and intellectual sensitivity in so doing is surprising. Those who see them can more easily imagine them reading a newspaper than in a barrack-square shouting commands. How much they still understand about "the shot with bullet" remains in the dark. Their accentuated

nonchalance at times stands in sharp contrast to the heel clicking of their forefathers.

"Exactly how it is with the Germans," an observer remarked on this score: "If the sluices are opened, rather much water pours out." By the English guard standard, the Bundeswehr representatives at times lack the right mean between strict discipline and laxity. Perhaps they also lack that phlegm which makes the British so self-controlled in critical situations. But they are a rising leadership generation of which Bonn, in international comparison, can be proud.

At the level of the colonels, the "action officers" work the hardest in NATO. Here "policy" is developed, the superiors are forced into the compulsion of the object in question, and national influence is exercised. Those who have first-class people at this level have the chance to prevail. This is something which the other NATO members see from the example of the Americans. They not only constantly pump new ideas into NATO, but also additional people--most often at the colonel level. The only ones who to some extent keep up with this expenditure are the English. They are clever. The Germans are assiduous.

Do the Germans in NATO lack posts or qualities? When they become despondent, the Bundeswehr soldiers frequently arrive at the conclusion that they are not adequately represented in the leadership positions of NATO. The typical German position, it is said, is the deputy or the lion of the antechamber: The head of the office of the American Chief of Staff at SHAPE is a German colonel. "We are involved everywhere, but we do not really belong anywhere," an officer says.

For historical reasons and because of lack of experience, the leadership share of the Germans in NATO is not as great as, measured by their contribution to the Alliance, it might be. On the other hand, the personnel pool for NATO is now as before small. Not even the smart German colonels can deny the fact that there is no surplus of Bundeswehr officers who are experienced, talented and qualified in questions of international security, including in "nuclear technology."

To be sure, there are typical careers, but it is always the same names that turn up in this connection: Wolfgang Altenburg, the present general inspector; Maj Gen Hans-Peter Tandack, the director of military policy in the FRG Ministry of Defense; two-star general Hans Henning von Sandrat, presently the director of the operations department in the Supreme Allied Headquarters in Mons and soon to be the German Army Inspector; the two-star general Juergen Schleuter, currently also at SHAPE; and Brig Gen Rolf Huettel, at present commander of the Tank Brigade XIII. The circle is tiny when compared to the half million soldiers who are serving in the West German forces.

The four-star general Leopold Chalupa presently holds the highest command post which can be attained by a German in NATO. He is Supreme Commander for Central Europe. For years he was groomed for this command. He was the only one--not a single serious alternative was envisaged. This is how tight personnel planning is in the Bundeswehr. For this reason Chalupa is also the first who skeptically declined to answer the question: "Do the Germans have enough

posts?" He said: "If one sees this dispassionately, one must, after all, first find the people who will fill the posts."

Proceed from your inventories, not from your paroles, Gottfried Benn once said. There is no personnel appointment which could change anything in terms of the hegemony of the Americans in the Alliance. There is also no chance of consigning to oblivion the fact that the Germans, although politically equal in the Alliance, are not psychologically equal. To all those who want more, General von Sandrat in Mons objects admonishingly: "Our walk through history has never been characterized by skillful diplomacy."

8970

CSO: 3620/135

## MERGER OF FIELD, AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SCHOOLS AT DRAGUIGNAN

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Nov 83 p 26

[Text] Ceremonies took place on 28 September to celebrate the merger of the field and air defense artillery schools.

Why merge the schools?

With its four components: nuclear, acquisition, ground, and air defense, the artillery's mission is to assure freedom of action to the head of the joint services in all three dimensions, at whatever level this commander happens to be.

In order to prepare artillery leaders to fulfill this mission in a coherent manner, it is necessary to depend upon a single school where all personnel, independent of the component where they will ultimately serve, will be trained and eventually perfected.

A common teaching and mixing basis at a single site, for leaders with different backgrounds, will foster reciprocal exchanges and will introduce an element of flexibility in a system of management now capable, in certain conditions, of allowing "component" changes.

Other expected advantages.

This merger presents other advantages:

- From the standpoint of the cohesiveness of the army which will now "shoot" with confidence in a single direction.
- From the standpoint of training effectiveness since directives, leadership, and equipment will now be concentrated at a single site and better adapted to the ever more complex needs arising from modern warfare.
- From the standpoint of management savings which are estimated at about ten percent for budget purposes.

Genesis

After its return from Idar Oberstein (FRG) in 1952, the school had split into the Artillery Application School located at Chalons-sur Marne, and the

Air Defense Specialization School located at Nimes, and changed into an "Application" school in 1971.

In 1962, some directives showed a desire to merge these two entities by taking advantage of the necessary reorganization of our armed forces within the metropolitan territory after the conclusion of the Algerian conflict. The advantages listed were primarily the lightening of the plan of occupation of the Champagne camps and, as a corollary, a transfer of activities into an area practically devoid of armed forces, and benefiting from favorable weather conditions which would allow, at least in theory, a better training efficiency in the field.

The mechanics of this project were put into motion again in 1965, with the transfer of the Non-Commissioned Artillery Officers Improvement Center to Draguignan from Poitiers, followed, in 1976, by the installation on the same site of the Chalons Application School, and by the creation of two training regiments: the 19th Airborne at Draguignan, and the 60th Artillery Regiment at Canjuers.

The Hyeres training group joined the homestead in 1982.

Finally, the Air Defense Artillery Application School and its support group, the 401st Artillery Regiment arrived during the summer of 1983.

From that point on, and without its equivalent in the other branches of the armed forces, all the means of training and improvement of artillery personnel were located at Draguignan.

To this merger of resources will correspond a merger of minds, a guarantee of effectiveness and dynamism within the corps.

6445

CSO: 3519/179

## SPECULATION OVER F-16 AGREEMENT SIGNING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 83 pp 1, 11

/Article by Ufuk Guldemir: "F-16 Project Signed With United States"/

/Text/ Ankara--The signing of the agreement to purchase F-16 aircraft is considered the first step in a new era in Turkish-U.S. relations. The agreement, signed just shortly before the ministers' swearingin ceremony, was the last act of the form government. Interviewed by reporters yesterday, however, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, National Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk and former National Defense Minister Umit Haluk Bayulken all avoided answering questions about the signing of the agreement and said they had no information on it. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu was queried by our correspondent and confirmed that his government had signed the agreement.

According to the agreement that was signed, the builder, General Dynamics United Technologies and Pratt-Whitney group, agreed to certain obligations in exchange for the 160 F-16 aircraft to be sold to Turkey. Some of these obligations are:

- The builder group will market \$1 billion worth of Turkish export products.
- The United States will invest a total of \$500 million in 16 sectors.
- Turkey's large reserves of cobalt will be developed.

## How Signed

Early last September, the Turkish Government decided between the F-16 and F-8, aircraft manufactured by two different firms, and sent its choice to U.S. Ambassador Robert Strauss-Hupe. The "letter of acceptance" then prepared was sent to Congress and cleared hurdles there as no objection was raised to the contract within the 30 days allowed by law. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger replied on 3 November 1983 to Umit Haluk Bayulken's letter of request, expressing U.S. government support for the F-16 project. The only thing left after this was the signing of the actual agreement text. This signature was placed on the text as the last act of the Ulusu Government before stepping down.

## Declaration Text

National Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk, in an interview with a CUMHURIYET correspondent, said he was not informed on the matter. The interview follows:

/Question/ When was the letter of acceptance relating to the F-16 project signed?

/Answer/ First I will be having briefings. I have not been informed on that yet.

/Question/ Will the briefings cover the F-16?

/Answer/ They will begin tomorrow morning. Department heads will have ½ hour each to explain what their departments do. They will probably go on for 3 or 4 days.

/Question/ Weren't you informed that the agreement was signed?

/Answer/ I have not been informed on this matter. I do not know anything beyond the newspaper reports.

Still, National Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk left his home at Bahcelievler after learning that he had become the new minister and went to ANAP /Motherland Party/ headquarters for the meeting called there by Ozal, after which he returned home to change clothes and took over the position from former Minister Umit Haluk Bayulken the same day at 5:30 pm.

Bayulken, talking to new Minister Yavuzturk about the ministry during the turnover procedures, told the new minister that the F-16 project letter of acceptance had been signed by the Turkish Government, but noted that "the signing of the agreement was to be announced by declaration, but owing to the change of government at this time, it would be appropriate for the announcement to be made by the new government," and the declaration text was handed to the new minister for the announcement.

The CUMHURIYET correspondent also asked former National Defense Minister Umit Haluk Bayulken about the matter:

/Question/ Was the agreement signed?

/Answer/ The new government will make the announcement.

/Question/ Was it you who signed it, sir?

/Answer/ It's no problem.

/Question/ When was it signed?

/Answer/ We are now out of government. You have to ask the new government that. There is no problem, don't worry.

Diplomatic circles in Ankara, meanwhile, confirmed the report, saying that "the agreement was signed 2 or 3 days ago." The same sources said that Turkey has thus done its part for the project to become effective.

#### Ulus's Comments

Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Bulend Ulus was also interviewed on the matter:

/Question/ Was the agreement signed before you left office?

/Answer/ I believe that is the case.

/Question/ Were letters exchanged?

/Answer/ Yes. We are out of government now. I think the new government will make a declaration on this matter.

#### First Delivery in March

Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was also questioned by reporters as he left the Assembly building and said that Turkey needed the F-16 aircraft for its defense. Asked whether he would sign the agreement, he answered, "it must have been signed. Wasn't it signed?" The reporters replied, "No," and Ozal said, "If the agreement has been left for us, we will sit down and go over it."

The F-16 project, described as the most important decision Turkey has made going into the 21st century, provided for a joint investment of \$500 million in 16 sectors. Also, certain components of the aircraft are to be manufactured by the Hassas Foundry in Izmir.

The first batch of airplanes will be delivered to Turkey in March 1984, according to the agreement.

8349

CSO: 3554/104

## RESIDENCE OF FOREIGNERS IN FRG DISCUSSED

## Few Plan Permanent Residence

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 13 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Axel Schnorbus: "Turkish Families Willingness to Return Home Greater Than Expected"]

[Text] The number of Turks living in the FRG is likely to drop noticeably soon. Even without curbing admission as contemplated by the federal and state governments, fewer women and youths are likely to come from Turkey for bringing families together than had thus far been assumed. Many of the Turks here plan to return home soon. According to a new opinion poll, only 7.3 percent of the persons questioned will remain in the FRG for good. "Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt-Berufsforschung" now published the most significant results of this survey conducted for the federal labor institute as well as supplementary depth interviews with Turkish heads of households, workers and unemployed in the Rhineland Palatinate/Saarland region.

According to this survey, 10 percent of the Turkish heads of households indicated relatively precise ideas about when they want to go home. Another 40 percent had planned a return, even though without being sure when. So roughly half of all Turkish heads of households may rate as potential returnees. Another 40 percent had been undecided, but would be ready to go home under certain circumstances.

These survey results coincide with a survey now published by "Deutsche Welle" (German Overseas Radio) according to which all Turkish workers are much interested in getting their pension insurance contributions returned ahead of time. Bayreuth state insurance, which handles the Turkish workers, according to "Deutsche Welle," in December alone received 10,000 applications for pension insurance contribution returns. The Duesseldorf state insurance also gets circa 170 inquiries or applications from Turks each day. Pension insurance contributions returned to Turkish workers, according to the Bayreuth state insurance, come to an average of circa DM 8,000. The return premium the federal government has offered, on the other hand, hardly meets with any interest from the Turks who want to go home. The federal institute survey arrives at the same conclusion. The discussion under way for some time had raised "greatly exaggerated ideas" among those potentially concerned about

the size of the premium. Persons questions had considered a premium of over DM 50,000 possible. The amount envisaged in the bill therefore could hardly offer an incentive.

That so many Turks want to go home can be surprising only at the first glance. Earlier surveys told us that originally the vast majority of the Turkish guest workers wanted to go home once they saved enough money. Staying in their host country only was to provide them with a better standard of living at home. Nor did the high unemployment at home actually affect their long-range goal of returning because covert unemployment and underemployment are the order of the day in Turkey.

In contrast, say, to the Poles and Italians, the Turks have no "tradition" as migratory or guest workers. Not until the 1960's can a noteworthy influx into the FRG be observed. After the recruitment accord signed on 30 October 1961, the influx speeded up, however, and so the Turkish resident population in the FRG increased steadily. There was no brake on this growth rate, even after the recruitment stop imposed in the fall of 1973. To be sure, now only new guest workers would come from Turkey, yet the resident population still was growing, either through uniting the families or the high birth rate. Nonetheless, relatively many Turks voluntarily returned home in past years. Estimates come to between 70,000 and 80,000 annually. The survey surmises that the long discussion about the return premium has led to a considerable "congestion" in returning, which could soon be alleviated, however. Then one could not preclude the risk that the difference between the amount the federal government offers and what the Turkish families evidently had expected reinforces their negative attitude toward the FRG.

According to the survey, the potential for bringing in others is smaller than is usually assumed. In 77 percent of all cases polled, married heads of households already had their wives live in the FRG, and of the remaining 23 percent only 15 percent indicated that their spouses were expected to come in the foreseeable future. This also greatly resembles the situation of the children who at present live in Turkey. Of the persons polled, 30 percent, to be sure, indicated they had children living at home, but only 5 percent of those polled or 16 percent of those with children in Turkey plan to bring them to the FRG in the years ahead under prevailing conditions.

Returnees do not count on great opportunities in Turkey. Though the labor market was eased in recent years because many found employment in the contiguous OPEC states--due to the high birth rate, 450,000 new jobs have to be created annually. Yet only 150,000 new jobs can be made available right now. The unemployment quota, giving the ratio between the unemployed and the dependent working population, thus has risen steadily. In 1982, it had come to 18 percent, in 1985 it is expected to rise to 21 percent. According to the survey, occupational reintegration opportunities still look more positive. With the economic upsurge that started in 1980, the shortage in specialists also got worse. Official estimates set the current deficit in specialists at circa 600,000. On the other hand, according to various estimates, circa 65,000 Turks supposedly work in the FRG who have specialization certifications or even more than that.

Many Turks desirous of going home evidently want to be in business for themselves at home. According to the survey, as many as 43.5 percent admitted that. Nor should one underrate the number of those who want to more or less retire after having returned home in relying on their pension. Considering that they start working between 15 and 20 years of age, Turkish workers at the age of 45 are already entitled to their pension.

#### Turks in the FRG

Persons in thousands	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982
Resident Population	469	712	1028	1079	1165	1462	1581
Employed	354	511	607	521	511	588	555
Unemployed	1	3	20	20	25	37	97
Turkish Immigrants	177	185	161	106	131	212	43
Returnees to Turkey	42	75	111	130	88	71	87
Differential between Immigrants & Returnees	+135	+110	+50	-25	+43	+142	-44

#### Poll Reveals German Attitudes

Bonn DIE WELT in German 7/8 Jan 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Aberhard Nitschke: "Majority Says: Reduce the Number of Guest Workers"]

[Text] Federal Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann can greatly rely on public support in his policy on foreigners, the environmental policy and in planning the new ID card. That was revealed by "survey data on topical domestic policy problems" the ministry obtained from IPOS [Institute for Practically Oriented Social Research] in Mannheim.

Stopping the influx of foreigners was expressed, in the words of the survey, by "an overwhelming majority of the adult FRG citizens." Percentages fluctuated between the federal states of Lower Saxony (with 89 percent of persons polled being for it, that being the highest figure) and Bremen, where 68.5 percent voted for the stop. FDP voters, so says the survey, are closer to the CDU/CSU voters in their opinion than to those of the SPD, verbatim: "There are small differences among the followers of the established parties in terms of backing or rejecting the demand, but none that could alter the majorities."

The question was this: "There are very many foreign workers in the FRG. What do you think: Should the number of foreign workers be reduced or left as it is?" In June 1982, circa 77.5 percent wanted to reduce it and 21.8 percent wanted to leave it as it is. The same question raised in November 1982 and in February 1983 showed 80 percent advocating reduction.

It appears most remarkable that the demands for stopping the influx and reducing the number of foreigners has met with overwhelming agreement from the adherents to the established parties (CDU/CSU: 89, FDP: 85, SPD: 77.5 percent). In the question of possibly cutting back the residence permit for foreigners, even the constituency of the Greens, of which 40 percent had voted for reduction, still showed a clear majority.

In the rating of groups of foreigners by means of a graduated scale, the Americans came off best, of whom only 1.3 percent had a "very negative" opinion, 34.7 percent a "positive" and 22.4 percent even a "very positive" opinion. The Turks made the poorest showing there, who were rated at the lowest level of "very negative" by 21.6 percent. The federal ministry of the interior emphasized when these survey results were presented that of the established parties FDP followers rejected the Turks most and even among the Greens the Turks ranked clearly below other groups of foreigners.

The position on the new ID card, of which the federal ministry of the interior says it is "almost totally forgery-proof," was assessed by the survey through the simple question: "Are you for it or against it?" Two thirds of the persons polled were for it and almost exactly one third against it. The ministry of the interior is preparing the introduction of the ID card by a flier which above all points out the higher protection from fraud in case of loss. As many as 300,000 ID cards had been reported lost at present, 16,000 blank certificates were missing from 4,000 certificate issuing agencies in the FRG, and 450 forged certificates had been found at the last terrorists raid in 1982. The point is made that, contrary to the opinion of opponents of the new certificate, no storage of personal data and the composition of "pictures of movement," as for instance in border crossing, will thereby be possible. The jurists in the federal ministry of the interior, according to a spokesman, had affirmed that no "census ruling" from Karlsruhe could be applied to the new ID cards. The certificate is printed in the federal printing company, is to be priced at DM 10 and will be valid for 10 years. Minors below 21 will get them free of charge (and they will be valid for 5 years).

In the environmental policy, for which most citizens will assume extra financial burdens, the coalition can clearly put down a "competency shift" for its benefit. Whereas in November 1982 the majority polled still thought that the SPD was more expert in the field of environmental protection, this has now been balanced out with regard to the Union parties; one of every four citizens thinks more headway has been made in environmental protection than a year ago.

#### Total of Foreigners Rises

Bonn DIE WELT in German 4 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Eberhard Nitschke: "Number of Foreigners Rose Despite Halt in Recruiting"]

[Text] "The recruitment stop did not clearly lead to reduction," the federal labor institute in Nuernberg has said: Between June 1980 and December 1982, the number of foreign workers did drop by 362,000, to be sure, but that of unemployed foreigners rose in that period from 196,000 to 293,000 and stayed around that figure even in the end of 1983.

Already in August last year, the president of the federal institute, Josef Stingl, pointed out that it was "a mistake wishing to control the problem of foreigners via the labor market by means of the recruitment stop." When the stop started there had been 4 million foreign residents and 2.6 million foreign

workers. Since then, the resident population had risen to 4.67 million, while the figures of workers had dropped to the current level due to the extremely high unemployment rate of now 14.1 percent.

Impressive returnee figures make no difference. Since the recruitment stop got started, 4.15 million foreigners have departed from the FRG. In no recruitment stop year has the number of returnees been below 365,000. The family member influx was mainly responsible for the further rise in the absolute number of foreigners. And the liberalization of the working permit which the previous federal government pursued brought it about that, despite an already worsened labor market situation, 179,000 labor permits were issued to family members of foreigners between April 1979 and November 1983.

When it comes to compiling such figures, even smaller sums play a role for that matter: As in previous years, the federal labor institute subsidizes also for 1984, now through DM 160 million, 25 percent of it coming from the federation and the Laender, the "program for vocational training and social integration of young foreigners," the graduates of which, and there may be 12,000 in 1984, get a working permit at once.

In view of this situation, federal labor minister Norbert Blum is glad that, despite all disparagement at the time that the law on encouraging foreigners to go home went into effect on 1 December 1983, the financial aid offered for going home is "eagerly wanted," according to a quick ministry inquiry in employment offices. The ministry talks about 50,000 foreign workers who with their families will resort to that offer. The federal labor institute even considers a figure of 60,000 realistic.

#### Few Claim 'Premium' Assistance

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 13/14 Feb 84 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Foreign Workers Return Home Without 'Premium' Assistance"]

[Text] According to a "Deutsche Welle" survey, a growing number of foreign workers contemplates going home voluntarily. An indication is the clearly greater number of, in particular, Turkish workers who have applied for repayment of their pension insurance contributions.

Yet evidently only few foreign workers get the benefit of official aid in returning home, of between DM 10,500 and 15,000, because for most of them the prerequisites for such aid do not apply. As "Deutsche Welle" reports, the Bayreuth state insurance institute, which takes care of the Turkish workers, had, in December alone, received more than 10,000 applications for the repayment of pension insurance contributions. According to a spokesman for that official authority, that trend was "clearly going up." Experts think the federal labor ministry may have been right in estimating that by the middle of next year roughly 50,000 foreign workers will have returned home.

Other state insurance institutions in the FRG dealing with foreigners of all nationalities likewise have found, according to "Deutsche Welle," a great continuing interest in a premature repayment of pension insurance contributions. Pension insurance promotes no premature repayment of contributions. The Turkish labor ministry, according to "Deutsche Welle," recently warned countrymen willing to return against letting themselves be repaid their contributions prematurely. When one does that, one loses all old-age and disability claims. The pension insurance amounts repaid thus far to Turkish workers, according to the Bayreuth state insurance institution, come to an average of around DM 8,000, yet even amounts between DM 15,000 and 20,000 per insured were no rarities.

On the other hand, foreign workers seem less interested in the premium assistance to returning home. Often the prerequisites had not been met for receiving that assistance, the "Deutsche Welle" report says, so that one finds also disappointment spreading gradually among the guest workers. One of the prerequisites for granting that assistance is that the foreign workers became unemployed because of the shutdown, partial shutdown or bankruptcy of their enterprise between 31 October 1983 and 30 June this year and thus are going home.

5885

CSO: 3620/151

## 'EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS' SPUR DEVELOPMENT, REINTEGRATION

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 22 Dec 83 p 16

/Article by Murat Ugur Aksoy, Center for International Migration and Development:  
"Employee associations--At First a Form of Self-Help, Now an Important Partner  
for Cooperating German Firms"/

/Text/ Many times criticized for no reason and intentionally given little praise, Turkey's employee associations have been operating since the 1970s as a self-help organization of Turkish workers abroad. Their objective is to promote investments in the homeland and, in addition, to secure the future of the workers there through the creation of jobs. Their membership totals about 300,000 employees who are shareholders, and their working capital is about DM 145 million. More than half of the approximately 300 employee associations have executed their plans. Some 30.4 percent of them are in the process of putting their goals into effect, while 8.8 percent are still in the planning stage.

These associations, which are being financed from savings of Turkish employees abroad, do not only contribute to industrial development but also increase the gross national product. They are also a significant factor in eliminating development gaps among the various regions in Turkey. Some 58.2 percent of the associations chose central and east Anatolia as the location for their projects while 41.8 percent are operating in the Marmara and Aegean regions. However, there is no doubt that the most important determinant for the choice of the location of a project is the strong love Turkish employees feel for the region where they grew up.

## Liaison Organization in Frankfurt

In view of the importance of employee associations, the governments of the FRG and Turkey signed an agreement in 1972 concerning the reintegration of Turkish employees in their homeland which spells out promotion and support programs for employee associations and individual returnees who are anxious to build a new life for themselves in Turkey.

Responsibility for advising and promoting these associations rests, in the FRG, with the Center for International Migration and Development (CIM), an affiliate

of the Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) at Eschborn, on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation, and in Turkey, with the State Industry and Employee Investment Bank (Desiyab). In addition, a special fund was established at the Turkish People's Bank to extend credits; both governments contribute to the fund.

Experience has shown that the employee associations face a number of problems which make it difficult for them to pursue their plans. The wrong choice of technology and the lack of management knowhow are big stumbling blocks to making an investment. There are also problems that have to do with Turkey's economic difficulties.

On September 12, 1980, the Turkish government recognized the importance of this self-help initiative and accorded it preferential treatment. Government incentives are no doubt an important, but by no means the only, way of promoting investments by these employees. The employee associations are important trading partners for German companies because they are a vehicle for exporting new German technologies and knowhow to Turkey.

The current economic recession in Germany forces business to find new markets for its products and to look for new and low-cost countries in which to invest. On the other hand, many Turkish employees are preparing for their return as a direct result of the recession and because the provisions of the Alien Law have been tightened up; they are planning a new life for themselves in Turkey with the help of their hard-earned German money and savings. A new existence can be built through membership in an employee association or the establishment of a small family business.

The search of German companies and the objectives of the Turkish employees abroad can be combined into a cooperative effort. Turkey's favorable geographic situation as a threshold country would play an important role. The increased interest of the two groups to cooperate with each other became evident early this year. Many German businessmen started making inquiries about participation in a Turkish employee association and about collaborating in joint investments in Turkey.

However, the question most frequently asked is what benefits a foreign company can expect from cooperating with a Turkish employee association.

The general provisions are contained in the 1964 Agreement between the FRG and Turkey for the promotion of reciprocal investment. Still lacking, however, is a double-taxation agreement between the two governments although such a treaty has been in effect between Austria and Turkey since 1973.

#### Assured Remittance of Foreign Exchange Earnings

The foreign investor may be discouraged and prejudiced primarily by Turkey's economic situation. the provisions of the Law Concerning the Protection of the Currency, the absence of a good-will clause in the German-Turkish Establishment Agreement and above all by bureaucratic hurdles and the difficulty of acquiring real estate in Turkey.

But these problems can be resolved through cooperation. The cooperative efforts can take a number of forms. They can be joint ventures or licensing and knowhow agreements which would ensure the import into Turkey. Also, such cooperation can be agreed on by two partners of different nationality issuing twin or parallel shares as it is done in Switzerland.

Article 3/i of the General Decree for Foreign Capital issued by the Turkish Government on January 24, 1980, addresses the question of foreign participation in Turkish employee associations. The article states that in enterprises with foreign capital, more than 49 percent may be foreign-owned, if at least 25 percent of the capital is in the hands of Turkish employees.

It also used to be a problem of who, in a foreign investment, should hold majority ownership. The new arrangement offers the foreign company the opportunity to own up to 75 percent of the joint venture provided Turkish employees own 25 percent. If the joint venture would be with an ordinary Turkish firm, foreign ownership would be limited to 49 percent.

In the past, the foreign investor was worried that he might not be permitted to remit his dividends or repatriate his capital upon liquidation. The Turkish currency protection law distinguishes in Decree 17 between foreign exchange earnings which must be remitted to Turkey and those whose transfer is not mandatory. Incomes of Turkish employees abroad are considered foreign exchange which need not be remitted to Turkey. Therefore, a foreign company which wants to establish a joint venture with Turkish employees, must make sure that the funds involved are not subject to remittance to Turkey. This, in addition to the agreement for the promotion of reciprocal investment, guarantees to the foreign enterprise that he can remit his dividends income.

A joint venture can also be of benefit to the Turkish employees. They can be partners in both the Turkish and the German enterprise, whereas Turks living in Turkey are only permitted partnership with the Turkish company.

Participation of Turkish employees in the German company is also important for building confidence among German investors not only in terms of risk-sharing, but also because of the long-term aspect of cooperation with Turkish employees. Such a joint venture was formed this year between the Wuppertal yarn bleaching company WGF and the Turkish employee association Merseluks.

Foreign firms are permitted to contribute their used machinery to the employee associations as equity, but the Turkish government then requires the employee association to export up to 50 percent of its output. But this is not a very large obligation in view of job processing orders or the interest of foreign companies in marketing their products in the Near East. Furthermore, 50 percent of export earnings may be kept abroad for future imports; that makes it possible for the group to maintain a reserve of foreign exchange abroad. The import as equity into Turkey of machinery financed from savings of the Turkish employees is also a privilege that is only accorded to employee associations. The right of Turkish employees to import goods without tapping Turkey's foreign exchange reserves is part of the preferential treatment. The only requirement is to

prove to the Turkish Ministry of Finance that two-thirds of the foreign company's total capital has come from savings accumulated by Turkish employees.

The Turkish Planning Office treats employee associations a notch better than other associations. That means that, if the Planning Office promotion list provides that the company may pay customs duties in instalments, the employee association is exempt from paying any duties. For investments that do not enjoy any kind of duty privilege, employee associations may pay customs duties in instalments. In other words, when a foreign investor has a cooperative venture with an employee association, he would enjoy the same privilege as the latter.

#### A Bridge between the Two Countries

Cooperation with a German investor also makes it possible for the employee association to resolve its management, technology and marketing problems.

Employee associations must be viewed in the context of Turkey's relationship with other European countries and the EEC. They are the only kind of social structure that has one foot in the FRG and the other in Turkey. If such cooperative efforts with foreign enterprises continue to expand, they can develop into a bridge between Turkey and the FRG and become an important vehicle for economic development in both countries, not merely because of their investments but also because of their sociological importance in Turkey. Through these relationships and cooperative undertakings in Europe, employee associations in Turkey can make a very crucial contribution to making Turkey once again a well-respected trading partner in Europe.

At a time when German-Turkish relations are as sensitive as they are today because of guest worker policies, the traditional friendship between the two countries cannot be kept alive by sweet talk but must produce practical solutions in the economic area. The FRG and Turkey must make sure that this time they are not going to miss their chance.

7821

CSO: 3620/150

## MEMBERSHIP DATA ON PAN-CYPRIOT LABOR FEDERATION

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 7 Jan 84 pp 1, 9

[Text] The Conferation of Cypriot Workers [SEK] as well as certain other circles are annoyed by the fact that the Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation [PEO] has been and remains the most massive syndicalist organization in Cyprus, with known influence on the working class and the people. This is emphasized in a press release of the PEO Central Organizational Bureau.

The press release contains specific data and figures which show that SEK gives the inspector of unions inflated figures in contrast to PEO which keeps strict control and reports to the authorities only the accurate number of its members.

## The Language of Figures

"PEO and its guilds," according to the press release, "keeping in mind the importance of accuracy on the organizations of the working class have always tried meticulously, seriously and responsibly to provide exact figures on the condition of their members. Otherwise, it would have been a fraud and a deceit not only toward the government and public opinion but also PEO itself and the syndicalist movement."

Under this principle, the PEO unions enroll thousands of new members, yet they do not report to the inspector the corresponding increase because at the end of each year they clear up their lists by removing the names of those who have died or have changed occupation or branch, emigrated or appeared to be listed twice or were not located in order to pay their dues. The data given below for the last 4 years show exactly how responsibly and seriously PEO operates on the question of clearing up the lists and reporting the real figures.

	1979	1980	1981	1982
a) Members at the beginning of the year	52,179	55,781	58,708	60,556
b) Members enrolled during the year	10,882	10,247	9,273	8,530
c) Total number by the end of the year	62,979	66,028	67,981	64,086

	1979	1980	1981	1982
d) Number of names removed	7,198	7,320	7,425	8,060
e) Number of members reported to the guild inspector at the end of the year	55,871	58,708	60,556	60,420

The press release further states:

--PEO and its guilds remove for the reasons mentioned above approximately 7,000 annually.

--PEO and its guilds show an annual increase of approximately 2-3,000.

#### They Do Not Clear Up the Lists

The PEO Central Organizational Bureau raises the question of whether the numbers reported by SEK to the inspector have paid their dues and whether SEK makes the necessary updating of the lists.

Let us see the data given by the SEK guilds themselves to the inspector in the last few years. These data show the membership of all the SEK guilds reported in the years 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982.

	1979	1980	1981	1982
Number in the lists	46,542	44,080	46,780	49,394
Number reported as regular members	36,635	38,138	40,611	48,663

The above data show that SEK reported in 1980 as dues paying members 1,503 more compared to 1979, in 1981 2,473 more than 1980, and in 1982 8,052 more than in 1981.

The question that may be justifiably asked is this: SEK in 1980 reported 1,503 more members than in 1979, and 2,473 more in 1981 than in 1980, and suddenly in 1982 it reported an 8,052 increase. Where did it find so many new members? The reply to this question is that the SEK guilds, or most of them, did not clear up their lists in 1982 as they ought to have done according to their charters and according to law. Instead they reported to the inspector all the members included in their lists, whether they were dead or had changed their occupation or had left for other reasons or were found to have not paid their dues.

This is shown clearly by the same data. For example: While in 1979 the SEK guilds removed from their lists 9,907 members, in 1980 5,949 and in 1981 6,169, in 1982 they removed only 731!!

But to prove more specifically that SEK reports members not in good standing, we give the data reported to the inspector in 1981 and 1982 by six SEK guilds.

	Regular Members	New Members	Listed Members	Regular Members Reported	Removed
	1981	1982	1982	1982	1982
Construction and general workers	9,280	1,426	10,706	10,208	498
Farm and Transportation	4,860	1,646	6,506	6,506	none
Industrial, general workers	9,877	2,754	12,631	12,631	none
Hotel employees	2,876	1,551	4,427	4,427	none
Government workers	4,703	443	5,146	5,146	none
Private employees	1,997	434	2,431	2,431	none

The question which justifiably can be asked by everyone who has elementary knowledge of syndicalist matters is: How is it that not a single member was removed in 1982 from the lists of the guilds of Farm and Transportation, Industrial and General Workers, Hotel Clerks, Government workers and Private employees with 31,000 listed members? Were all 31,000 up to date to be reported to the inspector? And if they were not paid up, why were they reported?

We are very familiar with the conditions of these branches and speaking out of experience we can say without hesitation that at least a few thousand out of the 31,000 no longer existed or were not paid up.

Another detail: The 498 members which appear to have been removed in 1982 from the SEK guild of construction workers came from the Nicosia district. Not a single member was removed from the lists in other districts.

#### A Policy of Discrimination

PEO further expresses regret for the commotion about this subject and concludes:

Since we discuss the strength of PEO and SEK, we must bring up one more basic point. PEO, as is known, is out of the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, the Refinery and the Cypriot Airlines. The reason for excluding them is not that there are no workers who want to join PEO but because in these agencies the syndicalist rights of the workers are violated in the most provocative manner with a scandalous policy of discrimination against PEO and in favor of SEK. Unfortunately this violation of syndicalist rights is perpetuated not only by the directorates of these agencies but also by the SEK leadership itself which even threatens strikes in the event PEO is recognized by these agencies.

7520

CSO: 3521/143

## DETAILS ON UNFAVORABLE 1983 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 4 Jan 84 p 8

[Text] The country's foreign trade balance for the January-December 1983 11-month period shows decline of imports, decline of exports, decline in the influx of invisible items, slight decline of foreign exchange reserves, improvement in the balance of payments and decline in the influx of foreign investment capital. Business spokesmen attribute the decline of imports to the restrictive measures imposed by the government but also to the overall recession of the Greek economy. The decline of exports is attributed to the lesser competitiveness of the Greek products even after the devaluation of 9 January 1983.

In greater detail, the picture of the balance of payments in the 11 months of 1983 compared to that of 1982 is as follows:

--Imports: including fuels, 8,022 million dollars in 1983 compared to 9,251 million dollars in 1982. Excluding fuels, 6,284 million dollars compared to 6,674 million dollars.

--Exports: including fuels, 672 million dollars in 1983 compared to 619 million dollars in 1982, and 727 million dollars in 1981. Excluding fuels, 3,080 million dollars compared to 3,166 and 3,605 million dollars. In other words, the balance of trade shows minus 4,870 million dollars in 1983, 5,466 million dollars in 1982 and 5,994 million dollars in 1981.

--Receipts from tourism in foreign exchange declined in 1983 (11 months) by 23.2 percent compared to a decline of 18.1 percent in 1982. It was 1,123 million dollars in 1983, 1,463 million in 1982 and 1,766 million dollars in 1981.

--Emigrant and worker remittances declined by 12.1 percent in 1983 (11 months) compared to a decline of 3.1 percent in 1982. In absolute numbers, it was 847 million dollars in 1983, 964 in 1982 and 995 million dollars in 1981.

--The influx of EEC funds almost doubled in the 11-month period of 1983, reaching 703 million dollars compared to 421 million dollars in 1982 and 81 million dollars in 1981.

--The influx of private investments declined in 1983 (11 months) by 6.8 percent compared to a decline of 26.5 percent in 1982. In absolute figures it was 261

million dollars in 1983, 280 million dollars in 1982 and 381 million dollars in 1981. The corresponding figure for the influx of capital for the purchase of real estate was 391 million dollars, 303 and 448 million dollars, respectively.

--The foreign exchange reserves at the end of November 1983 were 993 million dollars compared to 1,074 million dollars in 1982 and 1,291 million dollars on the corresponding date of 1981.

7520

CSO: 3521/148

## PERSPECTIVE ON POSSIBLE CENTRIST ECONOMIC POLICY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15-16 Jan 84 pp 1, 9

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou]

[Text] This time there is probably the best chance in the last 2 years to have a decisive shift in economic policy characterized mainly by the abandonment of dogmatic prejudices and the inauguration of a constructive cooperation with the productive classes.

Indeed, a series of signs but in many cases specific information as well show the government leadership seriously pondering the possibility of shifting toward a centrist economic policy. Its only reluctance is concerned with the political cost of replacing certain top ministers, because there is no doubt that with the serious weakening of confidence between the government and the classes, it is impossible to have a change in economic policy without changing the persons who direct it.

This view is gaining ground among the top leaders in the government who are currently studying several alternatives. Some plans will be indicated through the forthcoming partial reshuffle which is expected any day now, while others will be activated later. The fact is, in any event, that Papandreou lately is showing special interest in strengthening his ties with centrist cadres in or out of PASOK, while he has increasingly frequent contacts and discussions with G. Mavros.

Reliable economic circles, however, view with great scepticism the information about a forthcoming change in economic policy, and especially about the possibility of becoming more centrist in orientation since the populist policy [the government] has applied consistently in the last 2 years has gained powerful strongholds in the state machinery. On the other hand, because of the forthcoming PASOK Congress and KKE's strong pressures it is difficult for Papandreou to engage in tactical maneuvers which may be interpreted by the party cadres as jeopardizing the long-term goals of the movements.

At the same time, it has been shown from the signing of the agreement on the American bases and from other previous occasions that whenever Papandreou makes concessions in foreign policy matters in the context of the western alliance he tries to offset the effect on public opinion with leftist overtures in domestic policy thereby reactivating the moratorium with KKE. These days we face a similar case since a solution to the Cypriot problem is now, correctly, sought

in cooperation with the West and especially with the U.S. which alone can press Turkey for concessions and to guarantee any agreements. It appears that the hasty visit Florakis paid to Papandreou in Kastri aimed at warning him that there is no excuse for abandoning his earlier promise that the Soviet Union will be one of the guarantors of any solution to the Cypriot problem.

#### The Premier

In spite of these strong forces which show that a shift to a centrist economic policy is if not improbable at least problematic, the reliable economic circles cannot overlook the precise information that Andreas Papandreou for the first time since becoming premier appears to be truly anxious about the course of the economy. In recent contacts with representatives of the economic and political life he did not hide but instead emphasized his disappointment at the domestic economic developments and confessed that in the past he has been uncertain but now does not believe at all in the assurances of his ministers that the economy will improve soon.

Moreover, for the first time, the premier is accusing some of the economic ministers of being unable to make decisions, while he holds them fully responsible for actions and measures which decisively undermined the climate of confidence and led to a wave away from Greece not only of capital but of the businessmen themselves.

Even more significant is the information that Papandreou is virtually indignant over the situation in the public sector of the economy. The public enterprises go from bad to worse, with snowballing deficits and a worsening quality of the services they offer. The "socialized" private enterprises are even worse. Many are facing bankruptcy.

Papandreou speaks increasingly of the ineptitude of the management of public and socialized enterprises, for the shortage of good managers in the public sector. It is said that when a large private enterprise came recently under state control Papandreou himself said: "The only competent person is its manager who wants to leave and so the enterprise will pass on to the green-guards who will destroy it."

If all this is true, then the premier must indeed be at the threshold of momentous decisions as he has now been convinced that the public sector cannot assume the economic recovery, cannot even guarantee its simple survival.

At the same time, the government cannot ignore that certain strange circles have emerged around the socialized industries. The activities of these circles are already raising many questions. Related to this is the interpellation submitted [to the legislature] by the [New Democracy] deputies St. Dinas, Sot. Papapolitis, Nik. Gelestathis, Dim. Kapelouzos and Mikh. Papakonstandinou. In their question they ask the ministers of national economy and finance to make public information concerning the sums of money paid by the directorates of the socialized enterprises without proper documents. These sums come to billions paid without proper justification on the basis of the laws 1249/1982 and 1326/1983 which allow tax-free and taxable deductions on exports and gross revenues. The deputies ask the

appropriate ministers: "Who are the persons in each enterprise who handle these sums (since their socialization or nationalization) and what is their connection with the PASOK party machinery?"

In addition to all this there is one more reason which supports the view that a shift to a centrist direction is possible. This is the postponement of the parliamentary election. If the election were to take place before or together with the Euro-election, the few remaining months would be heavily loaded with party antagonisms and political passions and so it would be easy for the government to escape its daily problems by intensifying its populist propaganda.

But now that the parliamentary election is moved further away, the government is obligated more than ever to show progress and to try to improve the economy because there is no other way it can stop its rapid decline. Papandreou now realizes that no improvement is possible without the cooperation and support of private enterprise. The key question is whether he will continue a discredited policy or will dare to change course.

Papandreou is probably the most privileged premier of the last decades. He has a strong parliamentary majority and public tolerance unprecedented in our political annals. He is not pushed around by an Opposition which has not recovered from its recent defeat; he has the moratorium with KKE which guarantees social tranquility and above all he has the help of the president of the republic in dealing with the country's foreign problems. Now he is at a critical crossroads and all wait to see which course he will follow in the coming months.

7520

CSO: 3521/148

## GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO FORM FARMING COOPERATIVES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14 Jan 84 p 7

[Article by Kostas Dedes]

[Text] A number of questions are being raised by the aspiration of the Ministry of Agriculture "to integrate" the small agricultural farms above all into cooperatives. This aim is prompted by the conclusions of a special study (program) of the Ministry of Agriculture, according to which "the self-reliant economic survival of the small productive units is doubtful as long as they do not have opportunities to increase their productivity and to improve the marketing conditions for the product which they are growing on a personal basis."

In his statements yesterday to representatives of the press, Minister of Agriculture K. Simitis emphasized that in order for the income of the growers with small farms to be safeguarded, "the farms should be integrated into agricultural cooperatives, where by way of an expansion of their activities the agricultural income is maximized." The minister did not respond to the question of what "integration of the farms into agricultural cooperatives" means, nor to the question of when or in what way this "integration" will take place. He limited himself merely to stating that these questions will be answered soon. But he asserted that given the data of the study there cannot be an agricultural operation of the "managerial type" (that is, that the farmer cannot become a businessman). It should be noted that this scheme for agricultural operations was the goal of the agricultural policy of the New Democracy Party, which maintains that the Greek farmer should take advantage of the achievements of science and technology, as well as of the financing opportunities which are available to him "so as to become a businessman."

## Increase in Productivity

From the data which were made public, it is clear that between 1974 and 1981 the growth of agricultural operations was sensational. And this is because whereas in the 1972-1974 period some 37 percent of the farms were viable (that is, were able to show some income) and 63 percent were deemed not viable, at the end of 1981 these percentages were 75 percent and 25 percent, respectively. This increase took place despite the minimal rise--as is shown in the table--in the gross private investments and at the same

time the drop, in terms of actual prices, in public investments within the agricultural sector. In any case, it should be stated that the gross agricultural product--at constant prices--showed only a small increase in the interval 1974-1981, in contrast to the prices which the growers obtained, which it should be noted improved significantly (in the following table, the figures are expressed in millions of drachmas):

Year	*Gross agricultural product	Private investments	Increases in prices obtained (1976 = 100)	Increases in prices with costs factored in
1974	53,672	4,362	15 %	44.8%
1975	56,733	5,024	9.9%	2.6%
1976	55,971	4,938	18 %	9.6%
1977	51,830	5,678	14 %	12.9%
1978	57,214	4,785	13 %	8 %
1979	54,378	5,237	17.8%	20.1%
1980	60,650	3,960	21.9%	34.7%
1981	58,180	3,730	24.3%	23.4%

\*At constant 1970 prices. Source: National Accounts

As far as agricultural income is concerned--that is, the income which is disposable by the farmer for the needs of his family as well as the needs of the operation--according to the study it amounted "to 396,697 drachmas for the average agricultural operation in 1981. If from this income we subtract the payment on the land and the remaining invested capital, the result is that the labor income of the farming family in 1981 came to 143,382 drachmas per year on the average." The income in the small agricultural operations is smaller, of course.

From these data, the ministry comes to the following conclusions:

Firstly. A comparison of labor income between the agricultural sector and the other sectors of the economy is still seen to be less favorable for the agricultural sector.

At this point it would be useful for us to mention that the average income per stremma per year for various farms is the following: For the extensive operations (wheat, cotton, tobacco, and so forth), 6,472 drachmas (458,000 drachmas per farm). For horticultural and flower operations, 27,873 drachmas (748,000 per farm). For viniculture, 9,434 drachmas. For citrus trees, 11,076 drachmas. For olives, 2,484 drachmas. For other fruit trees, 7,488 drachmas (471,000 drachmas per farm).

From these data it follows that the income differences among the various growers are large. The olive growers are in the most disadvantageous position (income per farm is 190,000 drachmas per year).

Moreover, the annual income per livestock operation comes to 300,000 drachmas.

From the data which refer to the income per stremma and from the average income per farm, the farmer can calculate whether his farming unit is considered to be large, of average size, or small.

Secondly. The independent economic survival of these small productive units is doubtful. It is this fact, in conjunction with the familiar general structural problems of Greek agriculture--which have to do with the small size and the multiple parceling out of the agricultural operations--which supports the position that "these farms should be integrated into cooperatives."

12114

CSO: 3521/151

## BRIEFS

GREEK SHIPBUILDING IN USSR--The possibility of building ships in the Soviet Union and paying for them with Greek products was the main subject discussed between the Union of Greek Owners of Passenger Ships [EETP] and a Soviet Union delegation which has been in Athens since last Monday. A second issue discussed was the illegal competition the Soviet cruiser ships impose on the Greek ones. No agreement was reached. The Soviets insisted that their fares will continue to be low but "will avoid taking on passengers from Greek ports." The delegation visited Merchant Marine Minister G. Katsifaras and N. Skoulas, secretary of the Greek Tourist Organization. A ministry announcement said that there exist margins for cooperation. Last night, EETP President Andreas Potamianos gave a reception for the Soviet delegation. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Jan 84 p 2] 7520

CSO: 3521/156

## FINANCIAL BACKING, INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE HOUSING

## Support for Modest Housing

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Jan 84 pp 1, 11

/Text/ The proposed housing law which would replace the Law on Public Housing and would seek to alleviate the current housing shortage through business activity at the corporate level allows for the seizure of real estate by the General Directorate of Real Estate. The law stipulates that the General Directorate would have to pay for any property that is subject to seizure. The law also provides for the extension of "interim finance credit" to companies.

Several provisions are included within the law. Vacant lots that are located in residential areas and that belong to the General Directorate will be subject to priority classification or sale. Vacant lots that have earlier been designated for public facilities or services will be transferred to the appropriate public agencies at cost. Sixty five percent of public trust funds within this sector will be used as incentives for construction credit savings while 23 percent of the funds will be used for purposes of lot purchasing and infrastructure financing. In addition, 10 percent of the funds will be used for credit to be provided to housing associations and manufacturers of construction materials while 2 percent will be used for research, development and technology transfer.

Persons wishing to purchase a dwelling will be able to start a special savings account at any bank. These accounts will draw current interest rates and the interest that is earned will be tax free. Persons that open such accounts will deposit 10 percent of the cost of a dwelling for dwellings that measure up to 60 square meters, 15 percent for dwellings measuring from 60 to 75 square meters, 20 percent for dwellings measuring from 75 to 85 square meters and 25 percent for dwellings measuring between 85 and 100 square meters. Persons opening such accounts will have to deposit 20 percent of the cost of a 60 square meter housing unit and 35 percent of the cost of a unit measuring between 60 and 100 square meters during the 2 years in

which their units are under construction. If individuals change their minds about the purchase of a unit, others will be able to purchase these units on credit or on a cash basis. Each individual would be entitled to purchase only one unit through the use of a special savings account. According to the law, constructors who are building the housing units on behalf of the depositors will be able to obtain credit from the fund. This credit will be available for 80 percent of the construction cost of housing units measuring up to 60 square meters and 65 percent of the cost of housing units measuring between 60 and 100 square meters. According to the law "the credit will be utilized as necessary by banks that offer savings accounts geared towards housing credit". Interim financing credits will not accrue interest. Moreover, construction credits at the beginning of a construction project will also be available if such credit is approved by the Superior Council on Housing. No payments will be collected in connection with such credit grants for a period of two years.

Housing credit accounts will be started for those who fulfill the necessary conditions. Interim finance costs will be deducted from these credits and the remainder of the sum in question will be paid to persons who are entitled to housing credit accounts. The difference between market interest rates and housing credit savings will be returned in equal installments each year over a period of 20 years for units measuring up to 60 square meters and 15 years for larger units. Banks may receive five percent incentive interest in connection with such credits.

#### Housing Investment Discount

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 3 Jan 84 pp 1, 6

/Text / Finance and Customs Minister Vural Arikan has announced that a 100 percent investment discount will be provided in connection with investments in the housing sector. Arikan also stated that the building construction tax is to be abolished. In a statement he made yesterday as a guest speaker at the Research Center of the Istanbul University Faculty of Economics, Finance and Customs Minister Arikan discussed projected modifications to the tax system. As he spoke about incentives that are to be provided to the housing sector through such modifications, Arikan said: "As an incentive to housing construction, we will provide a 100 percent discount to whoever enters this field." Arikan also indicated that the building construction tax which had recently been increased will be eliminated in its entirety.

As he listed the advantages that will be provided to the construction sector by the new modifications brought to the tax

system, Arikan said that no real estate purchase tax will be collected from persons who erect buildings on lots that they own and that taxes, photographs and fees connected with housing credits will be eliminated. Arikan also announced that purchase taxes collected through the sale of steel, cement hygienic facilities and basic materials used in housing construction will be refunded. In addition, Arikan indicated that the cost incurred by industrial firms that provide housing for their personnel will be taken into account in computations of corporate tax.

Arikan spoke about additional fiduciary changes. According to his statement, real estate tax will be subject to general assessment based on value and rates will be adjusted on the basis of mills. Implementation will begin on 1 January 1985. All tax transactions will be centralized at one office and all tax payers will be provided with a tax number and a tax booklet. Agencies such as post offices and banks will be empowered to receive tax payments and automation will be introduced. Companies investing within underdeveloped regions will be exempted from taxes and fees pertaining to the establishment of a business. A similar exemption will be brought to the field of housing construction. A 100 percent tax deduction and a 10 year exemption will be introduced in connection with real estate tax. Authorization to increase personal deduction limits will be obtained from parliament. The sale of certificates including stocks will be fully tax exempt. Work in connection with value added tax is to be completed and implementation is to begin on 1 January 1985.

9491

CSO: 3554/122

## HEADS OF OIL, ELECTRIC POWER FIRMS ON ENERGY POLICIES

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 11 Jan 84 p 11

[Article by Katarina Koivisto: "Neste and IVO in Energy Debate--Sufficient Oil--More Electricity Needed"]

[Text] The use of light fuel oil during recent years has reduced by almost one and one-half million tons, one-half million tons of which are because of households which have connected to electric heating. Now we have reached a situation where consumption of oil products no longer is increasing here at home, and the ceiling for what we can export is beginning to be reached.

That was said by the managing director of Neste, Jaakko Ihamuotila, as he warned about something which he called overinvesting in other energy sectors. Finland is one of the countries which are least dependent on oil; about 37 percent of our energy requirements are satisfied with oil, while the figures in most other West European countries are well over 40 percent.

"Oil today is such a competitive form of energy that we do not need any more large new investments in other energy areas," said Ihamuotila.

He believes that there is clear competition between his firm and the electricity firm Imatran Voima (IVO).

#### Do Not Replace Oil

Small houses are the area in which competition is the hardest, and Ihamuotila well understands that new small houses are choosing electricity or remote heat. But to replace an oil heating system with electric heat in older houses he considers unwise, since an older house already has all of the basic investment which oil heat requires.

"It is good to have competition between different forms of energy, but it is not healthy if it leads to overinvestment just in order to increase a market share."

## Natural Gas Replacing Oil

Natural gas is an energy form that Ihamuotila believes in. He hopes that it will capture the part of the market in the heating sector which oil has lost. The entire heating sector represents about one-fourth of our energy consumption.

Before negotiations with the Soviet natural gas exporter Sojuzgasexport, Ihamuotila said that there is fairly wide agreement on how the price of natural gas will be decided in relation to other energy substances.

"Natural gas has no world market price, therefore the setting of prices is more problematical. For us it must have a price which can compete with other forms of energy."

## Nordic Cooperation

Today Neste exports both gasoline and light fuel oil to Sweden, something which offends gasoline circles in Sweden. There is no reason for this said Ihamuotila. Finnish exports comprise only four percent of Swedish imports, and Neste sells to Swedish oil companies.

But our national oil company also has other interests on the Swedish market. On the west coast Neste has purchased a petrochemical industry and battery production. In the production there are two firms, Neste and Norsk Hydro, while the Swedes themselves continue with the manufacture with the manufacture of ethylene.

Ihamuotila called the project, "The best kind of Nordic cooperation."

## Own Oil

Oil exploration is also part of the activities of the firm. Recently an oil crew made a discovery where Neste is in the North Sea.

Neste has an oil exploration crew in order to expand its activity as an oil company. That is because there is a certain concern that we may not be able to get Soviet oil, said Ihamuotila. But the profitability for a company which deals with finished refined products is low, since prices on the world market continue to decline. Crude oil trading, on the other hand, is fairly stable, and oil exploration is also a link in the effort for a more integrated oil company.

Ihamuotila denies that this could be an overinvestment by Neste, when we already have more oil than we need. Just a fraction of the company's investments are used for oil exploration.

During the past 5 years Neste has developed into an oil company in which 40 percent of the sales come from the export sector and through companies

abroad. That development will continue, said Ihamuotila, but half of the activity will continue to be domestic.

#### More Electricity is Needed

Do not count electricity out in Finland, it is just a question of at what price we will produce electricity. According to Imatran Voima (IVO) we will need more electricity at the beginning of the next decade. If there is not a new power plant, then electricity must be produced in other ways. A large power plant is needed in any case.

The managing director of IVO, Kalevi Numminen, is concerned that his company has become the scapegoat in the debate over a new nuclear power plant.

"We have just made our expertise available when it came to calculating which form of energy would be the most advantageous. Then we produce electricity in the way we can and charge the price it costs us to do so," he explained.

Numminen denies that this should cause any great energy competition between the two national companies IVO and Neste. The competition exists in the small private houses, which must choose between electricity and oil heat. The small houses comprise only about five percent of the total energy market, but they pay large sums for their energy.

According to Numminen the market sector which IVO and Neste are competing for is still smaller, because most of the small houses today choose electricity. Those which remain to compete for are the older small houses which must either renovate their oil heating systems or change over to another system.

"It is clear that marketing is the hardest in that sector where there is the greatest competition," said Numminen. "But IVO itself does not participate directly in marketing electricity as heat, it is the local electric companies which do that."

Electric companies offer heating electricity cheaper than other electricity, and a couple of electric companies also offer the first electricity free to a consumer who connects to an electric heat network. Numminen says that the discounts are easy to understand. Once the electric company has connected the cable to a house there is no extra cost to send the electricity for heating along the cable. The greatest expense for the local electric company consists in buying the electricity, and laying out and maintaining the network.

#### No Discount

Numminen emphatically denied that IVO would grant any discounts on the price of electricity.

"We are a wholesale firm and we sell electricity at a wholesale price which is the same for all. All discounts are paid for out of the pockets of the electric companies."

When speaking of competition Numminen points out that competition is much harder between the different electric companies than between IVO and Neste. IVO would rather sell electricity to more industries and electric companies.

Today about 40 percent of the electricity we consume comes from IVO and other national power companies such as Kemijoki and Oulunjoki, the rest comes from private companies such as for example industrial power; industry produces much electricity, and the local electric companies also have significant production.

#### Own Areas

Electricity can be produced by using coal, oil, peat or nuclear power. Wind power or chips are other possibilities, although not much used here.

Electricity and oil have their own areas of usage in which they can not compete with each other, explained Numminen, so therefore the competition between IVO and Neste is not so hard.

"Automobiles are always going to need gasoline, just as lamps and appliances need electricity. Electricity and oil will never replace each other."

Numminen sees natural gas primarily as a form of energy which produces heat. It does not compete with electricity either. Electric heat is suitable mainly only for small houses, while high rises and densely populated areas use oil and remote heating. Natural gas will never replace nuclear power, because before it would be a savings for a small house to use natural gas for energy, the house must be located by a natural gas pipeline.

Today about one-third of our small houses are heated with electricity, and most of the rest are heated with oil. But according to Numminen, at the end of the century the situation will be the opposite.

9287

CSO: 3650/104

## ENERGY MINISTER ON FRENCH INTERNATIONAL OIL POLICY

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French No 421, 9 Jan 84 p 48

[Article by Jean Auroux, Energy Minister: "To Avoid Lowering the Price of Oil."]

[Text] France wants peace. She seeks it in all the theaters of world politics. France also wants peace in the world of economics. In the energy area, my area of responsibility in the government, everyone appreciates the importance of the stakes and the role we have to play, especially during the current year, with the leadership of the EEC.

In the area of oil, we want to avoid a lowering of prices, and encourage the stabilization of the market. The lowering of oil prices can be explained, in part, by a decrease in the world demand for energy; France does not escape this phenomenon which covers two aspects of reality. On the one hand, the long-lasting slow-down in economic activity associated with the world crisis, and on the other hand, a structural change in productions and products. This is why France practices, and recommends for her international partners, a policy of control of energy.

The relaxation of the market is also due to the development of oil production. Inasmuch as this new oil is more expensive to produce, an interruption of these efforts could lead to renewed tension on the market. The stability of the oil market is therefore critical: that is the idea that we are attempting to share with all our partners. It is this idea which will enable developing countries to start production programs that they can reasonably expect to make profitable and which will allow industrialized countries to confirm their programs of control and diversification of energy. It will allow long range budget planning in the oil and associated areas, and finally, it will allow the end-user, private or industry, to make his choice with full knowledge of the alternatives. This need for stability is beginning to be recognized and accepted, but the means to achieve it are not yet known. Thus, our main concern is to improve the dialog between producers and consumers.

Behind this concern lies, in fact, the problem of distribution of the petroleum profits. Since the second world war, the shares assigned to the producer, the distributor, and the consumer, have changed according to the

distribution of strength. In order to reach our objectives, the distribution will have to be based on the real needs and thus acquire the desired permanency. Stability will require, in addition, that a part be dedicated to the development of production capabilities and storage, which are the regulators of the markets. Solidarity and justice would require that a part of the profits be also dedicated to the development of the less privileged countries. Everyone knows that France is particularly sensitive to these questions. The solution which will be difficult to find will require the sacrifice of some specific interests which, as experience showed, are really more or less precarious.

Faced with these difficulties, an institutionalized dialogue does not necessarily appear as the best solution and new types of cooperation between producers and consumers, limited but concrete, may be sought. The producers desire to be involved in the whole of the oil process, seems to me destined to become an important element during the coming years. It will also be necessary for the consumer not to be, and even more not to perceive himself to be in a situation of greater dependency, or energy diversification could be accelerated at the expense of carbohydrates.

In any case, the stakes are too important, both from the energy and the economic points of view as well as from the political point of view, for France not to be interested. She will not let any initiative escape, and will be present whenever she can further constructive dialogue bearing the promise of growth and peace.

9445

CSO: 3519/176

## MULTI-FRONT ATTACK ON ATHENS POLLUTION

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 8 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by A. Alexandropoulos]

[Text] Through the "tidying up" of about 8,000 cottage industries, repair shops, and so forth--which constitute 8,000 small local sources of pollution, contamination, and noise--a new effort is beginning, the "fourth front," against the haze which now constantly torments Athens. At the same time, measures are being expedited for controlling the three other major sources of pollution of the Athens atmosphere: Industry-automobiles-central heating for buildings. Positive results are being seen mainly with respect to the last source, the heating systems: Compared to last year, the percentage of conservation measures for the 80.1 million [sic] central heating facilities in the Attiki plain has increased by 50 percent, and the sensitization of the public is continually increasing.

The authorities of PERPA [Athens Pollution and Environment Control Program] are optimistic, predicting that if this rate continues, in the 2 years 1984 and 1985 the emissions of soot from chimneys will decrease by 40 percent and the concentration of sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere will decrease by 20 percent. Also the diesel used for these heating systems will decrease by 60,000 tons (with a value of 1.5 billion drachmas); the present consumption comes to 450,000-500,000 tons per year.

In more detail:

1. The decree modifying Presidential Decree 791/81 is expected to be published soon in the Efimeris tis Kyverniseos [Official Gazette], at which time, among other things, the 8,000 cottage industries of the Attiki plain will be obligated to comply with the terms of their permits (weaving shops, dyers' shops, foundries, garages, automobile repair shops, machine shops, and so forth). Up to now, these have been contaminating, polluting, and causing noise pollution in their areas.

2. The campaign by YKhOP [Ministry of Zoning, Housing, and Environment] regarding central heating has begun to pay off. According to data from PERPA taken from last year's sampling survey in various areas of the plain having differing social compositions (Kolonaki, Aigaleo, the commercial center, Peristerion, and elsewhere), it follows that 50 percent of the

installations are not being maintained, only 30 percent are well maintained, and 20 percent are tolerable. The average efficiency of these installations is only 60 percent (with fluctuations between 40 and 92 percent), which means that 40 percent of the energy of these heating systems is being lost.

3. As for industry: In February or in March at the latest, PERPA will announce a second package of antipollution measures (the first was announced in November) for certain categories of industrial plants for which the special studies have been completed. These are metallurgical industries, battery-manufacturing plants, dry cleaners, foundries, textile mills, and others, for which a number of immediate low-cost measures will be proposed (for example, for the reduction of emissions of hydrocarbons, dust). At the same time, the implementation of the November measures is beginning which are aimed at reducing dust and smoke in the industries, and in June antipollution measures will be announced for all industries in the Attiki plain. The major problem remains unresolved: Which and how many plants will be relocated.

12114

CSO: 3521/152

## AUTHORITIES CONCERNED OVER ALUMINUM PLANT POLLUTION

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Jan 84 p 2

[Article: "Conclusions of Pollution Study in ISAL: Dust and Fluoride Pollution More than before Vats Were Closed"]

[Text] The conclusions of the pollution study conducted in the Straumsvik aluminum plant 24 October through 3 November 1983, which were published yesterday, are that there is too much dust pollution in the vats and that fluoride pollution could cause problems in certain jobs. It also comes forth that this pollution has not decreased from what measurements showed before the closing of the vats began and that the fluoride strength in the urine of workers is greater now than at that time. Other pollution, such as sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrogen fluoride, is minor. The pollution in the vats forces the workers to wear dust masks to reduce the risk of respiratory diseases according to the joint news release from the State Work Safety Board and ISAL [Icelandic Aluminum Plant], but the pollution study was conducted on behalf of the State Safety Board in cooperation with the ISAL Health, Sanitary and Safety Board.

The report is now under study by the plant management and plant employees. The news release states that according to these conclusion, it will be necessary to make improvements in working conditions in order to reduce pollution and to ensure that the closing of the electrolytic disassociation vats will give the environmental results that were planned for the workplace. In order to accomplish this, a new plan will be prepared soon for these improvements as well as continuing the measures that are already in effect, in states in the news release.

It comes forth, among other things, in the report that the study consisted of 185 air samples taken from the workers' working environment; besides, measurements were made of the condition of the air, light and noise. Measurements were also made of fluoride in the urine of workers. These measurements were compared with results which were obtained before closing

the vat. The results are also compared with those obtained at similar aluminum plants in Norway.

As mentioned above, the main conclusions are that there is far too much dust pollution in the vats and fluoride pollution seems greater than in comparable Norwegian aluminum plants. It states further in the report that it came to light that dust and fluoride pollution had not decreased from what tests showed before the closing of the vats and that fluoride strength in urine is higher now than at that time. The test studies showed that 9 percent of the 111 workers who were tested had fluoride content in their urine above the 7 mg/l level. The pollution of hydrogen fluoride alone, carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide is generally well below the accepted level according to the conclusions stated in the report.

The main effects on health from pollution found in vats in aluminum plants are listed in the report together with an outline of the activities that take place in the ISAL vats and some suggestions that will have to be considered when decision on improvements will be made. The conclusions of the measurements and studies that were conducted are to be found in documents accompanying the report.

It also comes forth in the report that the State Safety Board has received one to three reports annually from doctors about work-related diseases among ISAL workers. As of 1977 ISAL has sponsored regular measurements of dust and fluoride pollution among workers in the vats and since 1979 these measurements have been conducted twice a year. It is also reported that in 1977 an agreement was made between Icelandic authorities and owners of the aluminum plants about the time limit for installing a filtering system that, among other things, would collect and clean smoke from the electrolytic disassociation vats. That work was finished in the beginning of March 1982 and that work consisted, among other things, of closing all the vats with special covers which were supposed to ensure that more than 90 percent of the vat smoke would be sucked into filtering stations. This filtering system was also meant to achieve another main goal, that is, to improve the working accommodations for the workers in the vats.

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